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INTRODUCTION
The explosive growth of the cable television industry in the United
States during the past two decades has engendered a provocative new
social dilemma: the transmission of sexually explicit programs over
cable into communities and homes where cable television is desired, but
sexually explicit programming is not. Legislation designed to respond
to this problem has stimulated litigation raising an important question
of constitutional law: Does state and local regulation of nonobscene,
but indecent, sexually explicit programming over cable television violate
the first amendment or the supremacy clause of the Constitution? The
purpose of this article is to review the cases and commentaries which
have addressed this issue and to propose a model of analysis for assess-
ing the constitutionality of cable television indecency regulations. The
article leads to two important, albeit unexpected, conclusions. First,
reasonable regulation of sexually explicit indecent cable television pro-
gramming is permissible under the first amendment. Second, state and
local indecency regulations are not preempted by federal law.
Part I of this article describes the societal context in which the con-
stitutional question arises, including the recent growth of cable televi-
sion and of sexually explicit cable programming, the public controversy
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over sexually explicit "indecent" cable programming, and the enact-
ment of laws regulating sexually explicit cable programming. Part II
contains a review and criticism of the cases and commentaries which an-
alyze whether laws regulating nonobscene, but indecent, cable television
programming are constitutional. Part III presents and applies a model
of first amendment analysis for assessing the constitutionality of cable
television indecency regulations. Part IV examines whether state and
local regulation of indecent cable television programming violates the
supremacy clause of the Constitution, and explains why state and local
cable indecency regulations are not preempted.
I. THE COMING OF AGE OF CABLE TELEVISION
A. The Rise of Cable Television and Indecent Cable Programming
Cable television has experienced incredible growth during the past
two decades. In 1963, two decades after the first cable television system
began operating in this country, 2 there were approximately 1,000 cable
television systems in operation serving approximately 950,000 subscrib-
ers.3 By 1973, more than 2,900 cable systems were in operation serving
approximately 7.3 million subscribers. 4 In just ten years the number of
cable television systems had increased by nearly thirty percent and the
number of subscribers had grown by more than 700 percent. During
the next decade the number of cable systems again doubled; the number
of subscribers quadrupled. By mid-1983 there were 5,748 cable televi-
sion systems in operation in the United States serving an estimated 31.7
million subscribers. 5
In the same year, cable "penetration" reached 38 percent of all
homes with television sets in the United States.6 ByJanuary, 1985, cable
penetration was at 43.7 percent, viewed in more than 37.2 million
homes. 7 It is estimated that cable penetration will reach fifty percent by
1988.8
Of course, the financial investments in the cable television industry
and the potential return on those investments are staggering. In 1984,
cable operators spent $1.138 billion to build, rebuild and upgrade cable
plants.9 That same year, however, cable system operating revenues to-
2. REPORT OF THE SLOAN COMMISSION ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, ON THE CABLE:
THE TELEVISION OF ABUNDANCE 24 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SLOAN COMM'N REP.].
3. TELEVISION DIGEST, INC. TELEVISION & CABLE FACTBOOK No. 52, CABLE & SERVICE
VOLUME 1735 (1984) [hereinafter cited as TELEVISION & CABLE FACTrOOK.]
4. Id.
5. Smith, Reporter's Notebook: Cable Meeting, N.Y. Times,June 18, 1983, § 4, at 48, col.
5 [hereinafter cited as Smith, Reporter's Notebook]. See also Hooking Up to Cable Households,
TIME, Apr. 18, 1983, at 68. By mid-1984 there were 6,400 cable television systems in
operation in the United States. TELEVISION & CABLE FACTBOOK, supra note 3, at 1735.
6. Smith, Reporter's Notebook, supra note 5, § 4, at 48, col. 4. See also Nielsen Charts Cable
Universe at 35r& Penetration, BROADCASTING, Jan. 10, 1983, at 92.
7. Nielsen: U.S. Penetration Reaches 43.7 Percent, CABLEVISION, Jan. 14, 1985, at 17.
8. Cable Industry Growth Chart, CABLEVISION, May 13, 1985, at 48.
9. Dawson & Capuzzi, Slow but Steady: The New Era in CA TV Construction. CABLEVI-
SION, Mar. 4, 1985, at 30.
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tailed $8.4 billionl 0 and industry profits reached $600 million.'' A 1984
study of 226 companies involved in ten different segments of the com-
munications industry revealed that cable and pay television led all other
segments of the industry in overall financial performance in 1983.12
Today cable television system operators can offer subscribers doz-
ens of television channels, clear cable delivery of broadcast television
channels, programs produced by the local cable system, and exclusive
entertainment and information channels produced for cable television
by independent "cable networks." In 1982, forty-seven different cable
"networks" offered a variety of specialty programming channels to local
cable system operators, including: all-sports, all-news, all-music,
children's entertainment, religious programming, Spanish language
programming, ethnic-oriented programming, family-oriented enter-
tainment, variety entertainment, first-run movies and sexually-oriented
programming. 13 More than sixty additional cable networks are cur-
rently being planned.
14
The exploitation of sexual programming to attract subscribers has
been almost as dramatic as the growth of cable television. Initially, cable
systems functioned primarily to facilitate reception of broadcast televi-
sion in areas where residential antenna reception was poor.'- Sexually
explicit programming was not a significant problem because federal law
forbids obscene or indecent utterances on broadcast television. 16 The
key, however, to the recent growth of the cable television industry has
been its ability to offer alternative programming not available on broad-
cast television, which traditionally has been largely unregulated.'
7
10. Kahn, Study Predicts Cable Industry to Flourish, CABLEVISION, June 10, 1985, at 11.
11. In 1985 it was predicted that industry revenues in 1990 would exceed $16 billion
and profits would reach $1.7 billion annually. The prospects for healthy returns on cable
television system investments remain very promising. Id.; see also Roberts, Financial Aspects
of Cable Television in a New Era in CABLE TELEVISION IN A NEW ERA 51 (P.L.I. 1983).
12. The survey found that cable and pay TV led all other segments of the communica-
tions industry in compound annual growth between 1979 and 1983. In 1983, cable's reve-
nue growth rate was more than twice that of the next highest group, which was the
advertising segment. In 1983, the cable segment ranked in the top three in all other meas-
ures of growth. Its operating margins were the second best in the communications indus-
try; its cash flow margins were the best. Russell, Cable, Pay TV Lead the Pack in Growth Rate,
CABLEVISION, Dec. 17, 1984, at 36. According to the report, cable and pay television com-
panies achieved compound annual revenue growth of 45.1 percent in the period between
1979 and 1983. Id.
13. Wheeler, Cable Television: Where It's Been, Where It's Headed, 56 FLA. BARJ. 228, 230
(1983). See generally Waters, Cable TV: Coming of Age, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 24, 1981, at 44 [here-
inafter cited as Waters, Coming of Age].
14. Davis, Current Regulatory Changes and Business Developments in the United States Commu-
nications Industry, 158 PRACTICING LAw INsTrrTE 9, 40 (1983).
15. SLOAN COMM'N REP., supra note 2, at 24.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982) provides: "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or
profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."
17. Significant restrictions on the authority of the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (the FCC) to regulate the cable television industry were articulated in a series of
Supreme Court cases construing the federal statutes which define the regulatory authority
of the FCC. See, e.g., FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979); United States v.
Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392
U.S. 157 (1968). The FCC's jurisdiction over cable is limited to that "reasonably ancillary
[Vol. 63:4
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Thus, largely unhampered by federal regulations, 18 some cable system
operators have opted to exploit sexual programming for profit.
For the most part, obscene "hard-core" pornography has not been
shown on public cable television systems, but "soft-porn" has been
available on cable television in a variety of formats. On a few local cable
systems, notably in New York City, basic cable service has included such
programs as "Midnight Blue" which features "topless dancers, sado-
masochistic skits and visits to nudist colonies featuring full frontal expo-
sure," 19 "Men and Films" which features "takeouts from gay movies,"
20
and "The Ugly George Hour of Truth, Sex and Violence" in which "a
former porn-film actor ... roams the city with a portable videotape cam-
era, brashly inviting strange women to come to his studio and disrobe
before his lens."'2 1 Additionally, at least six "cable networks" purport-
edly feature exclusively sexual programming.2 2 In 1983, sex-network
channels were available as an extra-tier, additional charge service, in
2,000,000 homes over cable television. Some cable television systems
even feature hard-core, "X-rated" movies.
2 3
The major source of sexually explicit cable programming, however,
is not the basic local access channels or even the sex-networks but the
to the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regula-
tion of television broadcasting." Id. at 178.
It is important to note that these restrictions are statutory. In October, 1984, Con-
gress enacted the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 which, inter alia, prohibits the
transmission over cable television of "any matter which is obscene or otherwise unpro-
tected by the Constitution .... Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-549, § 639, 98 Stat. 2780, 2801; see infra notes 344-410 and accompanying text. The
contrasts between the regulation and sexual exploitation of broadcast and cable television
programming are noted in ATrORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL RE-
PORT 282-83 (1986).
18. This is not to say that the cable industry has been totally unregulated in other
respects. In fact, the absence of preempting federal regulations of the cable television
industry created a void which agencies of state and local governments rushed to fill. The
resulting patchwork quilt of confusing, sometimes overlapping, often inconsistent, local
regulations is one of the primary reasons the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
was enacted. S. REP. No. 67, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-11 (1983); see infra notes 349-414 and
accompanying text.
19. See infra note 21.
20. Weinstein, Sex and Cable, CABLEVISION, Feb. 11, 1985, at 28, 32. The utilization of
high-tech telecommunications systems to convey sexually explicit programming was not
entirely unanticipated. For an intriguing and amusing literary forecast, see A. Clarke, I
Remember Babylon, in TALES OF TEN WORLDS 7 (1964).
21. Gunther, Pay TV Sex: How Far Can It Go?. TV GUIDE. Mar. 28. 1981. at 4.5: Waters,
Cable's Blues in the Night, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 24, 1981, at 48 [hereinafter cited as Waters,
Cable's Blues].
22. Id; see also Smith, Battle Intensifying Over Explicit Sex on Cable TV, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3,
1983, at AI, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Smith, Battle Intensifying]. The largest of the cable
TV sex-networks, the Playboy Channel, had 500,000 subscribers and was available on 275
cable systems in 1983. Id. at C22, col. 2. By October, 1984, Playboy reportedly had 457
affiliates with 720,000 subscribers. Taub, Brandman Named to Head Playboy Pr'ograms Inc.,
CABLEVISION, Oct. 29, 1984, at 11.
23. The National Cable Television Association claims that only about a half-dozen
cable systems show X-rated films. Smith, Battle Intensifying, supra note 22, at C22, col. 2. In
1985, an industry spokesperson reported that out of over 35 million total cable subscribers
there were only 700,000 subscribers to channels offering X-rated films. Ross, Pornography
Panel Hears Fox Testimony, CABLEVISION, Oct. 28, 1985, at 30.
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"all-around" movie channels such as Home Box Office (HBO) and
Showtime, which are generally available as an "extra" channel for an
additional fee. These popular general movie channels regularly feature
movies which explicitly portray nude men and women, heterosexual
lovemaking and homosexual activity. 2 4 In fact, forty percent of the mov-
ies shown by HBO on cable TV are reportedly rated "R."12 5 Moreover,
the sexual programming on these channels is not limited to movies.
Showtime, for example, has offered "A New Day in Eden," described as
"a soap opera with nudity."'26 HBO has presented such documentaries
as "Strippers," described by one television critic as "a mindless diver-
sion that provides a convenient showcase for assorted bumps, grinds
and bare breasts." 2 7 Lifetime offers "Good Sex" which features Dr.
Ruth Westheimer "bubbling over with talk about penises and ejacula-
tions" and preaching that "everything will be all right if you're open and
honest and have a good orgasm."
28
B. The Public Controversy and Political Reaction
Not unexpectedly, the offering of sexually-explicit programming
over public cable television has generated considerable controversy.
2 9
A substantial number of the television-viewing adults who desire the ed-
ucational, cultural and entertainment advantages of cable television are
kept from subscribing to cable television services because they do not
want to invite sexually explicit programming into their homes.30 By
24. Smith, Battle Intensifying supra note 22, at Al, col. 2; see also Weinstein, supra note
20, at 30.
25. Smith, Battle Intensifying, supra note 22, at C22, col. 4.
26. Id. at Al, col. 4.
27. O'Connor, Cable Displays a Growing Eagerness to Titillate, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1983,
§ 2, at 25, col. 4.
28. DiMatteo, 'Good Sex' Not Good Enough, CABLEVISION, Sept. 17, 1984, at 24. The
pronounced sexual programming on cable television arguably has had a deleterious im-
pact on broadcast television as well. New York Times television critic John O'Connor has
charged that broadcast television programs have become more sexually explicit in order to
compete with the pandering fare offered on cable. O'Connor, The Networks Flirt With Sexual
Explicitness, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1983, § 2, at 37, col. 1; see also Gunther, supra note 21, at 6,
7.
29. See generally Waters, Cable's Blues, supra note 21; Waters, Coming of Age, supra note
13, at 46; Smith, Battle Intensifying, supra note 22, at Al, col. 1; Gunther, supra, note 21, at 5.
In 1973 the FCC reported that the number of complaints about cable and broadcast
stations presenting offensive programming had jumped nearly thirty-fold in the past two
years. In re Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 41 F.C.C.2d 777, 778 n.5 (1973).
30. Two studies done since 1980 found, respectively, that 25% and 33% of the per-
sons surveyed "said they did not subscribe to [cable television] services because they did
not want their children exposed to some of its programming." Smith, Battle Intensifying,
supra note 22, at C22, col. 4. Even viewers of cable TV "adult programming" believe that
it is too explicit.
On Cable magazine conducted two surveys in March on attitudes about adult
programming on cable. One measured attitudes among adults in 506 cable
households, the other focused only on attitudes among adults in 484 cable house-
holds viewing adult programming. According to the results, viewers of the racier
fare closely agreed with their non-viewing counterparts .. . [a]dult programming,
the majority agreed, should be less explicit. Of the total 990 respondents, 66
percent of the [general cable viewers thought] adult-programs should turn down
the steam; 65 percent of adult-viewers agreed. Both surveys revealed the major-
626 [Vol. 63:4
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1983, it was reported that approximately 100 citizen groups around the
country were attempting to ban or curb indecent or obscene program-
ming on cable television. 3 1 Legislation intended to curb the perceived
problem of "cableporn" has been proposed, and some of it enacted, by
federal,3 2 state, 33 and local lawmakers. 34 Cable operators have been in-
dicted for violating obscenity laws. 3 5 Popular initiative petitions or ref-
erenda have raised the issue in some communities. 3 6 Congressional
hearings have addressed the subject,3 7 and in 1985 the Justice Depart-
ment appointed a national commission to assess the problem. The com-
mission released its report in July of 1986.38
At least nine states and Congress have enacted laws designed to
deal with indecent cable television programming. 3 9 Most of this legisla-
tion has been enacted since 1980. These laws reflect six different ap-
proaches to dealing with the problem of sexually explicit cable
programming: (1) criminal statutes punishing the knowing distribution
of indecent material over cable television systems;40 (2) nuisance statues
imposing "time, place and manner" standards on cable programming;
4 1
(3) statutes requiring cable system operators to provide "lockboxes" to
their customers;4 2 (4) statutes authorizing municipalities or other gov-
ity of cable viewers prefer a separate channel for adult material, and indicated a
preference for local communities to establish adult-programming standards.
Some Like It Hot, But Won't Tell, CABLEVISION May 14, 1984, at 12 [hereinafter cited as
"Some Like It Hot"].
31. Id. at C22, col. 5.
32. See infra, pp. 627-628 and 679-81.
33. See infra, pp. 627-628 and 679.
34. See infra, pp. 627-628 and 679.
35. See infra notes 334-36 and accompanying text.
36. See Weinstein, supra note 20, at 29; see also infra notes 120 and 332.
37. S. 1090, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 5542-48 (1985); see Wolfe, Senators
Blame Cable for "Pornography Invasion," CABLEVISION, Aug. 12, 1985, at 24; see also infra notes
337-40.
38. Pornography Commission Formed, CABLEVISION, May 27, 1985, at 15. In 1986 this
Commission published its report, a two-volume, 2000-page compilation entitled: ATrOR-
NEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT (1986). The report criticized
the sexually-oriented programming on cable television as"highly explicit and offensive to
many." Id. at 283. The report also recommended that Congress enact tougher restrictions
against the transmission of obscene material via cable television. Id. at 434. The Commis-
sion also considered proposals that nonobscene but indecent sexually explicit program-
ming should be banned from cable television, but was "deeply divided" about what type of
regulation, if any, was most appropriate. "[A]s a result there is no consensus among us
that would justify urging the regulation of cable encompassing more than the legally ob-
scene." Id. at 400; see generally id. at 398-400.
39. The states include Arizona, California, Kansas, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Is-
land (since repealed), South Dakota, Utah and Wisconsin; see infra notes 40-45 and 341-43
and accompanying text.
40. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1229 (Supp. 1983) (invalidated in Home Box Office,
Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 986 (D. Utah 1982)); see also Cable Communications Policy
Act of 1984, § 639, 47 U.S.C. 559; § 601, 47 U.S.C. 521 (1984).
41. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1701 to -1708 (Supp. 1983).
42. A "lockbox" is an electronic scrambling device which may be attached to a cable-
connected television set to prevent video reception of specific channels unless a key is
inserted or a code entered. Cable Communication Policy Act of 1984, § 601, 47 U.S.C.
544 (1984). CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53006.4 (West Supp. 1984) (cost to subscribers set at 50
cents per month); N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 829-1 (McKinney 1982) (cost plus 15%); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 134.43 (West Supp. 1983) (no extra fee); see infra note 235 and accompanying text.
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ernmental units to regulate cable television in the public interest;4 3 (5)
statutes immunizing cable operators from liability for transmitting inde-
cent programs which they did not originate;4 4 and (6) statutes prohibit-
ing state agencies or municipalities from enacting regulations which
control the content of cable television programming.
4 5
The seriousness of the problem of indecent explicit television pro-
gramming in the United States is underscored by the fact that it has af-
fected cable television regulation in other countries where the
development of cable television is just beginning. For example, the ex-
ploitation of sex and violence in "some of the programs receivable with-
out restriction on cable channels in the United States" were specifically
criticized as unacceptable in the 1982 report to Parliament investigating
the future of British cable television.4 6 Six months later, the official
White Paper containing the British government's policy recommenda-
tions singled out "adult" channels in the United States and Canada as
prime examples of the type of cable programming that should have "no
place" on cable television in the United Kingdom. 47 Consequently,
43. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, §§ 634(d)(1), 638,
98 Stat. 2780, 2797, 2801 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 554(d)(1), 558 (West Supp. 1985));
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-2006 (1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 9-35-17, 18 (1981); see also R.I.
GEN. LAws § 39-19-8 (1977), repealed by R.I. GEN. LAws § 39-19-8 (Supp. 1983)) (statute
authorizing revocation of cable operator licenses for originating programs that are "offen-
sive to commonly accepted standards of morality and decency" repealed and replaced with
provision authorizing revocation when origination programs which "have been adjudged
by a court of competent jurisdiction to be obscene").
44. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, §§ 611, 612, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 531, 532
(West Supp. 1985). N.J. REV. STAT. § 48:5A-50 (Supp. 1983); see also N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 830
(McKinney 1982).
45. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-510 (Supp. 1983); see also N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 829 (Mc-
Kinney 1982).
46. REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO CABLE EXPANSION AND BROADCASTING POLICY, CMD,
No. 8679, at 24, (1982) [hereinafter cited as CABLE INQUIRY.] While suggesting that the
overall amount of regulation of cable television should be much less than the regulation of
broadcast television, id. at 3, 11, the CABLE INQUIRY concluded that "the traditional broad-
casting requirements relating to taste and decency, and the suitability of programmers for
children likely to be watching, should be imposed on cable operators," id. at 24, for three
reasons. First, the CABLE INQUIRY rejected the argument that cable television was analo-
gous to print publication because, inter alia, "most people still see the carrying of program-
mers into the home [by cable television] as different in kind from the act of going out to
buy a book or a magazine." Id. at 4, 11. Second, the CABLE INQUIRY noted the risk that
without decency standards British cable operators would be tempted to show the kinds of
unacceptable sexually explicit or violent programs which were being offered in the unregu-
lated American cable television market. Id. at 24. Third, the CABLE INQUIRY did not be-
lieve "that 'self-regulation' by the cable industry would be generally acceptable at a time
when cable is establishing itself and when, for example, there are clearly differing views
within the industry itself about the showing of programmes which could be offensive to
many people." Id. at 4. However, the CABLE INQUIRY recommended that programming
on optional extra-cost channels where the subscriber is provided with sophisticated elec-
tronic decoders "to lock out of from his set films of censorship categories which are not
wanted on the subscription channel for the time, while allowing other categories to be
received" should not be subject to the ordinary decency regulations. Id. at 24, 25.
47. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CABLE SYSTEMS AND SERVICES, CMD No. 8866, at 57, 137
(1983) [hereinafter cited as WHITE PAPER]. This WHITE PAPER, prepared by the Home
Office and the Department of Industry, accepted the CABLE INQUIRY'S recommendations
that, while cable television programming generally should not be subject to the same de-
gree of regulation as broadcast television, it "should be subject to the same obligations as
those observed by the broadcasting organizations ... that nothing distributed offends
[Vol. 63:4
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although the Cable and Broadcasting Act enacted by Parliament in 1984
generally implements a broad policy of nonregulation of cable televi-
sion, a notable exception is that cable television services are required to
comply with the same standards of taste, decency and appropriate
scheduling applicable to the highly regulated British broadcast televi-
sion industry.
4 8
II. CASES AND COMMENTARY CONSIDERING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
LAWS REGULATING NONOBSCENE BUT INDECENT CABLE
TELEVISION PROGRAMMING
Although for many years the regulation of other aspects of the cable
television industry has been a matter of litigation 4 9 and scholarly discus-
sion, 50 until 1982 there was virtually no discussion of the constitutional-
ity of attempts to regulate or prohibit cable television systems from
transmitting nonobscene, but indecent, sexually explicit material. 5 1 The
against good taste and decency ... and to have special regard to programmes broadcast
when large numbers or children and young persons are likely to be watching." Id. at 56.
However the WHITE PAPER rejected the suggestion of the Hunt INQUIRY that decency re-
strictions need not apply to subscription channels to which access was controlled by elec-
tronic locking devices. Id. at 57. The government noted "a growing concern that violence
and pornography have already established too strong a presence in our society," and that
it would be "wholly undesirable if, in the face of [the recent legislative] move towards
increased safeguards, cable television was to give a new boost to those who seek to make
money out of the exploitation of sex and violence." Id. The "so called 'adult' channels"
of American cable television were referred to twice: once as an example of the kind of
sexually explicit and violent programming that could be expected to develop in Britain
"unless specifically prevented," and a second time as an example of precisely the kind of
programming which the authorities should not permit on British cable television. Id.
Thus, the WHITE PAPER concluded that "cable operators should have the same duties in
matters such as good taste and decency as those which now apply to [broadcast television],
across the totality of cable channels, with no special exemption for electronically lockable channels." Id.
(emphasis added).
48. The Cable and Broadcasting Act, 1984 ch. 46, § 10, provides, in pertinent part:
(1) the [Cable] Authority shall do all that they can to secure that every licensed
service complies with the following requirements ... (a) that nothing is included
in the programmes which offends against good taste or decency or is likely to
encourage or incite to crime or to lead to disorder or to be offensive to public
feeling ....
49. See generally, FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979)(access channel
regulations; FCC jurisdiction); United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972)
(access channel regulations; FCC jurisdiction); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,
392 U.S. 157 (1968) (regulation of local origination and distant signal carriage; FCCjuris-
diction); WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622 (7th Cir.
1982) (stripping vertical blanking interval of teletext information; copyright): Eastern Mi-
crowave, Inc. v. Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1982) (retransmission of
baseball game; copyright exemption), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983); Home Box Office,
Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.) (pay TV programming regulation), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
829 (1977); Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968) (non-duplication
carriage transmission and FCC Procedural Rules; FCC jurisdiction).
50. See, e.g., Kreiss, Deregulation of Cable Television and the Problem of Access Under First
Amendment, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001 (1981); Davis, Regulation of Cable Television by the Federal
Communications Commission, CABLE TELEVISION IN A NEW ERA 95 (1983); FORD ADMINISTRA-
TION PAPERS ON REGULATORY REFORM, DEREGULATION OF CABLE TELEVISION (1977); SLOAN
COMM'N REP., supra note 2, at 5,
51. One student-authored piece published in 1978 (and only mentioning in a footnote
the Supreme Court's decision in FCC n. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978)) raised the
issue but focused on obscenity. Note, FCC Regulation of Cable Television Content, 31 Rutgers
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issue was obscured by the continuing debate concerning obscenity and
the first amendment. Sexually explicit material generally has been cate-
gorized as either obscene or nonobscene. Since it is well established
that any material that meets the strict Miller definition of obscenity may
be totally banned from all media, 52 attention has primarily focused on
whether cable television programming is obscene. The constitutionality
of regulating sexually explicit programming that is not legally obscene
but which under community standards is patently offensive and inappro-
priate for unrestricted transmission to the general public, has been
largely overlooked by commentators. There exists only one Supreme
Court decision on point, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,53 which involved the
regulation of indecent language broadcast on the radio. It should be
noted, however, that the nature of first amendment protection varies de-
pending on the medium of communication.
54
The constitutionality of regulations restricting the transmission of
nonobscene but indecent sexually explicit material over cable television
systems is an issue whose time has come. 55 The increasing number of
cable television indecency regulations proposed or enacted around the
L. Rev. 238, 262 n. 158 (1978). However, law review writers were not reluctant to com-
ment on the constitutionality of restricting or prohibiting "indecent" communications in
other media. See, e.g., Maltz & Hogue, On Keeping Pigs out of the Parlor: Speech as Public
Nuisance After FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 31 S.C.L. REV. 377 (1980); Powe, American Voo-
doo: If Television Doesn't Show It Maybe It Won't Exist, 59 TEX. L. REV. 879 (1981); Note,
Broadcasting Offensive Programming Under a New Communications Act, 15 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 427 (1980); Note, FCC Empowered to Regulate Radio Broadcasts That Are Indecent But
Not Obscene, 52 TEMPLE L. Q. 170 (1979); Note, Regulating Indecent Speech: A New Attack on
the First Amendment, 41 U. Prrr. L. REv. 321 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Regulating Indecent
Speech].
52. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). A work "which depicts or describes
... sexual conduct" is obscene and may be banned if [1] "taken as a whole, [it appeals] to
the prurient interest," . . . [2] portrays sexual conduct "in a patently offensive way," and
... [3] taken as a whole, "lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value." Id. at
24. See Krattenmaker & Esterlow, Censoring Indecent Cable Programs: The New Morality Meets
the New Media, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 606, 607 n.2 (1983). Indecency regulations are aimed
at sexually explicit programming which may be patently offensive to the community but
which does not fully meet the strict Miller test for obscenity and, thus, may not be banned
under the Miller doctrine. One alternative to the "indecency" approach to regulating sex-
ually explicit and vulgar material on cable television might be to adopt a "variable obscen-
ity" standard; e.g., establish that the standard for obscenity depends upon the medium of
communication used, and thus, allow certain material to be declared "obscene" if trans-
mitted via cable or broadcast television while the same material might not be obscene if
presented in adult movie theaters, on video cassettes, etc.
53. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
54. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 748-50; Metromedia, Inc. v. San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). "Each method of communicating ideas is 'a law unto itself'
and that law must reflect the 'differing natures, values, abuses and dangers' of each
method." Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 501. "Each medium of expression ... must be assessed
for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present its own
problems." Id. at 501 n.8., (quoting Southwestern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
546, 559 (1975)).
55. "Last year [1983] some three dozen First Amendment cases were brought by
cable operators, a surprising handful of which seem to be headed for the Supreme Court.
'There's going to be a veritable explosion of litigation,' says Robert Roper, an attorney
with the N[ational] C[able] T[elevision] A[ssociation]. 'It's happening right now.' " Glad-




country both reflects and engenders deep concerns on the part of the
cable television industry,5 6 government officials, 57 public interest
groups concerned with mass media programming, 5 8 parents, and other
private citizens. 5 9 The courts and legal commentators have finally be-
gun to wrestle with this question in earnest.
A. The Supreme Court's Pacifica Decision
While the Supreme Court has yet to consider the regulation of inde-
cent cable television programming, 60 it has considered the constitution-
ality of government regulation of nonobscene but indecent radio
programming. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation6 ' the Supreme Court up-
held a declaratory order of the FCC which reprimanded the owner of a
radio station that broadcasted a nonobscene but "patently offensive"
adult comedy monologue one afternoon in October, 1973.62
The Supreme Court framed the issue as "whether the First Amend-
56. See National Cable Television Association, Inc., Memorandum to the Industry on Cable System
Carriage of Adult Programming (March, 1982); Gladstone, supra note 55, at 40; Gunther, supra
note 21, at 7-10.
57. See supra notes 32-45 and accompanying text.
58. See generally Cableporn-The Battle Is Joined, The National Decency Reporter
(Uul./Aug., 1982); Libertarians Release Cable Study, CableVision, Mar. 26, 1984, at 45; Ross,
supra note 23, at 30.
59. See generally Deseret News, Mar. 13, 1983, at BI, col. 1 (concern of a private citi-
zens group); Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 1982, at 37, col. 3 (concern of private citizens).
60. The Supreme Court almost considered the propriety of cable television indecency
regulations in 1979 when it decided FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
That case began when a cablecaster filed suit in 1976 in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit to enjoin enforcement of a series of cable television "access rules,"
promulgated earlier that year by the FCC. One provision of the access rules required
cablecasters to promulgate rules censoring indecent programming on access channels.
The Eighth Circuit held that the FCC had exceeded its jurisdiction in promulgating
the rules. Midwest Video Corp. v. F.C.C., 571 F.2d 1025, 1035-45 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd,
440 U.S. 689 (1979). Although the Eighth Circuit also suggested that the censorship pro-
vision violated the first amendment, the Supreme Court did not consider that question
because the FCC had, in the meantime, withdrawn that particular provision and it was not
"in controversy" before the Court. 440 U.S. at 693-94 n.4. Following the Supreme
Court's decision, the Commission not only repealed the "indecency censorship" provision
but declared that the only other regulation proscribing the transmission of indecent or
obscene material over cable television would thereafter be applied "only to programming
which is subject to system operator editorial control." In the Matter of Amendment of
Part 76 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning the Cable Television
Channel Capacity and Access Channel Requirements of Section 76.251. 83 FCC 2d 147,
148 (1980). Later, the FCC rejected a request by the ACLU that it repeal its remaining
indecency regulation. In the Matter of Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules
and Regulations Concerning the Cable Television Channel Capacity and Access Channel
Requirements of Section 76.251, 87 FCC 2d 40 (1981). See infra note 70.
61. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
62. The FCC had received a complaint from a man who had tuned in to the broadcast
while driving in his car with his young son. Id. at 730. After investigation, the FCC did not
impose formal sanctions, but put the declaratory order into the station's license file to be
considered in the event that further complaints were received. The FCC did, however,
clarify its definition of "indecent" and prohibited such programs from being broadcast.
Id. The station appealed to the District of Columbia Circuit which overturned the FCC
order. Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Supreme Court
granted the Commission's petition for writ of certiorari, 434 U.S. 1008 (1978), and re-
versed the judgment of the court of appeals. Mr. Justice Stevens authored the majority
opinion as well as additional comments in which only a plurality joined.
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ment denies government any power to restrict the public broadcast of
indecent language in any circumstances."' 6 3 A majority of the Court
concluded that it did not and upheld the FCC's action as a reasonable
restriction of the time, place and manner of broadcasting indecent mate-
rial. The opinion of the Court, authored by Justice Stevens,64 noted
that the medium through which the message is communicated is impor-
tant for first amendment analysis, and that broadcasting "has received
the most limited First Amendment protection" for two reasons: because
of its "pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans" 6 5 and because
"broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children." 6 6 The time of broad-
cast, public access to the medium, content of program, audience, and
legal sanction were all identified as critical factors which supported the
conclusion that the FCC action did not violate the first amendment.
6 7
The Court concluded with a picturesque, constitutional simile:
As Mr. Justice Sutherland wrote, a "nuisance may be merely a
63. 438 U.S. at 744. In interpreting the term "indecent" used in 18 U.S.C. § 1464
(1976) (making it a felony to utter "any obscene, indecent or profane language by means
of radio communication"), the Supreme Court was satisfied with the colloquial definition,
i.e., "nonconformance with accepted standards of morality." 438 U.S. at 740-41. For a
review of other cases in which the term "indecent" used in section 1464 has been inter-
preted see Comment, Obscenity, Cable Television and the First Amendment: Will FCC Regulations
Impair the Marketplace ofIdeas?, 21 Duo. L. REV. 965, 979-85 (1983).
64. One part ofJustice Stevens' opinion,joined only by a plurality, argued that regu-
lation of some content is constitutionally permissible as a general proposition. 438 U.S. at
744-45.
65. As Justice Stevens explained:
First, the broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the
lives of all Americans. Patently offensive, indecent material presented over the
airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the
home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the first
amendment rights of an intruder. Because the broadcast audience is constantly
tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer
from unexpected program content. To say that one may avoid further offense by
turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the rem-
edy for battery is to run away after the first blow. One may hang up on an inde-
cent phone call, but that option does not give the caller a constitutional immunity
or avoid a harm that has already taken place.
Id. at 748-49 (citation omitted).
66.
Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to
read .... Other forms of offensive expression may be withheld from the young
without restricting the expression at its source .... We held in Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, that the government's interest in the 'well-being of its youth'
and in supporting 'parents' claim to authority in their own household' justified
the regulation of otherwise protected expression. The ease with which children
may obtain access to broadcast material, coupled with the concerns recognized in
Ginsberg, amply justifies (sic) special treatment of indecent broadcasting.
Id. at 749-750 (citation omitted).
67. Justice Stevens emphasized:
This case does not involve a two-way radio conversation between a cab driver and a
dispatcher, or a telecast of an Elizabethan comedy. We have not decided that an
occasional expletive in either setting would justify any sanction or, indeed, that
this broadcast would justify a criminal prosecution. The commission's decision
rested entirely on a nuisance rationale under which context is all-important. The con-
cept requires consideration of a host of variables. The time of day was emphasized
by the commission. The content of the program in'which the language is used will
also affect the composition of the audience, and differences between radio, televi-
sion, and perhaps closed-circuit transmissions, may also be relevant.
id. at 750 (emphasis added).
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right thing in a wrong place,-like a pig in the parlor instead of
the barnyard." Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388
(1926). We simply hold that when the Commission finds that a
pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power
does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene.
6 8
Justices Powell and Blackmun concurred in the judgment and in
most of justice Stevens's opinion, but they filed a concurring opinion to
emphasize that regulations channeling indecent programming to protect
children and the home are constitutional.
6 9
Pacifica is the key to the constitutional question of whether any regu-
lation of nonobscene but indecent sexual programming on cable televi-
sion is constitutionally permissible. The issue turns on whether the
Pacifica principle, which justifies regulation of indecent radio broadcast-
ing, extends to indecent cable television programming.
B. The Decisions of the Lower Federal Courts
To date the constitutionality of regulations prohibiting or restrict-
ing the transmission of nonobscene but indecent sexually explicit mate-
rial over cable television has been addressed in four cases decided by
federal district courts and courts of appeals. 70 Thus far, no court has
68. Id. at 750-51.
69. Justice Powell emphasized:
The Commission's primary concern was to prevent the broadcast from reaching
the ears of unsupervised children who were likely to be in the audience at that
hour. In essence, the Commission sought to "channel" the monologue to hours
when the fewest unsupervised children would be exposed to it ....
A second difference, not without relevance, is that broadcasting - unlike
most other forms of communication - comes directly into the home, the one
place where people ordinarily have the right not to be assaulted by uninvited and
offensive sights and sounds .... Although the First Amendment may require
unwilling adults to absorb the first blow of offensive but protected speech when
they are in public before they turn away .... a different order of values obtains in
the home.
Id. at 757, 759 (Powell, J. concurring).
70. The constitutionality of laws regulating indecent cable television programming
was peripherally discussed in another case decided in 1977. In Midwest Video Corp. v.
FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979), the Eighth Circuit held
that the FCC had exceeded its statutory jurisdiction in promulgating "access regulations"
for cable television, including a requirement that cable operators adopt rules prohibiting
the transmission of obscene or indecent material on access channels. See 47 C.F.R.
§§ 76.252-.256 (1977). The court held that the regulations were not "reasonably ancil-
lary" to the Commission's statutory duty to oversee broadcast television. 571 F.2d at
1037-39. Resting its decision on the Commission's lack ofjurisdiction to enact the regula-
tions, the Eighth Circuit also suggested, without holding, that the censorship provisions
were defective on first amendment grounds. The court noted that the mandatory access
requirements appeared to violate the cablecasters' freedom of speech and suggested that
the indecency censorship provision constituted an unlawful prior restraint. The court em-
phasized the practical difficulties of monitoring content under an open-access system such
as that mandated by the FCC, it criticized the absence of procedural safeguards respecting
prior restraints and noted the serious difficulties cablecasters would face in trying to define
"obscene" and "indecent." Finally, the court noted the practical impossibility ofcablecas-
ters' implementing the Commission's suggestion that "distasteful" programs be transmit-
ted at hours that would "minimize exposure to young children" in so far as cablecasters
would have no control over the scheduling of programs on the access channels. Id. at
1055-58. The court, however, did not suggest that it was unconstitutional per se to regulate
the transmission of indecent material over cable television. Rather, the court saw first
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upheld any cable television indecency regulation.
1. H.B.O
The first reported case to rule on the constitutionality of indecency
regulations applicable to cable television was Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wil-
kinson,7 ' decided by the United States District Court for the District of
Utah in January of 1982. That case involved a challenge to the constitu-
tionality of a Utah statute making it a crime for any person to "know-
ingly distribute by wire or cable any pornographic or indecent material
to its subscribers." ' 72 The plaintiffs' attack was limited to the state's at-
tempt to ban nonobscene, but "indecent" cable television program-
ming. The validity of the proscription against the transmission of
"pornographic" material was not challenged. 73
After a brief review of the history of the regulation of pornographic
material, the court concluded that Miller v. California74 defined the
boundaries of permissible state regulation of sexual material. "States
may not go beyond Miller in prescribing criminal penalties for distribu-
tion of sexually oriented materials. For better or worse, Miller estab-
lishes the analytical boundary of permissible state involvement in the
decision by HBO and others to offer, and the decision by subscribers to
receive particular cable TV programming .... -75 The Utah legislation
was constitutionally defective because it sought "to deal with subject
matter beyond hard-core pornography [banning distribution of sexually
explicit material that was only indecent but not obscene]-to go beyond
Miller-and to do so without any of the safeguards mandated by
Miller." 76
The district court rejected the argument that the state's interest in
protecting children justified the legislation. The court distinguished the
amendment problems in the means employed, not in the objective pursued. The FCC did
not appeal this aspect of the judgment. See supra note 60.
71. 531 F. Supp. 987 (D. Utah 1982).
72. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1229(1) (Supp. 1981).
73. The term "indecent material" was defined by a reference to the following:
(1) Illicit sex or sexual immorality is defined as:
(a) Human genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal;
(b) Acts of human masturbation; sexual intercourse, or sodomy; or
(c) Fondling or other erotic touching of human genitals, pubic
region, buttock, or female breast.
(2) Nude or partially denuded figure means:




(iv) Female breast below a point immediately above the top of
the areola;
(b) Human male genitals in a discernably turgid state, even if
completely and opaquely covered.
531 F. Supp. at 995-96 n.16; see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1227 and § 76-10-1229(4)
(Supp. 1981).
74. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Seesupra note 52.
75. 531 F. Supp. at 994-95 (emphasis in original).
76. Id. at 995.
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Supreme Court's pre-Miller decision, Ginsberg v. New York, 7 7 which up-
held a New York law prohibiting the distribution of nonobscene "girlie"
magazines to minors. Judge Jenkins believed that Ginsberg had to be
modified in light of Miller.78 He further noted that, even if Ginsberg jus-
tified some regulation of material provided to children, the Utah legisla-
tion would still be defective, because "by its terms it would be equally
applicable to cable TV programming reaching homes and environments
having no children at all."' 79 Finally, the district court emphasized the
ease with which television viewers, especially cable television viewers,
could shield themselves from offensive programming by not buying a
television set, not subscribing to cable, or simply turning off the televi-
sion.80 The district court's judgment was not appealed.
2. Roy City
A few months later, the same federal district court was involved in
assessing the constitutionality of another attempted regulation of cable
television indecency. Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 8 1 in-
volved a challenge to a municipal ordinance enacted by a small residen-
tial community in Utah. The cable television company had previously
obtained a license from the city to use its easements, streets and ways to
lay its cables. The new ordinance provided for the revocation of
licenses, franchise agreements, and permits on a finding that the holder
"[k]nowingly distributes any pornographic or indecent material as de-
fined by law and in violation of the community standards of the commu-
nity encompassed within the territorial area included within the Roy City
boundaries .... 82 Roy City conceded that its authority to regulate
77. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
78. 531 F. Supp. at 994-96.
79. Id. at 997. The court described its standard of constitutional review as follows:
"Looking at the statute as enacted, we ask the question: is this something that goes beyond
Miller and enters an area that the Supreme Court appears to have said is an impermissible
area to enter ... ?" Id. at 999.
80. According to Judge Jenkins:
At least under some definitions, a high percentage of what we see on television, I
think, could very well be brought under the umbrella of indecency .... We put
up with it. What we do if we have occasion to be offended by something in a
program is we get up and turn it off. We do something else .... That's one of
the nice things about TV-not just cable TV .... There is no law that says you
have to watch. There is no law that says you have to purchase a television set.
There is no law that says you have to subscribe to a cable TV service .... Cable
television's peculiar advantages derive directly from this matter of choice. The
consumer is offered potentially limitless access to programming sources and con-
tent ....
Id. at 1001-02.
81. 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D. Utah 1982).
82. Roy City, Utah, Ordinance § 17-3-2(5), (quoted in 555 F.Supp. at 1174 (Appendix
A)). The term "indecent material" was defined to mean:
material which is a representation or verbal description of:
(a) An erotic human sexual or excretory organ or function; or
(b) Erotic nudity; or
(c) Erotic ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated; or
(d) Erotic masturbation; which under contemporary community standards is
patently offensive.
Roy City, Utah, Ordinance § 17-3-6 (quoted in 555 F.Supp. at 1176 (Appendix A)).
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indecent transmissions over cable television was subject to constitu-
tional limits. 8 3 The questions, therefore, were: what are those limits
and what are the standards by which the constitutionality of such regula-
tions should be evaluated? Roy City asserted that its ordinance should
be assessed under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in
Pacifica. Community Television argued that Pacifica was inapplicable to
cable television, and the district court agreed. 84 The court declared:
"Pacifica, which deals with broadcasting, the transmission of electro-
magnetic radio waves through the publicly controlled airways, is not ap-
plicable in this case. It is irrelevant."
'8 5
The court arrived at this conclusion after analyzing and weighing
five criteria. The court first listed and contrasted some of the operating
characteristics of cable television and broadcast television, emphasizing
that the characteristics of each are dissimilar in several respects.
8 6
For the second criterion, the district court gave a very narrow, tech-
nical definition to the concept of "pervasiveness," which was a key ele-
ment in the Pacifica ruling. The court stated: "The city as well
misapprehends the concept of pervasiveness. Literally it means ever-
present. It is in the air, or diffused widely. In that sense, broadcasting
meets the definition. In that sense it is pervasive because its medium,
the air, is pervasive. Transmission by wire is not."
8 7
Third, the district court asserted that the fact that cable television
transmissions go directly into the home is irrelevant to the constitutional
analysis. 8 8 Fourth, the court asserted that cable television is distinguish-
83. 555 F. Supp. at 1165.
84. 555 F. Supp. at 1166, 1167.
85. Id. at 1169 (emphasis added).
86.
Cable Broadcast
1. User needs to subscribe. User need not subscribe.
2. User holds power to cancel subscriptions. User holds no power to cancel. May com-
plain to F.C.C., station, network, or
sponsor.
3. Limited advertising. Extensive advertising.
4. Transmittal through wires. Transmittal through public airwaves.
5. User receives signal on private cable. User appropriates signal from the public
airwaves.
6. User pays a fee. User does not pay a fee.
7. User receives preview of coming attrac- User receives daily and weekly listing in
tions. public press or commercial guides.
8. Distributor or distributee may add services Neither distributor nor distributee may
and expanded spectrum of signals or chan- add services or signals or choices.
nels and choices.
9. Wires are privately owned. Airwaves are not privately owned but are
publicly controlled.
Id. at 1167. See also infra note 157 and accompanying text.
87. Id. at 1169.
88.
The Court finds great difficulty in distinguishing (other than the popcorn) be-
tween going to the movies at a theater and having the movies come to me in my
home through electronic transmission over wire. The choice is mine. The loca-
tion is different. The content is the same. Why should the non-"indecent" on
Main Street be transmuted by ordinance and municipal definition into "inde-
cency" in my home? That does not make sense if we are talking about a standard
to be applied uniformly. There is no distinction made with the Miller standard as
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able from broadcast television because, with cable, "the spectrum of
choice is appreciably expanded." '8 9 In enumerating the various choices
available for cable television viewers, the court noted the initial election
to subscribe to cable service; the ancillary selection of the scope of cable
services proffered and accepted; movie channels which require an in-
creased number of channels; and the ultimate choice of cable subscrip-
tion cancellation.9 0 The court considered the surfeit of choices as a
primary reason for cable service subscription, contrasting the relative
dearth of choices available for broadcast television viewers.9 1
The district court noted a final difference between cable and broad-
cast vis-a-vis acting in "the public interest." The court found that due to
the limited number of broadcasters and their attendant favored eco-
nomic opportunity in their use of the limited public resource of con-
trolled airways, "broadcasters must act in the public interest."'9 2 The
court determined that "[t]here is no such public interest charge to a
cable distributor" in the regulation of cable television systems.93
Satisfied that the Pacifica standard did not apply to cable television,
the district court held that the Miller obscenity standard was applicable
to the constitutionality of cable television indecency regulations. 9 4 The
district court emphasized that it was beyond the power of the city or
state "to control communication that is on the protected side of the porno-
graphic line set forth in Miller."'9 5 Applying the Miller test, the court struck
down as unconstitutional those provisions of the Roy City ordinance
which regulated the transmission through cable television of material
defined as indecent because it inhibited protected communication.9 6
to whether one goes to the movies or prefers to have the movies come into one's
home.
Id. at 1170. But see infra notes 202-220 and accompanying text.
89. Id. at 1168.
90. Id.
91. Id. But see infra note 145 and accompanying text.
92. Id. at 1169.
93. Id. But see infra notes 176-201 and accompanying text.
94. The three-pronged Miller standard "is a national standard with a core of uniform-
ity which allows for a degree of flexibility at a community level." Id. at 1169. The Miller
Court found that:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average per-
son, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest... (b) whether the work depicts
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 1169 n.23, (quoting Miller v. California, 438 U.S. at 24).
95. Id. at 1171 (emphasis added). The court stressed:
Beyond the line drawn in Miller public bodies must not step - indeed, cannot
step - in the control of artistic communication content. This isn't just what this
judge thinks .... In short, neither in the guise of licensing or franchising, nor in
the guise of authorizing the use of public property by a private business distribut-
ing electronic signals, can a municipality control message content that is not
pornographic.
Id. at 1172.
96. Roy City appealed the ruling of the district court in Community Television of
Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, but dismissed its appeal after the Utah legislature enacted another
law of state-wide application regulating the transmission over cable television of indecent
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3. Cruz (I) and Cruz (II)
In August of 1983, a third federal court opinion on cable indecency
regulations was handed down in Cruz v. Ferre.9 7 In January of 1983, the
city of Miami enacted a cable indecency ordinance which provided for
the regulation of indecent and obscene material on cable television.98 A
month after the ordinance was enacted, a cable television service sub-
scriber filed suit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the
city ordinance.9 9
The issue before the federal district court was whether the city
could constitutionally regulate the dissemination through cable televi-
sion of material defined by the city as "indecent." 1 0 0 The district court
concluded that the city had exceeded constitutional limits by adopting
regulations and enforcement methods which violated the first and four-
teenth amendments.' 0 ' Moreover, the court permanently enjoined the
city from enforcing those sections of the ordinance which prohibited the
transmission of indecent material on cable television.1
0 2
The court began its first amendment analysis 10 3 by noting that
Miller carefully defines the limits of "permissible obscenity regula-
tion." 10 4 The court stated that indecent speech or material falls outside
the definitional boundaries of obscenity and is thus accorded protection
by the first amendment against state regulation.' 0 5 Finding that Miami's
ordinance prohibited the cable transmission of both obscene and non-
obscene, indecent materials, the court concluded that "in regulating the
distribution of 'indecent' materials, the ordinance [swept] within its
bounds 'speech' subject to constitutional protection,"' 1 6 and thus was
"overly broad and facially defective."'
10 7
The court acknowledged that in Pacifica the Supreme Court had
material. Roy City v. Community Television of Utah, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D. Utah
1982), appeal docketed, No. 83-1217 (10th Cir. Feb. 17, 1983), appeal dismissed, No. 83-1217
(10th Cir. June 2, 1983). Additionally, the subsequently enacted state indecency statute is
currently being challenged in federal court. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
97. 571 F. Supp. 125 (S.D. Fla. 1983), aft'd, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985).
98. Id. at 127. City of Miami, Fla. Ordinance No. 9583 (Jan. 13, 1983) states, in perti-
nent part, that if probable cause were found to exist, that the City Manager could impose
sanctions if violations were determined to have occurred. Id.
99. 571 F. Supp. at 128. Home Box Office, Inc. intervened as a plaintiff; Cablevision,
the local cablecaster; intervened as a defendant. Id.
100. Id. at 126.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 127. The city was also permanently enjoined from implementing the proce-
dural section by which the ordinance was to be enforced. Id.
103. The court also found the ordinance to violate the fourteenth amendment's proce-
dural due process and equal protection guarantees. Procedurally, the ordinance was
deemed defective because it "concentratted] the functions of complainant, jury, judge and
'executioner' in one person ..... Id. at 133. The court also summarily concluded that the
equal protection clause was violated because the ordinance applied "only to cable trans-
missions" and not "to other forms of transmission such as over-the-air microwave trans-
missions, subscription broadcast television, or movie theaters." Id. at 134.
104. Id. at 130.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 130-31.
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"found that even though indecent speech was afforded some constitu-
tional protection, its content could be regulated under some circum-
stances,"' 1 8 but proceeded to distinguish Pacifica on two grounds:
[1] The ordinance . . .prohibits far too broadly the transmis-
sion of indecent materials through cable television. The ordi-
nance's prohibition is wholesale, without regard to the time of day or other
variables indispensable to the decision in Pacifica. [2] The ra-
tionale of Pacifica applies only to broadcasting. The medium of
cable television presents different first amendment concerns;
therefore, Pacifica is inapposite. 0 9
The "greater overall viewing control" in cable systems, resulting from
the availability of viewer guides and lockboxes, was deemed to be dis-
tinctively important. 110
The city of Miami appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed the district court two years later
in Cruz v. Ferre ( 1).Ill The first question the Eleventh Circuit had to
decide was whether the ordinance should be reviewed under the flexible
Pacifica indecency standard or under a strict Miller standard.' 12 The
Court of Appeals concluded that Pacifica was not applicable to the partic-
ular facts of the case." 3 Emphasizing that cable viewers must first elect
to subscribe to cable and then pay an extra fee for additional program-
ming services, the court distinguished the "pervasiveness" of cable pro-
gramming from that of radio programming."14 The court noted also
that the accessibility of indecent programming to children' 5 is signifi-
cantly less in the case of cable than in the case of radio programming for
several reasons: parents can decline to subscribe to cable, can decline to
pay for extra services, can use program guides to control the programs
their children view, and can obtain a lockbox or parental key. 116 Addi-
tionally, the court determined that recent decisions of the Supreme
108. Id. at 131.
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. The court emphasized that:
[T]o protect children or other immature viewers from unsuitable program ming,
subscribers [in Miami] need only use a free 'lockbox' or 'parental key' available
from Cablevision. This opportunity to completely avoid the potential harm to
minor or immature viewers sounds the death-knell of Pacifica's applicability in the
cable television context.
Id. at 132.
111. 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985).
112. The Eleventh Circuit found that the enforcement sections of the Miami Ordinance
violated the due process clause of the Constitution because the procedural protections
were "not sufficient to protect the vital interests at stake." Id. at 1422.
113. Id. at 1420.
114. "The Court's concern with the pervasiveness of the broadcast media can best be
seen in its description of broadcasted material as an 'intruder' into the privacy of the
home. Cablevision, however, does not 'intrude' into the home." Id. at 1420. The court
neutralized the "pig in the parlor" language from Pacifica by noting: "It seems to us, how-
ever, that if an individual voluntarily opens his door and allows a pig into his parlor, he is
in less of a position to squeal." Id. at n.6.
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Court "have largely limited Pacifica to its facts."' 17 The Eleventh Circuit
also stated that even if it were to apply the Pacifica standard to the Miami
ordinance it would affirm the district court because the total-ban ordi-
nance was facially overbroad. The court found that the ordinance ex-
ceeded the regulatory bounds envisioned by the Pacifica Court in that it
failed "to account for the variables identified in Pacifica: the time of day;
the context of the program in which the material appears; the composi-
tion of the viewing audience."'1 18
4. Wilkinson (I) and Wilkinson (II)
In Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 1 19 the federal dis-
trict court in Utah decided its third case in three years involving a consti-
tutional challenge or an attempt to restrict the transmission of sexually
explicit material on cable television. The court granted a motion for
summary judgment holding the Utah Cable Television Programming
Decency Act' 20 to be unconstitutionally overbroad and vague and there-
117. 755 F.2d. 1415, 1421 (llth Cir. 1985) (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983)).
118. id. at 1422.
119. 611 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Utah 1985). The district court's holding was very narrow.
The statute was challenged as facially overbroad. The court also discussed the federal
preemption doctrine but concluded that the preemption question was tied to the first
amendment question. Id. at 1101-1106. Judge Anderson concluded, very questionably,
that evidence concerning the type of material actually transmitted, the ability of the cable
company to prescreen material and delay showing it, and guidelines for implementingthe
law, adopted by the Attorney General, were irrelevant. Id. at 1106 n.3, 1107.
120. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-101-17-1 to -1708 (Supp. 1983). Before the Utah legisla-
ture convened inJanuary, 1983, anti-pornography groups had circulated an Initiative Peti-
tion proposing the Cable T.V. Decency Act, which would have made it a misdeameanor
"for any person to knowingly distribute within [Utah] any obscene or indecent material by
means of cable television." Cable T.V. Decency Act (And Initiative Petition), Sept. 15,
1982 (copy in author's possesion). Under Utah law, a bill proposed by initiative petition
must be considered by the legislature if five percent of the voters in the last election sign
the petition. If the legislature does not enact the bill, it must be submitted to a popular
vote during the next general election if the number of signitures the petition exceeds ten
percent of the registered voters who voted in the last election. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20-11-
1 to -4 (1984). The number of signatures on this petition exceeded ten percent of the
voters who voted in the last election.
The Utah Attorney General, David Wilkenson, after consulting several lawyers con-
cluded that the bill proposed in the petition would be unconstitutional (inasmuch as it did
not significantly differ from the law that had been held unconstitutional two years earlier in
Roy City). Thus, he assisted several legislators drafting an alternative bill, the Cable Televi-
sion Programming Decency Act, in an attempt to respond to the concerns of the citizenry
while avoiding the constitutional pitfalls which had nullified the earlier legislation. The
resulting act eventually won the support of the backers of the petition and passed both
houses of the legislature. The Governor vetoed the bill. Letter of Governor Scott M.
Matheson to Lieutenant Governor David S. Monson (Mar. 30, 1983) (copy in author's
possession). However, the state legislature overrode the veto and the Act became law
without the governor's signiture.
Even though the legislature had enacted a substitute law regulating indecent cable,
because the original petition had been signed by more than ten percent of the voters who
voted in the previous election it was put on the November, 1984 ballot. With the com-
bined opposition of persons who opposed any regulation of cable television and of sup-
porters of the substitute Act which the legislature had passed, the Initiative Petition
Proposal was defeated at the polls by a margin of nearly three-to-two. Deseret News, Nov.




Unlike prior laws which have been challenged the Utah Act merely
regulated "the time, place, manner and context in which the material"
was transmitted over cable television - it did not absolutely ban inde-
cent cable programming. Moreover, the Act only applied to "a continu-
ing course of conduct" rather than isolated incidents, and it imposed
civil fines rather than criminal convictions. 12 1 Thus, the Act followed a
relatively passive regulatory approach, rather than a heavy-handed out-
right ban 122 on sexually explicit cable television programming.
The court began its first amendment analysis of the Act by revising
the Miller test for obscenity. It held that the Act was facially overbroad
under Miller because the statute "[did] not limit itself to [regulating] ma-
terial that is legally obscene."' 123 The district court also held that the
statute was not a valid time, place and manner regulation for two rea-
sons. First, the court summarily declared that "indecency" is a content-
based classification, and that constitutional time, place, or manner regu-
lations cannot regulate on the basis of content.124  Moreover, the Act
was considered too vague "[b]ecause the meaning of the words 'time,
place, manner, and context' is unclear; section -1702 does not provide
the cable operators with notice of what material can or cannot be
shown." 125
Most of the district court opinion was devoted to rejecting the
state's contention that the Act was constitutional under the Pacifica doc-
trine. The court held that Pacifica was factually distinguishable because
the radio broadcast in Pacifica occurred in the mid-afternoon, while the
Utah statute was not explicitly limited to afternoon cable program-
121. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1703 (Supp. 1983) provides that "[a] person shall be
deemed to have maintained a nuisance when, as a continuing course of conduct, he knowingly
distributes indecent material within this state over any cable television system or pay-for-
viewing television programming." (Emphasis added.) The term "indecent material" is
defined as follows:
a visual or verbal depiction, display, representation, dissemination, or verbal de-
scription of:
(a) A human sexual or excretory organ or function, or
(b) A state of undress so as to expose the human male or female genitals,
pubic area, or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering or showing of the
female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any portion below the top
of the nipple; of
(c) An ultimate sexual act, normal or perverted, actual or simulated; or
(d) Masturbation which the average person applving contemporary community stan-
dards for cable television or pay-for-viewing television programming would find is
presented in a patently offensive way for the time, place, manner and context in which the
material is presented.
611 F. Supp. at 1100 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1702 (4) (1983 Supp.))
(emphasis added).
122. The district court paid little deference to the subtleties of the Act's language and
described the Act as creating a "de facto ban of some cable material." 611 F. Supp. at I I I
(emphasis added).
123. Id. at 1108. The Act did not limit itself to regulating material that appeals to the
"prurient interest" nor to material which, as a "taken whole, [Ihacks serious literary, artis-
tic, political, or scientific value." Id.
124. Id. at 1116.
125. Id. at 1117.
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ming. 12 6 The court also noted that Pacifica involved a milder penalty. 12 7
Moreover, the district court observed that the United States Supreme
Court vote in Pacifica "was closely divided."' 128 The district court also
inferred that Pacifica had been limited to its facts by the subsequent deci-
sion of the Supreme Court in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.129 In
that case, the United States Supreme Court held that a federal statute
prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives
was unconstitutional. The Utah federal district court interpreted the
Supreme Court's refusal to apply Pacifica in Bolger to mean that Pacifica
was limited to its facts. 130 The district court emphasized two "funda-
mental differences" between radio and television: unlike cable, radio has
physical spectrum limitations and historically radio has been regulated
while cable has not.131 The court concluded that "[tihe differences be-
tween radio and television make Pacifica easily distinguishable .... ,,132
Finally, the district court attempted to distinguish the rationale for
Pacifica. The court rejected Utah's argument that cable television was
more "pervasive" than the FM radio broadcast in Pacifica. The court
noted that it is only "pervasiveness which results in an unwarranted intru-
sion upon one's right to be left alone" that justifies regulation of FM
broadcasts. 133 The court concluded that "cable television is not an un-
invited intruder." 134 Citing the amicus brief filed by the FCC, the district
court noted four distinctions between cable television and FM radio:
persons must subscribe to cable, they must pay an additional fee for
movie channels, lockboxes are available, and viewer programming
guides are available.'
3 5
The court also rejected the argument that the interest in protecting
children justified the regulation of indecent cable programming because
the Act failed to even mention children and, it failed "to provide any
126. "The Utah statute.., imposes a fine upon cable operators who distribute material
outlawed by the statute at any time." Id. at 1110. (emphasis in original). The Utah Attor-
ney General promulgated guidelines providing that indecent cable programming could be
transmitted during " 'adult viewing hours' (midnight to 7 a.m.)" without violating the
"time, place, or manner" regulation. The district court disregarded those guidelines as no
cure for the constitutional infirmity because they were not legally binding on subsequent
attorneys general or on local municipal or county prosecutors, and thus protected speech
might subsequently be threatened. Id. at 1110, 1114-15; see also infra notes 295-99 and
accompanying text.
127. Id. at 1110.
128. Id. HereJudge Anderson made an arithmetic error. He noted that there were four
dissenters and two concurring Justices. However, he overlooked the fact that the two con-
curringJustices joined in the rele vant parts ofJustice Steven's opinion, which was denom-
inated as the opinion of the Court representing the opinion of a majority, not just a
plurality.
129. Id. at 11 (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 650 (1983)).
130. Wilkinson (1), 611 F. Supp. at 1111. The court also noted that the two arguments
relied upon by Utah to defend the regulation of cable programming had been rejected by
the Court in Bolger as adequate justification for the total prohibition of mailed advertise-
ments. Id.
131. Id. at 1112-13.
132. Id. at 1115.
133. Id. at 1113 (emphasis in original). Accord Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.




systematic procedure for protecting children."' 3 6 The court also noted
that "the scope of the Utah law extends far beyond the interests of chil-
dren."1 37 Thus, the Utah act was held to be facially unconstitutional.13 8
The State of Utah appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit. In Wilkinson (II), a brief per curium opinion, the
appellate court summarily affirmed the judgment of the district court
"on the basis of the reasons stated in the [lower court's] opinion."' 3 9
However, in a separate and lengthy, concurring opinion, Judge Baldock
carefully analyzed the constitutional issues and repudiated the superfi-
cial analysis of the district court. First, he rejected the argument that
nonobscene but sexually explicit material is constitutionally immune
from any regulation because it is not obscene.140 While the Utah inde-
cency statute did not satisfy the Miller test because it did not require that
a work as a whole appeal to prurient interests and lack serious social
value, 14 1 precedent suggests "that the Miller adult obscenity standard is
not the exclusive test to be applied to the regulation of sexually oriented
material." 142 In addition, the Miller test, appears to be both ineffective
and inapposite in the context of regulation of sexually explicit cable tele-
vision programming.
Judge Baldock also explained that the district court had erred in
holding that Pacifica does not apply to cable television. Whether inde-
cent programming on cable television may be regulated depends largely
upon how the medium of cable television is categorized. Although the
Supreme Court has not yet decided how cable as a medium is to be char-
acterized, the extent of regulation of cable television will most likely
turn on a comparison of cable with other media, particularly broadcast-
ing.' 4 3 Broadcasting has received the most limited first amendment
protection because of three characteristics: the physical scarcity of the
airwave frequencies, the pervasiveness of the medium, and the ease of
accessibility of children to the medium. Physical scarcity does not ap-
pear to be a limitation of the cable medium. However, cable and broad-
cast television are practically indistinguishable when it comes to
pervasiveness and accessibility to children. In Pacifica the Supreme
Court upheld the regulation of indecent broadcast programming pre-
136. Id. at 1114.
137. Id. at 1116 n. l.
138. Judge Anderson hinted that the law should be redrafted to provide specific guide-
lines concerning permissible times of indecent transmissions, emphasizing the importance
of "fair notice or warning." Id. at 1117. But the Attorney General guidelines, which he
ignored, already do that.
139. "The district court has written a comprehensive opinion with which we agree, and
to which we can add little of value. We affirm its judgment on the basis of the reasons
stated in the opinion." Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989, 91 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
The rest of the opinion was devoted to another issue.
140. Id. at 996 (Baldock, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 997. However, he rejected the district court's conclusion that the Utah law
also failed to meet the "patently offensive" requirement of Miller. Id. at 998.
142. Id. at 999.
143. The Tenth Circuit previously held that cable is very different from publishing, and
some other appellate courts have reached the same conclusion. Id. at 1001.
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cisely because of these two characteristics, and the rationale of Pacifica is
equally applicable to cable television. Judge Baldock noted that the ana-
lytically significant characteristics of cable and broadcast television are
very similiar: both rely on television receivers, both provide similar and
often interchangeable products, in both cases transmissions emanate
from outside the home and are received in the home, both are pervasive
in our society, and in both cases other means of protecting viewers from
the unwanted intrusion of offensive programming are ineffective.
14 4
Judge Baldock specifically refuted the argument that government
regulation of indecent cable television is unnecessary because viewers
voluntarily subscribe to the medium. He stated that broadcast television
viewers also voluntarily elect and pay to have access to that medium by
purchasing a television set, yet the regulation of indecency on television
is permitted. Like broadcast television programs, cable programs are
disseminated to the public in general, not to specific purchasers such as
those who purchase a particular movie or book. "The cable viewer is
not purchasing a particular program at the time of viewing, rather he is
purchasing a wider range of programs than is available on broadcast tel-
evision."' 1 4 5 There is no effective advance warning to viewers of offen-
sive material on cable because viewers can tune in at any time.
Programming guides are burdensome and ineffective, and "lockboxes"
are ineffective because they involve "unwanted complexity" because
they block out entire channels not just particular programs. The argu-
ment that cable television subscribers constructively consent to indecent
cable programming "is too simplistic and is akin to the notion that one
who hears an indecent broadcast has an adequate remedy by turning it
off. This notion was expressly rejected in FCC v. Pacifica .... -146 Cable
television offers a valuable resource to families, and the opportunity to
utilize that resource "should be available to all who are willing to sub-
scribe, even those who object to patently offensive indecent material be-
ing presented during family viewing hours."'
1 4 7
Judge Baldock agreed that the Utah Cable Decency Act was uncon-
stitutional because he thought it completely prohibited, rather that
merely regulated, transmission of indecent cable television programs.
Defining indecent cable programming by making statutory reference to
"the time, place, manner and context" in which sexually explicit pro-
gramming is presented was ambiguous because it would, "cause people
of common intelligence to guess at the meaning of indecency and differ
as to the law's application."'
14 8
Thus, to date no court has upheld any attempt to regulate nonob-
scene sexually explicit cable television programming. On rather broad
grounds, the lower federal courts have declined to extend the Pacifica
144. Id. at 998-1005.
145. Id. at 1005.
146. Id. at 1006.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1007. But see intfa notes 295, 312-15 and accompanying text.
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doctrine to cable television, rigidly insisting that Miller defines the only
permissible regulation of sexually explicit cable programming.
C. The Analytical Errors In The Lower Federal Court Opinions
All federal courts which have attempted to restrict indecent cable
television programming have consistently overstated the legal doctrines
which they use to justify their judgments. Judge Baldock's concurring
opinion in Wilkinson (II) contains the most careful first amendment anal-
ysis to date, yet the other two judges who decided that appeal ignored it
and even Judge Baldock's analysis ultimately tripped on a misunder-
standing of the statute involved. Surprisingly the lower courts' analyti-
cal overbreadth did not spoil the outcome in three of the cases which
involved laws totally banning all indecent cable programming. Never-
theless, these analytical overgeneralizations could, and in the Wilkinson
case clearly did, impair the analysis of and the judgment concerning
more carefully-conceived and drafted measures designed to reasonably
regulate, channel, and condition the transmission of sexually explicit in-
decent cable fare. The lower federal courts have committed two key an-
alytical errors: they have suggested that sexually explicit material may
only be regulated if it is obscene, and they have held that Pacifica has
absolutely no application to cable television.
1. Some Limited Regulation of Nonobscene Sexually Explicit
Material Is Permissible
The courts that have invalidated cable television indecency restric-
tions have held that governmental bodies may not constitutionally regu-
late the distribution of material "that is not pornographic.' 14 9 This
conclusion has been based upon the mistaken assumption that Miller de-
fines the absolute "boundary" of permissible state regulation of sexually
explicit cable television programming. 150 As both a factual and legal
matter this generalization is overbroad and erroneous. The essential
flaw is the simplistic reliance on a "pigeon-hole" analysis which insists
that sexually explicit material either is obscene and can be regulated or
not obscene and completely beyond regulation.
As a factual matter, sexually explicit material does not lend itself to
such a bifurcation. Even the movie industry does not try to categorize
films into just two categories. More important, however, as a matter of
constitutional law the lower courts have erred in assuming that Miller
defines the exclusive, absolute, universal boundary of permissible state
regulation of all sexually explicit material.
The Supreme Court has in many cases upheld some reasonable re-
149. Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164, 1172 (D. Utah
1982). The term "pornographic" means legally obscene under Miller.
150. Wilkinson (1), 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1117 (D. Utah 1985); Cruz v. Ferre, 571 F. Supp.
125, 130 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 989, 994-95
(D. Utah 1982); Rov City, 555 F. Supp. at 1169. But see Wilkinson (I1), 800 F.2d at 995-997
(Baldock, J., concurring).
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strictions on nonpornographic sexual communication.1 5 1 For example,
in a case involving the regulation of nonobscene, sexually explicit "kid-
die-porn," the Supreme Court noted that although some states may find
that the Miller approach accommodates their interests, the first amend-
ment does not prohibit states from going further. Specifically, the Court
has said that Miller may fall short with respect to children. "The Miller
standard, like all general definitions of what may be banned as obscene,
does not reflect the State's particular and more compelling interest in
prosecuting those who promote the sexual exploitation of children."'
52
The Miller test was fashioned to assess the validity of laws which
prevent individuals from obtaining sexually explicit material they desire
to obtain, whereas cable indecency regulations are designed to protect
other individuals from the intrusion of sexually explicit material they do
not want to view. Miller is an effective test to protect legitimate constitu-
tional interests in the former context, but it is inadequate and ineffective
to protect the legitimate constitutional interests in the latter context. If
protecting individuals and families from the intrusion of unwanted sexu-
ally explicit material is a constitutionally legitimate state interest - and
there appears to be no doubt about that - Miller is the wrong test for it
does not accomodate or allow states to effectively protect that constitu-
tional interest.
2. The Pacifica Doctrine Is Not Limited to Radio Regulations
The most serious mistake made by the lower federal courts was de-
claring that Pacifica absolutely does not apply to cable television inde-
cency regulations. Their rejection of Pacifica has been overbroad. In
most of the lower court cases there was at least one compelling distinc-
tion between the case at bar and Pacifica: whereas Pacifica involved only
the regulatory channeling of indecent programming, the laws involved in
HBO, Roy City, Cruz (I) and Cruz (II) absolutely and totally banned sexually
explicit material from the entire cable television medium. Only two
courts, however, even mentioned this important distinction. 153 Gener-
ally, the lower courts have relied on potentially sweeping but surpris-
ingly specious arguments to distinguish Pacifica. In Wilkinson (I), the
151. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (kiddie-porn restrictions); New
York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714 (1981) (restrictions on topless dancing
in bars); FCC v. Pacifica, 439 U.S. 883 (1978) (indecent afternoon radio broadcasts);
Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (restricted zoning of "adult"
theatres); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (statute authoriz-
ing Post Office to not deliver offensive mail to addressee at his request); Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (prohibiting sale of "girlie magazines" to minors); see also Leh-
man v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm'n, 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Upper Midwest Booksellers Ass'n v. City of
Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1985); M.S. News Co. v. Casado, 721 F.2d 1281
(10th Cir. 1983).
152. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761. See also Wilkinson (I), 800 F.2d at 997-999
(Baldock, J., concurring).
153. This distinction was noted both in Cruz (1), 571 F. Supp. at 131 and in Cruz (I).
755 F.2d at 1421-1422. See also Wilkinson (II), slip op. at 10-16 (Baldock, J., concurring).
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court's reliance on overbroad generalizations to distinguish Pacifica
caused the court to err.
Two lower courts have cited Bolger to suggest that the Supreme
Court has "limit[ed] Pacifica to its facts."' 154 This suggestion is simply
erroneous. A quick review of citations to the case reveals that the
Supreme Court has repeatedly relied on Pacifica even in deciding cases
involving non-broadcast media. 15 5 In Bolger, the Supreme Court simply
noted that Pacifica did not justify an absolute ban of all mailed contra-
ceptive advertisements - a far cry from the conclusion that the Pacifica
approach does not apply at all to regulations of indecent cable television
programming. As Judge Baldock noted, Bolger is distinguishable be-
cause the Bolger Court "was satisfied that parents exercise substantial
control over the distribution of mail [advertisements for contraceptives]
received at home and that the restriction on this type of mail allowed
parents to control and eliminate its receipt."'
' 5 6
The effort of the lower federal courts to distinguish Pacifica reached
its nadir when Judge Jenkins created a "laundry list" contrasting some
of the operating characteristics of cable and broadcast television. 15
7
The impressive-looking list, however, is analytically irrelevant because
none of the characteristics described in it relate to the Supreme Court's
analysis in Pacifica. The district court failed to mention, much less distin-
guish, the characteristics of the broadcast media which the Supreme
Court identified as justifying a flexible standard of permissible regula-
tion in Pacifica.
In Pacifica the Supreme Court acknowledged that there were three
particularly important reasons why the first amendment does not pro-
hibit reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on broadcasts that
are indecent but not obscene: (1) because of the "pervasive presence"
of broadcasting in the lives of Americans; (2) because radio program-
ming confronts citizens in the privacy of their homes; and (3) because
broadcast programming is "uniquely accessible to children."' 5 8 From
the perspective of these three key considerations there are no analyti-
cally significant differences between broadcast radio and cable televi-
sion. With respect to pervasiveness, impact in homes, and accessibility
to children, indecent cable television programming is analytically indis-
154. Wilkinson (1), 611 F. Supp. at 1111; see also Cruz (H), 755 F.2d at 1421-22.
155. See, e.g., Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser. 106 S. Ct. 3159. 3165-66 (1986);
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982) (kiddie-porn); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455, 471 (1980) (residential picketing); see also Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
890 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (school libraries); Upper Midwest Booksellers Ass'n
v. City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1985); Basiardanes v. City of Galveston,
682 F.2d 1203, 1213-14 (5th Cir. 1982); Reeves v. McConn, 638 F.2d 762, 763 (5th Cir.
1981).
156. Wilkinson (11), 800 F.2d at 1007 (Baldock, J., concurring).
157. Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp 1164, 1167. See
supra note 86. The appeal of the "laundry list analysis" is illustrated by the fact that it was
copied and endorsed in the Cruz (1) opinion by Judge Hoeveler, whose independent analy-
sis of Pacifica was otherwise impressively sound. But see lWilkinson (H), 800 F.2d 1003-1006
(Baldock, J., concurring). See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
158. 438 U.S. at 748-49. See supra note 65 and accomtpanying text.
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tinguishable from indecent broadcast programming. 159 While the
Pacifica principle may require a different application to cable television
than to radio, the absolute rejection of the Pacifica doctrine by the lower
courts in cable television cases is analytically unjustifiable.
D. The Law Review Commentators
Legal commentators did not consider the constitutionality of the
regulation of nonobscene but indecent cable programming until
1983.160 Since then many articles or notes addressing this issue have
been published. 161 The lower court decisions invalidating cable televi-
sion indecency regulations generally have been applauded by the law
review commentators.16 2 Paccifica, on the other hand, has not been pop-
ular with the law review writers. 163 Most of the commentators seem to
agree with the opinion of Professor Laurence Tribe that
[t]he result the Court reached in Pacifica seems a poor basis for
doctrinal extrapolation .... It would be regrettable, then, if
the opinions of the majority were allowed to leave any enduring
marks on First Amendment jurisprudence: Pacifica should be
confined to its facts and eventually discarded as a "derelict in
the stream of the law."'
6 4
The general reluctance of legal commentators to endorse the con-
stitutionality of regulations restricting indecent cable television pro-
gramming appears to be at least partially premised on the belief that it is
dangerous for the state to interfere with the right of adults to have ac-
cess to any communicative material they desire and that it is inappropri-
ate for government to attempt to establish or preserve moral values
pertaining to sexual behavior. 165 However, the commentators who have
159. See infra pp. 650-51, 656-59 and 661-663.
160. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., Geller & Lampert, Cable, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 32
CATH. U. L. REV. 603 (1983); Hofbauer, 'Cableporn' and the First Amendment: Perspectives On
Content Regulation of Cable Television, 35 F.C.C.L.J. 139 (1983); Krattenmaker & Esterow,
supra note 52; Riggs, Indecency on Cable: Can It Be Regulated, 26 ARIZ.L.REV. 269 (1984);
Comment, The Growing Pains of Cable Television, 7 CAMPBELL L. REV. 175 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Growing Pains]; Note, Indecent Programming on Cable Television and the First
Amendment, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 254 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Indecent Program-
ming]; Comment, Regulation of Indecent Television Programming: HBO v. Wilkinson, 9J. CON-
TEMP. L. 207 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Regulation of Indecent Television Programming].
See also Note, supra note 63; infra note 332.
162. See Krattenmaker & Esterlow, supra note 52, at 608-11, 633; Note, Indecent Pro-
gramming, supra note 161, at 263-68; see also Hofbauer, supra note 161, at 152-54, 176-81,
202-03; Note, Regulation of Indecent Television Programming, supra note 161, at 212-15; Com-
ment, Growing Pains, supra note 161, at 188-92.
163. For example, Krattenmaker & Esterow, supra note 52, at 627 would treat Pacifica as
"a limited exception, for an extreme, virtually non-replicable case." See also Geller &
Lampert, supra note 161, at 615-16; Powe, supra note 51, at 895-905; The Supreme Court.
1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 148-63 (1978); Note, Regulating Indecent Speech, supra note
51, at 332-41.
164. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTiONAL LAw 67-68 (Supp. 1979).
165. For instance, after arguing that Pacifica should be given the narrowest possible
reading and that it should not be relied upon in assessing the constitutionality of laws
prohibiting indecent cable television programming, the authors of one article opposed to
indecency regulations concluded with this revealing caveat:
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argued most vigorously against cable television indecency regulations
have focused primarily on laws which totally prohibit such program-
ming. 166 Their analyses have tended to be as overbroad as the prohibi-
tions they have in mind. A few commentators have recently suggested
that some regulations that partially prohibit or channel indecent pro-
gramming on cable television should be constitutionally permissible
under the principles of Pacifica.
16 7
III. A MODEL ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REGULATIONS
RESTRICTING "INDECENT" SEXUALLY EXPLICIT CABLE
TELEVISION PROGRAMMING
It is well established that the first amendment protects nonobscene
speech, even if it is patently offensive and indecent. It is equally clear
that the first amendment does not forbid all regulation of protected
speech. The question, therefore, is one of degree. And the degree of
permissible state regulation of nonobscene but indecent, sexually ex-
plicit material depends upon a variety of factors which fall into two cate-
gories: the intrusiveness of the speech and the intrusiveness of the
regulations.
Factors relating to the intrusiveness of the speech which are rele-
vant to the analysis of cable television indecency regulations include: (1)
the "pervasiveness" of the medium; (2) the monopolistic use of a public
resource; (3) the privacy of the place into which the material intrudes;
(4) the degree of audience captivity; (5) accessibility of inappropriate
material to children; and (6) the offensiveness of the form of expression,
especially if it is sexually explict. Factors relevant to assessing the intru-
siveness of the regulation include: (1) the characteristics of the medium
of communication; (2) the necessity for other regulation in the public
interest; (3) the type of regulation imposed; and (4) the context of en-
forcement. Finally, the balance of harm to the competing interests must
be assessed. All of these factors must be considered because "[t]he abil-
ity of government consonant with the Constitution to shut off discourse
solely to protect others from hearing is .. .dependent upon a showing
that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially in-
tolerable manner."' 16 8 These factors are considered below in the order
Consider the alternative. The danger of extending Pacifica to cable is self-evident.
Such an extension would not only open the door to limit what is increasingly
becoming an important additional means of disseminating diverse ideas and in-
formation, but also would threaten to destroy the first amendment rights of indi-
viduals to say, see and hear what they choose .... The state simply may not
constitutionally regulate offensive material merely to protect its citizens' moral
sensibilities, certainly not when the acquisition of that material requires an affirm-
ative, informed choice by an adult.
Krattenmaker & Esterow, supra note 52, at 635-36.
166. See, e.g., id. at 606, 608, 624-25, 627-28; Note, Indecent P'og'amming, supra note 161,
at 263-68.
167. See e.g., Riggs, supra note 161, at 326-28; Note, Regulation of Indecent Television Pro-
gramming, supra note 161, at 214-15.
168. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); see also Central Hudson Gas & Elec-
tric Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
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listed.
A. The Intrusiveness of the Speech
1. The Pervasiveness of the Medium
The first justification given by the Supreme Court for allowing gov-
ernment regulation of indecent radio programming in Pacifica was the
"uniquely pervasive presence [of radio broadcasting] in the lives of all
Americans." 169 Unfortunately, the lower courts have thus far misunder-
stood the concept of "pervasiveness." For instance, in Roy City, District
JudgeJenkins revealed his belief that "pervasiveness" merely referred to
the physical attribute of airwave transmission. 170 It is clear, however,
that the "pervasiveness" the Supreme Court was concerned with in
Pacifica was the intrusive presence of broadcast programming in the
daily lives of all Americans,' 7 1 not the technical characteristics of the
means of transmission. 
72
From several analytically significant perspectives the intrusive pres-
ence of cable television is greater and more pervasive than that of FM
radio. The visual impact of television, both broadcast and cable, cou-
pled with the auditory effect, gives television a greater impact than the
mere words of radio. The Supreme Court in Pacifica explicitly tied the
concept of pervasiveness to the presence of the medium in the home
and to the difficulty of protecting the listener or viewer from unexpected
program content. 
1 73
Although each of these factors will be discussed in depth below, it is
important to note that from this protective or defensive point of view,
the intrusiveness of a particular program on cable television is indistin-
guishable from broadcast radio or television programming. In each case
the viewer has no control over channel programming. The viewer could
avoid the offensive program by turning the channel, by turning off the
set, or by avoiding the medium altogether. 174 Unlike purchasers of
books, magazines or video cassettes who obtain only the specific mate-
rial they desire, television viewers are confronted with programming se-
lected for them by others and transmitted to them on a continuing basis.
Cable television, like broadcast radio, reaches directly into the home
where specific indecent programs may be an unwelcome intrusion for
169. 438 U.S. at 748.
170. Judge Jenkins wrote that pervasiveness "means ever-present. It is in the air, or
diffused widely .... [Broadcasting] is pervasive because its medium, the air, is pervasive.
[Cable] [t]ransmission by wire is not." 555 F. Supp. at 1169. See also Krattenmaker &
Esterlow supra note 52, at 633.
171. 438 U.S. at 748.
172. For example, a "two-way radio conversation between a cab driver and a dis-
patcher" utilizes the same technology and medium - the public airwaves - as the com-
mercial radio station involved in Pacifica; yet the Supreme Court implied that such
broadcasting was not pervasive. Id. at 750.
173. 438 U.S. at 748-49 (Powell, J., concurring).
174. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748; see also IVilkinson (H), 800 F.2d at 1006 (Baldock, J., con-




many adult subscribers who do not desire to view, even inadvertently,
patently offensive sexual depictions, and where many children are in the
viewing audience during most of the day and early evening.
Finally, in terms of economic and social impact, cable television is
fast approaching the size and significance of broadcast television.
175
Cable television is now commonplace in virtually all communities. It is
not unfair to conclude that the pervasive presence of cable television in
the lives of Americans is as great or greater than that of FM radio in
1973 when the program complained of in Pacifica was broadcast.
2. The Monopolistic Use of a Public Resource
Greater media regulation is permitted when the medium regulated
requires the use of public resources than when private resources are uti-
lized. One reason broadcasting has been subject to greater regulation
of sexually explicit material than the print media is because broadcasters
use public resources and hold a public trust. A broadcaster enjoys the
"advantages .. .of a preferred position conferred by the Government"
and this justifies some "government[al] effort to assure that a broad-
caster's programming ... serve[s] the public interest."1 76 Accordingly,
under the first amendment a broadcaster enjoys "the widest journalistic
freedom consistent with its public obligations .... ,,177 Cable television
also involves the use of the public domain - in some respects to an even
greater degree than broadcast television. ' 7 8 Thus, cable television may
be regulated in some ways print publishers and other nonusers of public
resources are not.
The regulation of broadcast communications has been justified be-
cause of the conjunction of two unique characteristics of the medium:
broadcasting requires the use of a public resource and the number of
persons who can use that resource for that purpose is limited. Broad-
casting requires the use of radio frequencies which belong to the pub-
lic. 17 9 By the 1920's, it was apparent that radio frequencies could
accommodate only a limited number of broadcasters and that the de-
mand to broadcast over the radio exceeded the supply of available fre-
175. See supra notes 2-14 and accompanying text. In the small residential community of
Roy City, Utah, apparently 78% of the eligible homes subscribed to the cable TV service
offered by the plaintiff in the Roy City case. Appellant's Brief, at 6, Community Television
of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, No. 83-1217 (10th Cir., May 17. 1983). See also dilkinson (H), 800
F.2d at 1005 (Baldock, J., concurring).
176. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400 (1969).
A broadcaster seeks and is granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and
valuable part of the public domain; when he accepts that franchise it is burdened
by enforceable public obligations. A newspaper can be operated at the whim or
caprice of its owner; the broadcast station cannot.
Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C.
Cir. 1966).
177. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 110
(emphasis added); see also Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. at 395.
178. See generally Kreiss, supra note 50, at 1024-26.
179. See generally FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984); Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101-02 (1973).
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quencies.18 0  Thus, the reasonable regulation of broadcast com-
munications, consistent with the legitimate public purposes to which the
public airwaves have been dedicated, has been upheld, s18 even though
similar regulation of media not requiring the use of limited public re-
sources has been invalidated. 182 Likewise, reasonable regulation of
other media which require the use of limited public resources has been
upheld so long as the regulation has been consistent with the legiti-
mate public purposes to which those public resources have been
dedicated.1
8 3
Like broadcasting, cable television requires the use of public
resources. Cable television companies must use public ways, alleys,
streets, easements and public condemnation authority to run and main-
tain their cables.1 8 4 Developing and maintaining a cable television sys-
tem would be impossible without the right to enter, use, and possibly
disrupt public property or public easements on private property. More-
over, the public resources necessary for the operation of cable television
systems can only be used by a very limited number of cable television
operations at one time.
18 5
180. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 387-90; see also National Broad-
casting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213-14, (1943). It is questionable whether the
"scarcity" rationale still is a valid justification at all for broadcasting regulations. See
Botein, Cable TV in the U.S.A.: The Legal and Regulatory Environment, 3J. MEDIA L. & PRAc.
320, 323 (1982); Fowler & Brennan, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX.
L. REV. 207, 221-26 (1982). But see FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376
n. 11.
181. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) (federal
statute requiring broadcasters to sell airtime to candidates for federal office upheld);
Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (penalty for broadcasting indecent radio program upheld); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the "fairness doctrine" which
requires broadcasters to give persons or causes criticized in editorials an opportunity to
reply).
182. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (Florida
statute requiring newspapers to give free right to reply to political candidates whom they
had editorially criticized held unconstitutional by unanimous Court).
183. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (school district policy permitting union rep-
resenting teachers to use internal school mail system but denying other unions from using
the system constitutional); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding military regula-
tions banning partisan political speeches and literature disruptive to military morale on
military post); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (city policy prohibit-
ing use of advertising space on public buses for political advertising held to be constitu-
tional even though the city allowed commercial advertising for public service groups,
churches, banks, cigarettes, liquor, etc.). Cf Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (Illinois
statute which prohibited residential picketing except in labor dispute invalidated); Consol-
idated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (PSC ban on billing letter
inserts discussing controversial issues invalidated); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972) (ordinance prohibiting picketing on a public way near school invalidated); Hague v.
CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (ordinance prohibiting public meetings and distribution of
printed material in streets without permit unconstitutional).
184. See, e.g., Omega Satellite Prod. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 127 (7th Cir.
1982); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1377-78 (10th
Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982).
185. This is due in part to the intolerable disruption of the public ways created by the
repeated trenching, stringing, and repairing of the public ways which multiple cable sys-
tems could foster. See generally Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1449 (D.C.
Cir. 1985); Omega Satellite Prod. Co., 694 F.2d at 127; Communitv Communications Co., 660 F.2d
at 1397. But cf. Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396,
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Because cable television systems require the monopolistic or oligo-
polistic use of certain public resources, 18 6 it is well within the province
of a local government to dedicate those resources to purposes consis-
tent with the character of the community and the quality of its neighbor-
hoods. As a condition to the use of their public resources, it is
reasonable for family-oriented communities to require a cable television
company to agree to provide programming that is not unfit for general
family viewing - at least during hours when families would be watching
television. Such requirements would be consistent with the legitimate
public purposes to which the public resources are dedicated: to protect
1406 (9th Cir.), cert, granted, 106 S. Ct. 302 (1985), aff'd and remanded 106 S.Ct. 2043 (1985)
("It has not been alleged that public utility facilities owned or controlled by the City can
only support the use of a single or a few cables.") The Supreme Court remanded Preferred
Communications for "fuller development of the disputed issues" of fact, e.g. the degree of
disruption and the dangers of having two cable operations. 106 S. Ct. at 2038. Another
factor is that cable television systems operate in most communities as "natural monopo-
lies." Omega Satellite Prod. Co., 694 F.2d at 126. Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh
Circuit, described the "natural monopoly" of cable television this way:
The cost of the cable grid appears to be the biggest cost of a cable television
system and to be largely invariant to the number of subscribers the system has.
We said earlier that once the grid is in place - once every major street has a
cable running above or below it that can be hooked up to the individual resi-
dences along the street - the cost of adding another subscriber probably is
small.
If so, the average cost of cable television would be minimized by having a
single company in any given geographical area; for if there is more than one com-
pany and therefore more than one grid, the cost of each grid will be spread over a
smaller number of subscribers, and the average cost per subscriber, and hence
price, will be higher. If the foregoing accurately describes conditions . . . it de-
scribes what economists call a "natural monopoly," wherein the benefits, and in-
deed the very possiblity, of competition are limited. You can start with a
competitive free-for-all - different cable television systems frantically building
out their grids and signing up subscribers in an effort to bring down their average
costs faster than their rivals - but eventually there will be only a single company,
because until a company serves the whole market it will have an incentive to keep
expanding in order to lower its average costs. In the interim there may be waste-
ful duplication of facilities. This duplication may lead not only to higher prices to
cable television subscribers, at least in the short run, but also to higher costs to
other users of the public ways, who must compete with the cable television com-
panies for access to them.
Id. While the existence of a natural monopoly does not warrant regulation of private com-
munications media, the fact that a public resource realistically may be used by only one, or
a very few, cable system(s) at a time, necessarily and directly affects the public interest
upon which the constitutionality of cable television regulations depends. See, e.g., Omega
Satellite Prod. Co., 694 F.2d at 127-28; Community Communications Co., 660 F.2d at 1379. The
validity of the restrictions imposed upon users of the medium must directly relate to the
legitimate public purposes to which it has been dedicated.
186. The Tenth Circuit noted these points in an excellent opinion, Community Com-
munications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S.
1001 (1982), wherein the court distinguished cable television from the print media and
held that cable broadcasting's attributes are sufficiently distinguishable from those of the
print medium to preclude applying "the nearly absolute strictures against direct govern-
ment regulation of newspapers' disemmination of information . . . in wholesale fashion to
cable operators." Id. at 1377. In an incisive opinion for the court of appeals, Judge Sey-
mour concluded that "government must have some authority in such a context to see to it
that optimum use is made of the cable medium in public interest," id at 1379, because of
the "natural monopoly" aspect of cable television, id. at 1378, and because cable television
systems must utilize public streets, ways, alleys and easements, causing "government and
cable operators [to be] tied in a way that government and newspapers are not." Id. at
1377-78.
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and foster the character of the community. Because the type of material
restricted would still be available to the members of the community
through private channels of communication, 187 the decision to so condi-
tion the use of the public resources could hardly be deemed censorship
of private communications.
Nothing in the first amendment requires local governments to pro-
vide public resources as a conduit for transmission of material that of-
fends the values and subverts the character of the community. Nothing
in the first amendment prevents the government from requiring a com-
munications company that enjoys the exclusive or oligopolistic use of
the public domain for private profit to refrain from transmitting at cer-
tain times or under certain conditions sexually explicit material that is
patently offensive to the community.18 8 Dedication of public resources
to foster an atmosphere in which families can enjoy access to educa-
tional programs, coverage of current events, and quality entertainment
in their homes without having to risk the intrusion of unwanted sexually
explicit programming is a legitimate and important public interest. In-
sofar as the regulations imposed upon cable operators reasonably fur-
ther that interest in a manner which is not overly broad and without
prejudice to particular viewpoints, the first amendment provides no ba-
sis for invalidating the regulations.
Board of Education v. Pico 189 provides strong support for this conclu-
sion. The issue in that case was whether a local board of education
could remove from junior high school and high school libraries certain
books which it found to be "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-
Sem[i]tic, and just plain filthy."' 9 0 The trial court granted summary
judgment for the school board, but the court of appeals reversed and
remanded for trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there
was a genuine issue of material fact. 19 1 Significantly, eight of the Jus-
tices specifically indicated that even though the books were not obscene
they could constitutionally be removed if they were vulgar. 19 2 If a
187. For example, video rental outlets, bookstores, theatres, etc. Moreover, this mate-
rial might also be available on cable television at times when it was not devoted to further-
ing the dedicated purposes.
188. See Red Lion Broadcasting, 395 U.S. at 389: "There is nothing in the First Amend-
ment which prevents the Government from requiring a licensee.., to conduct himself as
proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are representa-
tive of his community .. ." See also Kreiss, supra note 50, at 1026. "The argument that the
cable operator ought to have complete editorial freedom in order to disseminate his own
views and ideas is considerably weakened when the cable operator is considered a
conduit."
189. 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion).
190. Id. at 857.
191. Id. at 869-75 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.); id. at
883-84 (White, J., concurring in the judgment only). Three Justices, in an opinion written
by Justice Brennan, argued that the first amendment protects a "right to receive informa-
tion" and that school libraries occupy a unique and specially-protected place in the con-
stella tion of first amendment rights. Id. at 863-69 (Brennan, J., opinion joined by Marshall
and Stevens, JJ., Blackmun, J., joined in part). Five Justices, however, explicity rejected
that broad theory. Id. at 875-80 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part); id. at 885-95 (Burger,
CJ., dissenting joined by Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor, JJ.).
192. Id. at 871 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and Stevens, J.J.) ("pervasively vul-
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school or public library may ban or restrict access to certain nonobscene
books or magazines that some of its patrons want to read but which
would offend many others and are deemed to be vulgar,' 93 it is not un-
reasonable for state and local governments to similarly regulate pro-
gramming on cable television systems which enjoy the privilege of
exclusive use of public resources.
In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,19 4 several members of the
Supreme Court upheld the principle that public authorities may forbid
the use of public resources for sexually explicit programs. The Court
considered the refusal of a municipality to lease a city theater to South-
eastern Promotions for presentation of the musical "Hair," which was
replete with scenes involving group nudity and simulated sex. A jury,
the trial court, and the court of appeals upheld the municipality's re-
fusal, finding that the production was "obscene."' 9 5 The Supreme
Court did not review that finding, nor did the majority address the con-
stitutionality of restricting use of public facilities for sexually explicit
programs. Emphasizing the narrow basis for its decision, the Court
found the municipality's refusal unconstitutional because the decision to
refuse to lease was made "under a system lacking in constitutionally re-
quired minimum procedural safeguards." 1
96
In separate opinions, however, three dissenting Justices addressed
the lurking first amendment issue and explicitly endorsed the propriety
of a public entity monitoring for decency the material presented on a
publicly-owned stage. Justice White, who refrained from addressing the
first amendment question in Pico, emphasized in a dissent which was
joined by the ChiefJustice that a public entity "may reserve its audito-
rium for productions suitable for exhibition to all citizens of the city,
adults and children alike."' 9 7 Justice Rehnquist declared:
[I]f it is the desire of the citizens of Chattanooga, who presuma-
bly have paid for and own the facilities, that the attractions to
be shown there should not be of the kind which would offend
any substantial number of potential theatergoers, I do not think
gar"); id. at 880 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part) ("offensive language" or inappropriate
to age group); id. at 890 (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by Powell, Rehnquist and
O'Connor, JJ.) ("random vulgarity" would be sufficient); id. at 897 (Powell, J., dissenting)
("vulgar or racist").
193. When school libraries are involved, the constitutional analysis is different than
when the library involved is an ordinary public library. While there has been substantial
litigation concerning censorship in school libraries, see supra note 191 and Note, State Indoc-
trination and the Protection of Non-State Voices in the Schools: Justifying a Prohibition of School Li-
brary Censorship, 35 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1983), there has been surprisingly little litigation
concerning censorship or restriction of materials in public libraries. See, e.g., O'Neil, Li-
braries, Liberties and the First Amendment, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 209 (1973); O'Neil, Libraries,
Librarians and First Amendment Freedom, 4 HUMAN RTS. 295 (1975); Schmutz, The Purity Patrol,
10 STUD. LAW., Oct. 1981, at 14, 16; Appleson, Lawscope: Out of Reach, 67 A.B.A.J. 825
(1981).
194. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
195. Id. at 550-52.
196. Id. at 552.
197. Id. at 569 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J.).
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the policy can be described as arbitrary or unreasonable. 198
Finally, the Pacifica opinion further supports the principle that pub-
lic bodies may regulate vulgar programming on communications sys-
tems using limited public resources to operate. The significance of
cable operators' use of public resources is emphasized by the Supreme
Court's distinction in Pacifica of private, closed-circuit cable systems.
The Court noted that "differences between radio, television, and perhaps
closed-circuit transmissions, may also be relevant [to the constitutional anal-
ysis]."' 19 9 Therefore, private "closed circuit" cable television systems
operated on private property present an analytically distinguishable situ-
ation. 20 0 Public cable television systems, however, are not "closed cir-
cuit" in any sense that was relevant to the constitutional analysis in
Pacifica. To impose reasonable restrictions on the transmission of sexu-
ally explicit material over public cable television systems, which must
use the public domain to operate does not, however, constitute an intru-
sion on the constitutionally protected first amendment or privacy inter-
ests of cable operators or subscribers. Clearly, then, the public interests
of decency and good taste justify some regulation of speech communi-
cated via media using public resources.
2 0 1
3. The Privacy of the Place into Which the Material Intrudes.
The place where the communication occurs is extremely significant
for first amendment analysis. The Supreme Court has emphasized that
the reasonableness of a time, place and manner regulation depends
upon "whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with
the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time."' 20 2 The
Court has repeatedly distinguished communication that occurs in public
from communication that intrudes into the privacy of the home. The
latter has consistently been subject to greater regulation under the first
amendment than the former. As a place of refuge, the home has been
accorded the status of a constitutionally protected sanctuary. 20 3 The
Supreme Court has stated that "[tihe state's interest in protecting the
well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the high-
est order in a free and civilized society." 20 4 This special status derives
from our constitutional traditions of extraordinary respect for personal
privacy2° 5 and deference to family autonomy.20 6 The value of protect-
198. Id. 572 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
199. 438 U.S. at 750 (emphasis added).
200. For example, closed-circuit cable systems operated by "x-rated motels" which
show sexually explicit movies to thier customers might call for a different analysis. Those
systems are analytically more similar to private "x-rated" movie theatres than to public
cable television systems.
201. 438 U.S. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring). See infra note 309.
202. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
203. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See generally Hafen, The Constitu-
tional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing The Individual And Social Inter-
ests, 81 MIcH. L. REv.463 (1983).
204. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980).
205. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (warrantless and nonconsensual entry
into defendant's home to make routine felony arrest unconstitutional); Stanley v Georgia,
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ing the sancity of the home is so important that the Supreme Court has
upheld statutes protecting the residential character of entire neighbor-
hoods, not just individuals' residences, from unwanted intrusions of
protected sexual activity.
20 7
In Rowan v. United States Post Office Department,20 8 the Court upheld
the constitutionality of a federal statute requiring the mailer of material
which the recipient considered to be "sexually provocative" to remove,
upon request, the name and address of the recipient from the mailer's
mailing list. The Court rejected the argument that the Constitution per-
mits a vendor "to send unwanted material into the home of another"
because "[t]he ancient concept that 'a man's home is his castle' into
which 'not even the king may enter' has lost some of its vitality .... ,,209
This factor was emphasized in both the majority and concurring
opinions in Pacifica. There the Court said: "Patently offensive, indecent
material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in
public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual's right
to be left alone plainly outweighs the first amendment rights of an in-
truder. "210 Concurring, Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun, un-
394 U.S. 557 (1969) (overturning conviction of defendant for merely possessing obscenity
in his home); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (insertion of "spike mike"
into heating duct of defendant's home unconstitutional); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128
(1954) (illegal entry to install microphone in bedroom of defendant "flagrantly ... vio-
late[d] the... Fourth Amendment," but exclusionary rule held not applicable to states);
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (forced stomach pumping to recover illegal
drugs unconstitutional). In fact, the Court has repeatedly declared that "physical entry of
the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is di-
rected." United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). "The fourth
amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of
privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions
of an individual's home-a home that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional
terms ...." Payton, 445 U.S. at 589; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (convic-
tion of family planning employee for violating law prohibiting distribution of contracep-
tives or contraceptive information overturned).
206. See Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (law authorizing parents to commit their
child to mental hospital over child's objection without adversarial hearing upheld); Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-506 (1977)(conviction of grandmother for
violation of zoning statute prohibiting her from allowing two grandsons to reside with her
overturned); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)(conviction of Amish parents for not
sending their children to school past the eighth grade overturned).
207. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (zoning ordi-
nance requiring motion picture theaters that show non-obscene but sexually explicit mov-
ies to be dispersed throughout the city upheld). Cf Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452
U.S. 61 (1981) (zoning ordinance prohibiting live entertainment was applied to prohibit
nude dancing, held unconstitutional, with dicta stating that "if there were countywide zon-
ing, it would be quite legal to allow live entertainment in only selected areas of the county
and to exclude it from primarily residential communities .... . id. at 76). In Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974),Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, declared:
"The police power is not confined to eliminating filth, stench and unhealthy places. It is
ample to lay our zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion
and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
208. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
209. Id. at 737, 738.
210. 438 U.S. at 748. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Pacifica defended the restric-
tion on indecent radio broadcasts because of the distinction that "adults who feel the need
may purchase tapes and records or go to theaters and nightclubs to hear these words." Id.
at 750 n.28.
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derscored the significance of this intrusion:
[B]roadcasting-unlike most other forms of communication-
comes directly into the home, the one place where people ordi-
narily have the right not to be assaulted by uninvited and offen-
sive sights and sounds .... Although the First Amendment may
require unwilling adults to absorb the first blow of offensive but
protected speech when they are in public before they turn
away, . . . a different order of values obtains in the home.
"That we are often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home
and subject to objectionable speech and other sound[s] does
not mean we must be captives everywhere."
2 1 1
In many cases where laws regulating speech in public have been
invalidated on first amendment grounds, the Supreme Court has been
careful to distinguish this factor and has reiterated that regulation in the
interest of protecting the privacy of the home is permissible. For in-
stance, in Cohen v. California,2 12 the Supreme Court overturned the "dis-
turbing the peace" conviction of a young man who wore a jacket in a
public courthouse bearing the slogan "Fuck the Draft." The Court
stated that the privacy interest of individuals who are offended by seeing
a printed vulgarity while "walking through a courthouse corridor ... is
nothing like the interest in being free from unwanted expression in the
confines of one's own home."'2 13 The Court has recognized that "gov-
ernment may properly act in many situations to prohibit intrusion into
the privacy of the home of unwelcome views and ideas which cannot be
totally banned from the public dialogue."
'2 14
Similarly, in Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville,2 5 the Court declared un-
constitutional a local ordinance prohibiting drive-in movie theaters from
showing any film that contained nudity. Again, however, the Court care-
fully distinguished the greater interest of the state in protecting the pri-
vacy of the home from the "limited privacy interest of persons on the
public streets."2 1 6 The Court observed that the kind of regulations en-
acted by the city of Jacksonville "have been upheld only when the
speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home ... or the degree of captiv-
ity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid ex-
posure." 2 17 In Carey v. Brown 2 18 the Court held that an Illinois statute
prohibiting picketing at residences, except labor picketing, unconstitu-
tionally violated the equal protection clause. The Court, however, em-
phasized that the defect in the statute was its unconstitutional
preference for one type of speech,2 1 9 and went to great lengths to reit-
211. Id. at 759 (quoting Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (Powell, J.
concurring)).
212. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
213. Id. at 21-22.
214. Id. at 21.
215. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
216. Id. at 212.
217. Id. at 209 (citations omitted).
218. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
219. Id. at 461-63.
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erate that the protection of homes from unwanted speech was a valid
objective of state legislation. "Preserving the sanctity of the home ... is
surely an important value. Our decisions reflect no lack of solicitude for
the right of an individual 'to be let alone' in the privacy of the home,
'sometimes the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick.' "220
The nature and degree of intrusiveness into the home of cable pro-
gramming is virtually identical to that of broadcast television. Indecent
cable television programming reaches directly into the homes of all per-
sons who subscribe to the medium, some of whom deeply resent the
intrusion of sexually offensive materials into the havens they have cre-
ated for their families. Protecting the sanctuary of the home justifies
reasonable regulations which enable families to avoid unwanted intru-
sions of sexually explicit indecent material into their homes without
foregoing an entire medium. As with broadcast television and radio,
cable television should be reasonably regulated to achieve this goal.
4. Audience Captivity
Because the television viewer has no control over the television pro-
gramming, he is, in a sense, a captive of the programmer whenever he
turns on the television set. This is just as true of cable television as it is
of broadcast television. This type of intrusiveness was emphasized by
the Supreme Court in Pacifica as one of the main justifications for the
constitutionality of the regulation of broadcast indecency. 22 1 Many
viewers subscribe to cable for programs such as news, sports and gen-
eral entertainment but do not want to see, even inadvertently, sexually
explicit programs. Their invitation of the cable medium into their
homes is no more an invitation of sexually explicit cable programming
than was the purchase of FM radio an invitation to George Carlin's inde-
cent monologue which was heard by the complainant and his son in
Pacifica. The Supreme Court, in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Demo-
cratic National Committee,2 22 upheld the FCC's finding that a television
broadcaster had not violated the Fairness Doctrine by refusing to sell
time to responsible entities to present views on public issues. The Court
noted that "in a very real sense listeners and viewers constitute a 'cap-
tive audience.' ",223 Quoting Judge Bazelon, the Court observed:
" 'Written messages are not communicated unless they are read, and
reading requires an affirmative act .... [A]n ordinary habitual television
220. Id. at 471 (quoting Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 118 (1969) (Black, J., con-
curring)). The Court further emphasized that " 'no mandate in our Constitution leaves
States ... powerless to pass laws to protect the public from ... conduct that disturbs the
tranquility of spots selected by the people ... for homes .... " Id. at 470-71.
221. Because the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out, prior warnings
cannot completely protect the listener or viewer from unexpected program content. To
say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent
language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow.
Carey v. Brown, 438 U.S. at 748, 749. See also id. at 759 (Powell,J., concurring) (emphasiz-
ing that "a different order of values obtains in the home").
222. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
223. Id. at 127.
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watcher can avoid [messages] . . . only by frequently leaving the room,
changing the channel, or doing some other such affirmative act.' ",224
Even in cases not involving the home, the Court has justified state
regulation designed to protect captive audiences from unwanted intru-
sions. 22 5 Most recently the Court emphasized this factor in Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Products Corp. 226 Distinguishing the Pacifica statute prohibit-
ing indecent radio broadcasting from the statute before it, which prohib-
ited the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives, the
Court found mail to be "far less intrusive and uncontrollable" than ra-
dio or television broadcasts. 2 2 7 The Court opined that the "short,
though regular, journey from mail box to trash can ... is an acceptable
burden" to impose upon persons who receive unsolicited contraceptive
advertisements through the mail.
2 28
The lower courts which have invalidated cable indecency regula-
tions have emphasized the ostensibly greater freedom which cable tele-
vision affords its viewers as compared to broadcast television. 229 The
courts, however, have confused different methods of making the same
choice with different choices. They have embraced the fallacy that one is
freer, or has more choice, if four steps arie required to tune-in than if the
process only requires three steps.
There is no analytically significant distinction between the "entry
choice" made by the viewer of broadcast television and the viewer of
cable television. The entry choices are made in different ways23 0 and
involve different market CoStS, 2 3 1 but they are functionally equi-
valent.23 2 The choice to subscribe to cable television service and receive
a prepackaged set of cable channels is functionally no different than the
purchase of a television set with channel capacity limited to the twelve
ordinary frequency bands, or a television set with the capacity to receive
six higher frequency channels, or a radio with AM and FM tuning. The
choice to tune in to a program is the same, whether the viewer must
manipulate three knobs or four. The choice to tune out or turn off a
television program is the same whether the program is transmitted over
cable or broadcast television.
224. Id. at 128 (quoting Banzhafv. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969)(emphasis in original)).
225. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); Public Util.
Comm'n v. Pollack, 343, U.S. 451 (1952); Kovaks v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
226. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
227. Id. at 74.
228. Id. at 72 (quoting Lamont v. Comm'n of Motor Vehicle, 269 F. Supp. 880, 883
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 386 F.2d 449 (2nd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 915 (1968)).
229. See, e.g., Cruz (I), 571 F. Supp. 125, 132; Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164, 1168-69. The
courts have emphasized that cable viewers must voluntarily subscribe. Cruz (H), 755 F.2d
at 1419; Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. at 1113; Cruz (1), 571 F. Supp. at 132; Roy City, 555 F.
Supp. at 1169-70; H.B.O., 531 F. Supp. at 1001-02; see also G. SHAPIRO, P. Kurland &J.
Mercurio, "Cable Speech" The Case for First Amendment Protection 42-48 (1983).
230. Different ways are: T.V. purchase versus purchase plus cable subscription.
231. For example, $25 per month on installment to buy the television set versus $35
per month-$25 for the television set plus $10 for the cable service.
232. From the Pacifica perspective, it is noteworthy that FM radio is an "extra" level of
radio service, purchased as an "extra" supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
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More important, once the cable television subscriber has made his
entry decision, to buy the television and subscribe to cable, he is every
bit as much a "captive" of the system's programming as the broadcast
television viewer. A television network or cable system executive in New
York or elsewhere chooses which programs to present and when to
transmit them. 2 33 Unlike a book-buyer or movie-goer, the T.V. pur-
chaser or cable subscriber has selected specific content. Thus, to a large
extent, the viewer is at the mercy of cable television programmers.
23 4
Without some public regulation the individual who seeks benefits of
cable television but without the risk of viewing, even inadvertently, pa-
tently offensive, sexually explicit material may be forced to chose all or
nothing. He or she must either take cable programming in whatever
preselected package the cable system or channel operator chooses or
forego the benefits of cable television altogether.
23 5
5. Accessibility to Children
The dissemination of nonobscene, but "patently offensive," sexu-
ally explicit material by means of a communication system that is easily
accessible to children creates a serious problem. In Pacifica the Court
held that greater regulation is permissible in such circumstances. In his
concurring opinion Justice Powell explained that
[s]ellers of printed and recorded matter and exhibitors of mo-
tion pictures and live performances may be required to shut
their doors to children. . . . The difficulty is that such a physi-
cal separation of the audience cannot be accomplished in the
broadcast media. During most of the broadcast hours, both
adults and unsupervised children are likely to be in the broad-
cast audience, and the broadcaster cannot reach willing adults
without also reaching children. This . . . is one of the distinc-
tions between the broadcast and other media to which we have
often adverted as justifying a different treatment of the broad-
cast media for First Amendment purposes.
23 6
Likewise, in Rowan, the Court identified the parents' interest in pro-
tecting their children when it upheld the constitutionality of a postal
233. See also Weinstein, supra note 20, at 31 (stating that programmers, not consumers,
make the choices); supra note 145-56 and accompanying text.
234. See Ross, supra note 23, at 30 (concerns of public interest representatives about
cable operators' control of programming).
235. At present, the technological devices which are designed to screen out or lock out
undesired programming do not appear to be very reliable. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note
20, at 32; Goldstein, Cable TV's Shame: 'Gore-nography', N.Y. Times,July 3, 1984, at Y27, col.
6. The state of Utah proffered evidence in Wilkinson (I) that less than one percent of cable
subscribers have lockboxes. Wilkinson (I), 800 F.2d at 1003 (Baldock, J., concurring).
Judge Baldock described the devices for screening out sexually explicit programming (pro-
gram guides and lockboxes) as ineffective, burdensome, and complex. Id. at 33. He con-
cluded that the benefits of cable television "should be available to all who are willing to
subscribe, even those who object to patently offensive indecent material being presented
during family viewing hours." Id. at 34.
236. 438 U.S. at 758, 759 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,
433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977)); see also Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973), Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-87.
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regulation allowing a homeowner to have his name removed from mail-
ing lists: "Nor should the householder have to risk that offensive mate-
rial come into the hands of his children before it can be stopped."
23 7
The Court has emphasized that protecting the well-being of a minor
constitutes a compelling state interest, 238 and that a state may enact reg-
ulations to support the rights of parents to shelter their children from
offensive expression and offensive behavior such as child pornogra-
phy.2 3 9 In 1968, the Court upheld a New York statute which prohibited
the sale of "girlie" magazines to minors under the age of seventeen,
even though the Court acknowledged that the magazines were not ob-
scene and that sale of them to adults could not be prohibited. 2 40 Af-
firming a conviction under the statute, the Ginsberg Court declared that
the parents' authority to direct their children's upbringing in the home
is a basic part of American society. "The legislature could properly
conclude that parents ... who have this primary responsibility for chil-
dren's well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid dis-
charge of that responsibility."' 24 1 Thus, there is a powerful state interest
in preserving and supporting the authority of parents as guardians and
supervisors of what enters the home and is accessible to children. The
state also has a strong interest in protecting children from exposure to
material that may be harmful to their moral, emotional and social
development.
24 2
Because of the accessibility of children to television at all hours of
the day and night2 4 3 the government's right to restrict the transmission
237. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970).
238. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982).
239. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982); Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749, 750; Gins-
berg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
240. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
241. Id. at 639. In another case Justice Powell explained why state support for paren-
tal authority in childrearing has traditionally been favored by the Court.
Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent
with our tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one of the basic
presuppositions of the latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those sup-
portive of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the full
growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful
and rewarding.
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1979) (plurality opinion).
242. See Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 5159 (1986); Ginsberg, 390
U.S. at 640 Patterson v. Phoenix, 103 Ariz. 64, 69, 436 P.2d 613, 618 (1968); see also Chng
& Giles, Television, Children and Sexuality: The Need for Parents as Mediators, 18 FAM. PERSPEC-
TIVES 179 (1984) (citing studies establishing "the potential damage children may incur in
several areas of the development: intellectual, social, psychological and sexual" from
watching inappropriate television shows).
243. See V. PACKARD, OUR ENDANGERED CHILDREN: GROWING UP IN A CHANGING WORLD
94 (1983) (reporting Nielsen findings that close to 10% of preschool children and a quar-
ter of grade school children are watching TV between ten and eleven p.m.; nearly five
percent of preschoolers and 10% of gradeschoolers are watching TV between eleven p.m.
and midnight); Chng & Giles, supra note 242, at 181 (Studies show that children spend
18,000 hours watching television, 50% more time than they spend in school, that children
aged two to five watch an average of 31 hours of television each week, adolescents 25
hours per week, and that "from a very young age many children watch programs that were
intended for adult audiences.").
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of indecency over broadcast television is clear.2 44 The Pacifica rule al-
lowing reasonable regulations to protect children from indecent mate-
rial carried over a readily accessible broadcasting medium is equally
applicable to cable television.
24 5
6. The Manner or the Form of Expression
The form of expression or speech affects its intrusiveness. The cir-
cumstances, method and manner of speech may make an enormous dif-
ference in the constitutional analysis. In his classic statement of this
principle, Justice Holmes noted that "the character of every act depends
upon the circumstances in which it is done .... The most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting
fire in a theatre and causing a panic."' 24 6 The nature of the govern-
ment's interest implicated by this factor was identified by the Supreme
Court in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton 2 4 7 as a concern for quality of life in
our democracy. 2 48 Material that is patently offensive because it contains
244. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749, 750.
245. It is important to note that Pacifica upheld the "channeling" of inappropriate ma-
terial away from children, not the total banning of it. If effective and reliable lockboxes and
programming guides are available and affordable, and time-channeling is required, the
interests of children may be largely capable of protection by the same method emphasized
in Ginsburg - by parental supervision.
246. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). If one were to calmly invite
theater patrons to leave the building because of fire danger, Justice Holmes' example
would wither, because the form of expression, "shouting fire," is a key element in his exam-
ple. See also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words may be
proscribed); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (libel may give rise to liabil-
ity for damages).
247. 413 U.S. 49 (1973). It is important to distinguish this factor-the form of expres-
sion-from the other factors which pertain to the intrusiveness of speech. All four factors
involve dual interests-the interest of the individual as well as the interest of the govern-
ment. Thus, the privacy of the home or place of communication implicates the individual's
interest in personal privacy as well as the government's interest in preserving the right to
be left alone. The captivity of the audience implicates the individual's interest in choice and
the government's interest in preserving the value of individual autonomy. The accessibility
of children to indecent material implicates the interests of parents in raising their children
and the governmental interest in protecting future generations from potentially corruptive
material. Likewise, the manner or expression of the speech implicates the individual's right to be
free from unreasonable and unsolicited influences which sabotage the quality of life as well
as the government's interest in maintaining a safe and decent society. Of course, the gov-
ernment's interest in maintaining a safe and decent society will not support interference
with the pursuit of nonthreatening but unpopular lifestyles by some individuals. See, e.g.,
Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
559, 581 (1965) (Black, j., concurring and dissenting); Niemetko v. Maryland, 340 U.S.
262, 272-73 (1951). See generatty New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964); L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTrruTsONAL LAw 580-88 (1979).
248.
Quite apart from [any linkage between obscene material and] sex crimes, how-
ever, there remains one problem of large proportions aptly described by Profes-
sor Bickel:
It concerns the tone of society, the mode ... the style and quality of life
now and in the future .... Even supposing that each of us can, if he wishes,
effectively avert the eye and stop the ear (which, in truth, we cannot), what is
commonly read and seen and heard and done intrudes upon us all, want it or
not. ...
As Mr. Chief Justice Warren stated, there is a "right of the Nation and of the
States to maintain a decent society."
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lurid descriptions of sexual organs or activities is more intrusive upon
the privacy, autonomy and decency which the Constitution protects than
many other kinds of regulable speech. 2 49 Sexually explicit material has
a tendency to degrade and cheapen women, to present women as ob-
jects to be used, and to deny women their right to individual dignity and
choice.
2 50
The regulation of sexually explicit material is really regulation of a
form of expression than regulation of content. 25 1 Vulgarity is a matter
of style, not substance; manner, not content. Any message or idea con-
veyed with offensive, sexually explicit depictions, or vulgar descriptions,
can be conveyed without the offensive sexual depiction or vulgar de-
scription. The use of sexually explicit language or depictions jars for the
same reason the use of profane, racist, or sexist language jars. Just as
there are valid justifications for restricting the use of such language in
certain contexts,2 52 the restriction of sexually explicit expression may be
reasonable in some contexts. This is what the Court meant in Pacifica
when it likened pornography to a "pig in the parlor."
2 53
This point may be difficult to comprehend if one is wedded to the
pigeonhole doctrine of the first amendment that views sexually explicit
material as either obscene and wholly unprotected or nonobscene and
wholly protected. That "either/or" framework is not only overly sim-
plistic and unrealistic, but inaccurate as a matter of fact and law. Factu-
ally, the line between technically obscene material and nonobscene,
sexually explicit material, which is patently offensive to community val-
ues, is hazy at best. Indecent, sexually explicit material offends "for the
same reasons that obscenity offends,' '2 54 only not to the same degree.
413 U.S. 49, 58-60 (citations omitted).
249. It is important to distinguish material that is sexually explicit and patently offen-
sive from material that merely contains nudity. This distinction was noted by the Court in
Erznoznik. The Jacksonville drive-in movie ordinance which was invalidated prohibited
outdoor movie theaters from showing films containing any nudity. Justice Powell, writing
for the Court, emphasized that
[t]he ordinance is not directed against sexually explicit nudity, nor is it otherwise
limited. Rather, it sweepingly forbids display of all films containing any uncov-
ered buttocks or breasts, irrespective of context or pervasiveness. Thus it would
bar a film containing a picture of a baby's buttocks, the nude body of a war victim,
or scenes from a culture in which nudity is indigenous. The ordinance also might
prohibit newsreel scenes of the opening of an art exhibit as well as shots of bath-
ers on a beach.
422 U.S. at 213.
250. Note, Antipornography Laws and First Amendment Values, 98 HARv. L. REV. 460 (1984).
251. See City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984)
("proscribing intrusive and unpleasant formats for expression") (emphasis added).
252. For example, restrictions on the use of profane, racist or demeaning sexist lan-
guage in courtrooms, classrooms, or churches, are not uncommon or unreasonable. See
Riggs, supra note 161, at 273 n.78. See also infra note 259.
253. 438 U.S. at 750, 751.
254. 438 U.S. at 746 (Stevens,]., plurality opinion). Sexually explicit material in some
respects partakes more of the characteristics of a drug than communication. See F.
SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 181 (1982). The effects of sexually
explicit material upon the immediate sexual condition of the recipient, may far exceed
whatever impact it has on his or her rational-cognitive senses, if any. In this sense, sexu-
ally explicit material is more like a substance than speech; its transfer more clearly resem-
bles commerce than communication.
[Vol. 63:4
CABLE TELEVISION PROGRAMMING
And it may be restricted for the same reason that obscenity may be re-
stricted, only not to the same degree.
Constitutionally, the "either/or" categorization of sexually explicit
material is also inaccurate. In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., a ma-
jority of the Court agreed that "there is surely a less vital interest in the
uninhibited exhibition of material that is on the borderline between por-
nography and artistic expression than in the free dissemination of ideas
of social and political significance .... "255 Justice Stevens, writing for
himself and three other members of the Court, expressed an even more
forceful point of view when he added that "society's interest in protect-
ing this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude
than the interest in untrammeled political debate .... -256 While the
Court has held that nonobscene sexually explicit communication "is not
without its First Amendment protections from official regulation,
'2 5 7
the Court has never declared that patently offensive, sexually explicit
material is entitled to the same degree of protection under the first
amendment that is provided for political speech, "the search for truth"
in the sciences, and artistic expression. 25 8 Indeed, in a number of con-
texts, especially those involving children, the Court has emphasized that
the constitutional protection accorded nonobscene but sexually explicit
indecent material is of a lesser magnitude.
2 59
255. 427 U.S. at 61.
256. Id. at 70 (Stevens J., plurality opinion); see also Schad, 452 U.S. at 80 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). In Pacifica,Justice Stevens expressed his opinion that: "At most... the Com-
mission's definition of indecency will deter only the broadcasting of patently offensive ref-
erences to excretory and sexual organs and activities. While some of these references may
be protected, they surely lie at the periphery of First Amendment concern." 438 U.S. at 743 (em-
phasis added). He further explained:
The question in this case is whether a broadcast of patently offensive words
dealing with sex and excretion may be regulated because of its content. Obscene
materials have been denied the protection of the First Amendment because their
content is so offensive to contemporary standards .... [Indecent materials] offend for
the same reason that obscenity offends. Their place in hierarchy of First Amendment
values was aptly sketched by Mr. Justice Murphy when he said: "[Sluch utter-
ances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth than any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."
Id. at 745, 746 (emphasis added).
257. Schad, 452 U.S. at 66.
258. Id. at 65. See also Garrison v. Louisiana, 374 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964): "[S]peech
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self
government."
259. In New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 757 (1982), the Court acknowledged that the
constitutional protection extended to certain lewd, albeit not obscene, sexual material was
not very great. "The value of permitting live performances and photographic reproduc-
tions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis. "
Id. at 762. Although the Court was sharply divided in Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853 (1982), concerning whether a public school library could remove nonobscene but
somewhat offensive books, eight of the nine Justices expressed their opinion that the
books could have been removed if they had been "pervasively vulgar." Id. at 871 (plurality
opinion); id. at 890 (Burger, CJ., dissenting); id. at 897 (Powell, J., dissenting). In Bethel
School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3165-66 (1986), the Court held that the
first amendment does not prevent a high school from disciplining a student for giving a
speech filled with indecent sexual innuendoes in a school assembly.
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B. The Intrusiveness Of The Regulations
Balanced against the degree of intrusiveness of the speech is the
degree of intrusiveness of the regulation. Pigeonhole thinking on this
side of the equation can be just as unrealistic and dangerous as pigeon-
hole notions about protected speech.
1. The Characteristics of the Medium of Communication
The nature of first amendment protection varies depending on the
character of the medium being regulated. "Each method of communi-
cating ideas is 'a law unto itself' and that law must reflect the 'differing
natures, values, abuses and dangers' of each method.
'260
The significance of the medium of communication for first amend-
ment analysis does not depend upon the technical characteristics of the
particular medium of expression. Rather, the constitutional significance
of the medium of communication depends upon the impact that use of a
particular medium may have upon protected constitutional interests.
Each particular medium has some immutable limitations, and some me-
dia unavoidably implicate constitutionally significant factors such as the
site of the communication, the degree of captivity of the audience and
the accessibility of children. Thus, in assessing the constitutionality of
the regulation of indecent material transmitted over cable television sys-
tems, the characteristics of cable television which affect other significant
constitutional interests must be considered.
261
For purposes of indecency regulation,2 62 the analytically relevant
characteristics of cable television are comparable to those of broadcast
television.2 63 Like broadcast television, cable television has a "pervasive
260. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981). "[D]ifferences in
the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards ap-
plied to them." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969). Each me-
dium of communication "tends to present its own peculiar problems." Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952). See also Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420
U.S. 546, 557 (1975).
261. The media characteristics which are analytically significant for one issue might be
irrelevant to the analysis of another issue. Thus, the characteristics of cable that are signif-
icant for analysis of the constitutionality of indecency regulations may differ from those
deemed relevant in assessing the constitutionality of access rules or antitrust regulations.
262. In assessing the constitutionality of other types of regulations including "must-
carry" rules, access rules, and restrictions on competition, some courts have concluded
that the analytically significant characteristics of cable television do not resemble broad-
casting. See, e.g., Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1447-54 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986); Preferred Communications v. Los Angeles, 754 F.2d
1396, 1403-10 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 380 (1985), remanded, 106 S. Ct. 1034
(1986). But cf. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1375-
80 (10th Cir. 1981) (city's districting ordinance may consittute a first amendment viola-
tion), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982); Berkshire Cablevision v. Burke, 571 F. Supp.
976, 983-88 (D.R.I. 1983) (Rhode Island's mandatory access regulations do not violate the
first amendment). However, even if the analytically significant characteristics of cable and
broadcast television are distinguishable when the issue involves some sort of economic,
market or operational regulation, they are indistinguishable when the issue is indecency
regulations.
263. See Wilkinson (H), 800 F.2d 1004-06 (Baldock, J., concurring). In Midwest Video (H1)
the Court acknowledged that cable television had become "enmeshed in the field of televi-
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presence in the lives of all Americans, ' 2 64 requires the near-exclusive
use of a limited public asset 2 6 5 and sends its programs directly into the
home 2 66 where sexually explicit programs may assault unsuspecting
viewers26 7 - including children. 268 These reasons justify the fact that
broadcasting has received less first amendment protection than all other
forms of communication.
26 9
Cable television might also be compared with telephone communi-
cations because it is a cable-delivered communications medium. The
transmission of indecent telephone communications, however, has long
been prohibited by federal law in a similar manner and to a similar ex-
tent as indecent broadcasting. 2 70 In 1983, for instance, Congress
amended the existing prohibition of indecent telephone communica-
tions to specifically address the problem of "dial-a-porn." 2 7 ' As
amended, 47 U.S.C. § 223 makes it a crime to knowingly make an ob-
scene or indecent communication by telephone to anyone under eight-
een years of age or to anyone without consent. 27 2 The FCC enacted
regulations providing that it would be a defense to prosecution if the
defendant operated only between 9:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m. or required
payment by credit card before transmitting the indecent message.2 73 In
Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC,2 7 4 the Second Circuit, while sug-
gesting that some regulation would be permissible, set aside this order
because the FCC had failed "to demonstrate that the regulatory scheme
is well tailored to its ends or that those ends could not be met by less
drastic means." 2 75 The Commission then promulgated a new regula-
tion which provided a defense if the defendant had required payment
for the telephone message by credit card or had required an authorized
access or identification code which was issued only to applicants over the
age of eighteen.
2 76
The important distinction between the regulation of "dial-a-porn"
and indecent cable television programming is that with "dial-a-porn"
the objectionable communication is specifically obtained by the recipi-
sion broadcasting" and that cable operators were "engage[d] in the functional equivalent
of broadcasting" when they provided origination cablecasting. 440 U.S. 689, 700 (1979).
264. See supra pp. 650-51.
265. See supra pp. 650-56.
266. See supra pp. 656-59; see also note 80.
267. See supra pp. 659-61 and 663-65.
268. See supra pp. 661-63.
269. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726, 748-749.
270. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1984).
271. 47 U.S.C. § 609 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see also H.R. REP. No.356, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 19, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2219, 2235. See generally
Cleary, Telephone Pornography: First Amendment Constrainst on Shielding Children From Dial-A-
Porn, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 503 (1985).
272. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (b)(l).
273. 49 Fed. Reg. 24,996, 25,003 (1984) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 64.201).
274. 749 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1984).
275. Id. at 121. "The FCC must give us a record that shows, convincingly, that the
regulations were chosen after thorough, careful, and comprehensive investigation and
analysis." Id. at 123.
276. 50 Fed. Reg. 42,699 (1985) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 64.201).
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ent affirmatively requesting it, whereas cable television subscribers who
receive the entire medium and specific cable television programs are not
individually selected. 2 77 Thus, "dial-a-porn" regulations can be limited
to the specific telephone number from which the offensive communica-
tions emanate, but indecent cable television programming, for better or
worse, must be regulated on a broader basis. 27 8 In any event, the Carlin
court did not suggest that the statute prohibiting indecent telephone
communications to youth or unwilling recipients presented any constitu-
tional problems.
2 79
2. The Necessity for Other Regulation in the Public Interest
The legitimate need for government to regulate cable television sys-
tems in the public interest is well established.2 8 0 In fact, the Tenth Cir-
cuit has declared that "government and cable operators are tied in a
way" that necessitates the regulation of cable television in the public
interest.28 1 "That is, government must have some authority in such a
context to see to it that optimum use is made of the cable medium in the
public interest. ' 28 2 Although the extension of such regulations to en-
compass matters of programming decency is a relatively recent develop-
ment, the power to protect the public interest in cable television 28 3 has
long been recognized. 2 84 Since government must extensively regulate
cable television, the resulting governmental entanglement creates a
measure of public responsibility which may justify greater regulation of
communications than would be justifiable if purely private means of
communications were involved. Moreover, since cable television re-
quires the use of the public domain, the public has a direct interest in
preventing the exploitation of the public asset for private gain.
277. The analogy to cable television would be closer if "dial-a-porn" messages were
automatically sent to all telephone subscribers, who only needed to pick up the telephone
receiver to receive them, whether they wanted them or not, or if cable television systems
operated on a pay-per-program basis. The latter is technically feasible and operational.
278. Like telephone communications regulations, cable television indecency regula-
tions could also regulate at the reception point, not the point of transmission. But the
burden imposed upon users for the benefit of the commercial profiteer and the difficulty of
practical enforcement renders this manner of regulation less preferable. See generally 50
Fed. Reg. at 42,702-07 (1985) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 64.201).
279. 749 F.2d at 123. The court did not address the constitutional issue. See also Carlin
Communications, Inc. v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 461 So.2d 1208 (La. App. 1984)
(upholding tariff on intrastate telephone calls prohibiting obscene or sexually explicit
communications).
280. See S. RIVKIN, CABLE TELEVISION: A GUIDE TO FEDERAL REGULATIONS(1974); Al-
bert, The Federal and Local Regulation of Cable Television, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 501, 508-18
(1977); Barnett, State, Federal and Local Regulation of Cable Television, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW.
685, 690-708 (1972). See generally infra notes 189-190 and accompanying text.
281. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1378 (10th
Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 452 U.S. 1001 (1982).
282. Id. at 1379. See supra note 186.
283. The public interest includes the morals of the community and the privacy of its
citizens as well as the property interest of the city whose easements carry the cable.
284. The British CABLE INQUIRY stressed the public interest in preventing the "impov-
erishment" of television programming. CABLE INQUIRY, supra note 46, at 7; see also WHITE
PAPER, supra note 47, at 6.
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3. The Type of Regulation Imposed
While regulation of media-operators is not unconstitutional,
28 5
nevertheless, regulations which may restrict the dissemination of speech
are closely scrutinized. The more comprehensive the regulation or the
more severe the sanction imposed upon violators, the greater the bur-
den ofjustifying the regulation. With respect to cable television regula-
tions, two considerations are' paramount: whether the regulation
absolutely prohibits communication or merely channels it through
"time, place, and manner" regulation, and whether the sanctions im-
posed are civil or criminal.
a. Time, Place and Manner Restrictions
If a regulation is deemed a time, place, and manner regulation of
speech, the standard of first amendment review shifts from strict scru-
tiny to something less inflexible. The Court looks to whether the regu-
lation reasonably advances an important state interest. 28 6 If so, the time,
place, and manner restrictions must be upheld. To be reasonable, re-
strictions on communication must provide alternative times, places, and
manners in which the communication may occur.2 8 7 In other words,
"[w]hile the first amendment does not guarantee the right to employ
every conceivable method of communication at all times and in all
places .... a restriction on expressive activity may be invalid if the re-
maining modes of communication are inadequate.
'288
This was the fatal flaw in the federal statute which totally prohibited
mailing unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives which the
Supreme Court invalidated in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. 289 Dis-
tinguishing Rowan, which upheld a statute giving addressees the right to
prevent purveyors of personally offensive, sexually explicit materials
from sending such materials to them through the public mails, the Court
stressed the difference between narrowly drawn restrictions and blanket
prohibitions. "[W]e have never held that the Government itself can shut
285. For example, the first amendment does not immunize owners and operators of
communication systems from nondiscriminatory regulations and responsibilities. Owners,
operators and users of mass communications media may be liable for violating sexual vice
laws, Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc. 106 S. Ct. 3172 (1968); antitrust laws, Citizens Publish-
ing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1
(1945); labor laws, Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); laws
prohibiting door-to-door solicitation, Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); for ig-
noring subpoenas, or refusing to give testimony, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972);
and for general tax liabilities, Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585-86 (1983); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
286. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 n.17 (1982); Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 n.18 (1980).
287. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75 (1981); Heffron v. Interna-
tional Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981); Kovaks v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 85 (1949).
288. City Council of Ios Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 810-13
(1984); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73-4 (1983); Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 565 (1980); Globe
Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 607; Gravned, 408 U.S. at 117.
289. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
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off the flow of mailings to protect those recipients who might potentially
be offended."' 290 Acknowledging the importance of protecting family
privacy in the home and what children see, the Court emphasized that
the means of achieving those purposes were overbroad. "We ... con-
clude that the justifications offered by [the Government] are insufficient
to warrant the sweeping prohibition on the mailing of unsolicited con-
traceptive advertisements."' 29 ' Thus, a total ban of all indecent cable
television programming would be subject to a stricter standard of judi-
cial scrutiny than regulations merely attempting to "channel" indecent
material to times and channels where unsupervised children and unwill-
ing adults would not be exposed to it.
2 9 2
Channeling cable television programing is not as simple as channel-
ing printed matter. The purchaser of printed matter can inquire about
the content before accepting a book or magazine, and the content of the
book or magazine does not change. Distribution can be accurately and
somewhat effectively channeled at the point of sale of the printed mat-
ter. On the other hand, the subscriber or purchaser of cable or broad-
cast television obtains a medium that generally delivers a continuous
flow of programming, the content of which is continually changing and
not known at the time of purchase. Thus, regulating the sale or sub-
scription of the television set or cable hook-up would not effectively
channel the programming. Nevertheless, some degree of "channeling"
sexually explicit cable television programming may be achieved without
absolutely banning it.
Most of the cable indecency laws that have been invalidated have
not been "channeling" regulations. The statute and ordinances in-
volved in the HBO, Roy City and Cruz cases appeared to totally ban all
nonobscene but indecent programming from cable television. In so do-
ing, Roy City, Miami, and the state of Utah may have committed the
same error condemned by the Supreme Court in Butler v. Michigan,
293
where it noted: "The incidence of this enactment is to reduce the adult
population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children."
294
On its face, however, the Utah statute involved in Wilkinson only re-
290. Id. at 72.
291. Id. at 75. In NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963), the Court observed that
"[biroad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect." Id. at 438.
292. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 757 (Powell,J., concurring); see also Metromedia v. City of San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 521-27 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 553-55 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
293. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
294. Id. at 383. On the other hand, the Supreme Court in Pacifica upheld the applica-
tion of a similar statute which, on its face, also appeared to totally prohibit all indecent
broadcasts by construing the prohibition to entail consideration of the time, place, and
manner of the broadcast. 438 U.S. at 742, 750. It is possible that the Roy City and Miami
ordinances could also be interpreted in the same manner. Both ordinances explicitly de-
fined "indecent material" with reference to "community standards" and "patently offen-
sive." Roy City, 555 F. Supp. at 1176; Cruz, 571 F. Supp. at 127. These terms could be
interpreted as requiring consideration of the time, place, and manner in which the sexually
explicit material was transmitted. However, this modest construction apparently was not
intended by the draftsmen of either ordinance.
[Vol. 63:4670
CABLE TELEVISION PROGRAMMING
quired cable operators to broadcast sexually explicit programming at a
time or in a context that was not patently offensive to the community of
cable television watchers. The district and appellate courts' failure to
grasp the significance of that distinction, the mischaracterization of the
Utah law as a de facto ban of indecent cable programming, and the reli-
ance on inapposite cases dealing with laws that totally prohibited inde-
cent cable programming were major flaws in the Wilkinson courts'
analyses.
2 95
A reasonable time, place, and manner restriction cannot be based
upon the content of speech.2 96 It has been argued that regulations re-
stricting the communication of sexually explicit indecent material can-
not be analyzed under the "time, place, and manner" test because such
regulations are content based. 2 9 7  However, the very title of "time,
place or manner" regulation recognizes that regulation of the manner or
form of expression is not necessarily content or viewpoint regulation.
Thus, some restrictions based upon the form of expression, including
fighting words, 298 and sexually explicit material or activities have also
been reviewed under a less demanding standard of review.
2 99
In fact, the Court has never applied strict scrutiny to regulations
295. After an excellent analysis of other issues, Judge Baldock's concurring opinion
stumbled on this point when he summarily concluded, without analysis, that the Utah law
entails an absolute prohibition even though it referred to "time, place, manner and con-
text" of programming. Wilkinson (H), 800 F.2d at 1007 (Baldock, J., concurring). His and
Judge Anderson's concern over the vagueness of the broad "time, place, manner, and
context" standard seems premature in a case involving a facial challenge to a newly en-
acted, never enforced state law, especially in light of the precise guidelines issued by the
Utah Attorney General. Id. See also infra notes 312-15 and accompanying text.
296. For instance, in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530
(1980), the Supreme Court held unconstitutional an order of the New York Public Service
Commission prohibiting inclusion by utilities in their monthly bills of inserts discussing
public issues. In explaining why that regulation was subject to a strict standard of scrutiny,
the Court stated that "when regulation is based on the content of speech, governmental
action must be scrutinized more carefully to ensure that communication has not been pro-
hibited 'merely because public officials disapprove the speaker's view.' " Id. at 536 (quoting
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). The Court
went on to declare: "Governmental action that regulates speech on the basis of its subject
matter 'slip[s] from the neutrality of time, place, and circumstance into a concern about
content.' Therefore, a constitutionally permissible time, place, or manner restriction may
not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech." Id. at 536 (quoting
Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972) (citation omitted). See generally
First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); City of Madison v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1976).
297. See generally Stone. Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Sub-
ject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 87, 111-12 (1978). But see Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (finding a park rule that banned camping
to be content-neutral, even though only advocates of one political position sought to ex-
press their position by camping in the park).
298. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1942); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 49-51 (1919).
299. See Clark, 468 U.S. 298-99; Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750; Young v. American Mini-
Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. at 58; Miller, 413 U.S. at 15; see also Bethel School District, 106 S. Ct.
3159 (1986); Local Educators Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286, 1295 (7th Cir. 1981), aff'd sub
nom., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948 (1983). In
Erznozkik, the Court specified two clear exceptions to the proposition that content-based
restrictions are not reasonable time, place and manner restrictions. "Such selective restic-
tions have been only upheld when the speaker intrudes upon the privacy of the home ...
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which attempt to channel, rather than totally ban, sexually explicit inde-
cent material. This is because indecent sexual explicitness is more akin
to a form of expression, rather than content.30 0 Therefore, viewpoint-
neutral regulations restricting vulgar or indecent sexual explicitness,
30 '
may be subject to a more deferential standard of judicial review as rea-
sonable time, place, and manner restrictions.
3 0 2
b. Sanctions
A second factor to be considered in evaluating an indecency regula-
tion is the severity and type of sanctions involved. The Court in Pacifica,
apparently found the absence of criminal sanction significant in analyz-
ing the permissibility of the regulation involved in that case.3 03 Like-
wise, the civil nature of the nuisance penalty imposed on an adult
bookstore was particularly noted by the Supreme Court when it ap-
proved the closure of a bookstore. 30 4 Justice Stevens has repeatedly
emphasized the difference between criminal sanctions and civil sanc-
tions. In his dissenting opinion in Smith v. United States,30 5 he questioned
the suitability of criminal prosecution as the mechanism for regulating
the distribution of erotic material. He was dismayed that "the guilt or
innocence of a criminal defendant in an obscenity trial is determined
primarily by individual jurors' subjective reactions to the materials in
question rather than by the predictable application of rules of law." °30 6
Justice Stevens noted that "the line between communications which 'of-
fend' and those which do not is too blurred to identify criminal con-
duct. ' '3 0 7 Additionally, when sanctions are considered, the "chilling"
effect of such measures must be taken into account. An excessive sanc-
tion may have a very broad impact if it is so severe that persons will be
compelled to take extreme precautions to avoid its imposition. On the
other hand, modest sanctions3 0 8 which do not involve the taint of crimi-
nal enforcement or the direct risk of incarceration might be accorded
or the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid
exposure." 422 U.S. at 209
300. There are many less offensive and harmful ways to communicate the message that
sexual intercourse is pleasurable than to show a happy man and woman copulating. Advo-
cates of traditional, strict morality, as well as advocates of new, liberated moralities are
obliged to refrain from vulgar forms of expression.
301. For example, depictions of sexual activities which are patently offensive to the
community.
302. In Consolidated Edison the Court described the ordinance in Erznoznikas one which
"discriminates among movies solely on the basis of content." 422 U.S. at 211. The ordi-
nance, however, was written to ban nudity in movies; not sexually explicit indecent mate-
rial. Nudity per se is not necessarily vulgar, indecent, or even sexually explicit (e.g. nude
babies and naked tribal natives, etc.) Viewed in this light, there is no disharmony between
Erznoznik and Rowan.
303. 438 U.S. at 739 n.13, 750.
304. See Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 3172 (1986).
305. 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
306. Id. at 316 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
307. Id.




more leeway in judicial review.30 9
4. The Context of Enforcement
In Pacifica the Supreme Court emphasized that "context is all-im-
portant. '3 10 In his concurrence, Justice Stevens added that "indecency
is largely a function of context-it cannot be adequately judged in the
abstract. '3 1' Thus, it appears that the constitutionality of regulations
restricting indecent programming on cable television will turn, at least
in part, on the context of enforcement.
Without the concrete setting of an actual case, there is a significant
risk that a court may sacrifice justice to theory. As the Seventh Circuit
has noted: "There is, however, a big difference between the danger of
an abuse and the abuse itself; and it is a fair question how far the courts
should go in making municipalities rewrite their cable television ordi-
nances to prevent dangers that may be largely hypothetical.
'3 1 2
Deciding the constitutionality of indecency regulations without the
benefit of a complete factual record which sets forth the context of en-
forcement is disfavored, in part, for much the same reason that prior
restraints on speech are disfavored: a court may base its judgment on
assumptions concerning statutory interpretation or application which
have no factual foundation. Two hundred years of constitutional history
teaches us that the best rules for governing the affairs of free citizens do
not spring fully developed from the pens of our judges or the mouths of
our legislators; rather, they evolve from the process of applying proven
legal principles to actual life experiences. Thus, in assessing the consti-
tutionality of cable television indecency regulations, courts must be wary
of prematurely pronouncing judgments intended to establish or vindi-
cate general principles of law. The best safeguard against judicial dog-
matism is the traditional rule requiring an actual case and controversy
before judges may rule on the constitutionality of controversial laws.
Only when all the facts are known may the challenged regulations be
accurately adduced, allowing for a realistic appraisal of the risks, bene-
fits, and excesses of the law.
On this point both of the courts in Wilkinson committed error. Deal-
ing with a unique time, place and manner statute that was challenged
immediately upon its enactment for facial unconstitutionality, the dis-
309. In Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984), the Court emphasized that it had long
ago "rejected the notion that a city is powerless to protect its citizens from unwanted
exposure to certain methods of expression which may legitimately be deemed a public
nuisance." Id. at 805.
310. 438 U.S. at 750.
311. Id. at 742 (Stevens, J., concurring).
312. Omega Satellites Prod. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 128 (7th Cir. 1982).
In a similar vein, the Tenth Circuit underscored the importance of the particular facts:
Whether that power [to regulate cable television] has been permissibly exercised
by the City in this case calls for a particularized inquiry into the unique attributes of
the cable broadcasting medium. The district court is best suited for such inquiry
in the first instance upon afully developed factual record.
Community Communications, 660 F.2d 1370, 1380 (10th Cir. 1981) (emphasis added).
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trict court refused to consider evidence of the nature of programming
shown over the long cable system. The court also rejected as immaterial
evidence of the technological ability and legal right of the plaintiff cable
operator to prescreen questionable programming and to "time-shift"
potentially offensive programming to later hours.3 13 The court's only
justification for its abstract approach was that "[flew facts are relevant to
a facial challenge, because the issue is not analyzed in a factual con-
text."' 3 14 This is both a misstatement of the rule and a misapplication of
it. Indecency, like obscenity, "cannot be adequately judged in the ab-
stract. '"315 The Tenth Circuit's summary affirmance also neglected this
principle.
C. The Balance of Harm
In a broad sense, the constitutionality of a law regulating the trans-
mission of sexually explicit indecent programming over cable television
entails a balancing of the regulator's rights against the public's interest.
Functionally, the constitutional analysis entails consideration of (1) the
nature and comparative value of the competing interests; (2) the relative
cost and burden to individuals of vindicating those interests; (3) the abil-
ity to obtain redress for speech-created harm through means other than
regulation; and (4) the availability of effective, less-restrictive measures
to protect legitimate public interests.
1. The Value of the Competing Interests
Opponents of cable indecency regulations defend two legal inter-
ests: the general interest in protecting uncensored communications and
the specific interest in protecting sexually explicit indecent materials.
The former is of paramount value; the latter is trivial. Freedom of
speech is the premiere constitutional right because it is an indispensable
ingredient of self-government. The extraordinary judicial protection ac-
corded the right to speak underscores the preeminence of this constitu-
tional interest. Yet even freedom of speech is not absolute. Despite the
occasional chiding of articulate dissenters, the Supreme Court has never
given a literal construction to the declaration that "Congress shall make
no law .. .abridging the freedom of speech ... -316
The second interest is less noble. Indeed, the value of sexually ex-
plicit indecent material to society and to individuals is de minimis. At best
it may have some entertainment value; at worst it may cause exploitive
and demeaning anti-social behavior. Our democracy, nevertheless, tol-
erates such material, not because erotic material has any significant in-
trinsic social or personal merit, but because society is concerned about
the grave dangers of abuses of power inherent in the suppression of any
313. Wilkinson (1), 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1107 (D. Utah 1985).
314. Id.
315. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 742; see also Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 216.





Proponents of indecency regulations are also concerned with pro-
tecting two interests: the interest in decency and the interest in access
to and use of modern mass communication systems. Protecting the lat-
ter interest contributes to the quality of life and enhances the processes
of social interaction and interdependence upon which our democracy
depends. The interest in decency implicates another aspect of the first
amendment, because it involves the practice of moral beliefs. Indeed, to
the extent that cable television involves government action, the right to
be free of morally offensive intrusions assumes greater constitutional
importance. Yet, the primary claim to constitutional protection of de-
cency relates to individual's right to be let alone, 31 8 without having to
forego a valuable educational and social medium.
2. The Cost of Vindicating Protected Interests
The cost and burden of vindicating these conflicting interests re-
quires an appreciation of the realities of cable television programming
and marketing as well as an understanding of the practical and legal ef-
fects of the challenged indecency regulation. Without regulation, cable-
casters may force those who object to having sexually explicit indecent
material accessible through their television to make an all-or-nothing
choice: either to forego the benefits of cable television altogether or to
accept some encroachment upon their personal standards of decency.
On the other hand, cable operators may voluntarily segregate sexually
explicit indecent programming so that the real benefits of cable televi-
sion are available to subscribers without offensive programming.
A total prohibition of all sexually explicit indecent programming on
cable television may significantly inconvenience consumers by forcing
them to go elsewhere to receive such entertainment. 31 9 Mere "channel-
ing" regulations, however, would impose less onerous burdens upon
those who wish to have access to erotic material via cable television.
3 20
Once the competing burdens are clarified, one must weigh the costs
of access to a constitutionally protected interest against the cost of
avoiding injury to that constitutionally protected interest. Sexually ex-
plicit programming may reasonably be viewed as an "extra" service pro-
317. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23-4.
318. See Redrup v. New York. 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967).
319. On the other hand, since there are a number of established communications out-
lets for sexually explicit communications such as "adult" bookstores, "adult" video stores,
"adult" theatres - a total ban of sexual programming from a pervasive, indiscriminant,
home-based medium of communication might not be deemed to significantly burden ac-
cess to such entertainment. After all, the ban would not close down any preexisting media
of sex communication, nor would it preclude development of new technologies which are
not public and pervasive.
320. Of course, if cable channel owners or operators were unable to legally or techno-
logically screen out, edit or delay telecasting sexually explicit material, the burden of some
regulatory schemes would be heavy indeed, but that does not appear to be the case. See
generally Motavalli, New Pay Service Planned for HBO, CableVision, Nov. 4, 1985, at 11
(describing new offering by HBO for older people with some films "possibly being edited
to tone down strong language, sex and violence").
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vided by cablecasters, for which an extra cost or burden is
appropriate.3 2 1 Regulations requiring cablecasters to "channel" their
indecent programming can be viewed as merely "time-shifting" or
"channel shifting" measures. Time, place and manner restrictions on
transmission of this material merely places the burden of taking the initi-
ative on those who wish to view sexually explicit indecent material on
their cable system. Such restrictions eliminate the correlative burden of
avoidance from those who do not want to have sexually explicit material
intrude into their homes and families at all hours of the day. As Judge
Baldock explained, "it is unreasonable to shift an affirmative duty onto
every parent to study all cable television program listings each week,
even assuming such listings provide adequate warning."
'3 2 2
3. The Ability to Obtain Redress
Public regulation of communication should be permitted only to the
extent that private remedies fail to adequately compensate persons in-
jured by communication. The principle of private accountability is one
of the unarticulated assumptions upon which the first amendment is
predicated. 32 3 The first amendment expresses a preference for private
redress over public regulation as a means of achieving the legitimate
goals concerning communications.3 2 4 To the extent that individuals can
obtain private redress for injuries inflicted through communication, the
anti-government regulation policy of the first amendment is enhanced.
Ideally, cablecasters should be held accountable though private civil
litigation for harms caused by their unreasonable programming, and
there should be no need for public regulation of cable programming.
But in our imperfect world it is sometimes necessary to supplement pri-
vate remedies with public regulation to achieve justice. Some types of
injuries are not appropriate for private monetary restitution, and many
plaintiffs cannot afford the time, energy or money to pursue private rem-
edies. The "chilling" consequences of some private actions might seri-
ously impair values and practices protected by the first amendment.
Public regulations are not as precise and may not achieve the quality of
justice in some cases as private remedies, but they may achieve a greater
measure of justice for some individuals and for society as a whole. In
fact, for some types of injuries, public regulation may provide a more
adequate and just form of relief than any private remedy.
321. See generally 50 Fed. Reg. 42,706-07 (1985) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 64.1) (it is
inappropriate to put the burden of restricting access to "dial-a-porn" on an individual
telephone subscriber).
322. Wilkinson (II), 800 F.2d at 1006 (BaldockJ., concurring).
323. That is, as between public accountability through public regulation such as laws
and ordinances and private accountability through private channels of influence such as
religion, morals, and market forces, the first amendment chooses private accountability.
324. That is, by prohibiting laws restricting speech, the first amendment forces parties
to resort to methods and institutions of private redress to implement and protect legiti-
mate interests affected by speech. The primary concern of the first amendment is to keep




Private redress is an inadequate means of protecting adults and chil-
dren from sexually explicit programming. Community interests are sub-
verted by the unrestricted exploitation of cable programming for private
profit. Market forces have not deterred cable operators from disregard-
ing these interests in their pursuit of maximum capital return. The kinds
of injury inflicted by offensive, sexually explicit cable programming is
not amenable to relief by ordinary private adjudication. Both the nature
of the private interests affected and the improbability of significant mon-
etary recovery discourage private actions.
Reasonable regulations requiring cablecasters to channel the pres-
entation of sexually explicit indecent programming so as to shield dis-
criminating viewers from the unwanted intrusion of indecent
programming fall well within constitutional bounds under the principle
of accountability through regulation. 3 25 Regulations requiring cablecas-
ters to channel their indecent programming provide a "floor" of protec-
tion to minimize the infliction of injuries that are inadequately remedied
through traditional private actions. Such regulations may also serve to
protect the cable television industry from excessive litigation, thereby
providing an alternative means of dispute resolution. Laws banning all
nonobscene "indecent" programming on cable television, however, go
beyond accountability. Blanket prohibitions of all nonobscene but inde-
cent programming usurp rather than complement the function of pri-
vate restitution.
4. The Availability of Less-Restrictive Regulations
The first amendment also mandates a preference for less-restrictive
regulations over more-restrictive regulations so long as the former pre-
serves legitimate governmental interests. Even restriction of communi-
cations intended to further an important public interest will be sustained
only if it is "no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that inter-
est."'3 26 Regulations which only affect the time, place or manner of
communications must reasonably advance important public interests
and may not shut off access to alternative channels of communication.
In short, the first amendment mandates that speech restrictions be nar-
rowly drawn and that the regulation "extend only as far as the interest it
serves." 32 7 Thus, laws absolutely banning indecent cable programming
must pass stricter judicial scrutiny than laws requiring the channeling of
such programming. Given the emphatic judicial solicitude for free
speech in all media, an absolute ban of cable indecency is unlikely to be
325. See generally supra, pp. 669-73.
326. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); see also City Council of Los
Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 806 (1984); Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396, 411 (1974); Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1451 (D.C. Cir.1985);
Preferred Communications v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1405-06 (9th Cir.
1985).
327. Central Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 565
(1980) (citation omitted); see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk
County, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982); Grayned v. City ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104, 117 (1972).
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upheld by any court - despite the existence of alternative media for
communicating the same material.
328
There are, however, many methods of channeling sexually explicit
cable programming which provide substantial protection for viewers
who do not wish to be confronted by offensive programming in their
homes. For instance, laws could effectively segregate sexually explicit
programming on cable television by: (1) requiring cable system opera-
tors to disclose to potential customers at the time of subscription the
type of potentially offensive programming conveyed over specific chan-
nels; (2) restricting all offensive programming to certain channels or
pay-for-viewing systems; (3) requiring that channels transmitting offen-
sive programming be optional or extra-tier services; (4) requiring that
transmission of offensive programming via cable be "scrambled" so that
only viewers with decoding devices 3 29 could receive it; (5) requiring that
effective lockboxes3 30 that scramble unwanted signals be made available
at no or low cost to subscribers; (6) restricting offensive programming to
those times when children would be less likely to be in the viewing audi-
ence; or (7) requiring program guides that identify potentially offensive
programming be provided at no or low cost to all subscribers. These
regulations would entail less restriction of and impose less burden upon
first amendment interests than an absolute ban of indecent cable televi-
sion programming. These restrictions should be upheld, because they
only channel the time, place or manner of a particular form of expres-
sion; clearly further legitimate public interests, 33 1 and they leave reason-
able opportunity for cable communication of offensive nonobscene
programming to those who desire it.
Finally, while the first amendment mandates less restrictive alterna-
tives it does not require states to employ ineffective regulatory mecha-
nisms simply because they are less restrictive than effective regulations,
nor does it demand that the particular regulatory scheme be the very least
restrictive. The "superlative" standard suggests an illusory, objective
determination when, in reality, the differences between different regula-
tory schemes are more a function of subjective judgment and knowledge
of particular circumstances. Politically responsible local officials are best
suited to make these determinations. A "superlative" standard merely
provides a smokescreen by which philosophically fossilized judges might
substitute their own judgment for those who are better informed. Time,
328. See supra note 319 and accompanying text. Pacifica approved of a statute that
facially prohibited indecent radio broadcasting. The Court's emphasis on the specific con-
text, however, underscores the assumption that some applications of across-the-board
prohibitions would surely fail judicial review. See 437 U.S. at 750, 751.
329. Such devices are already available for telephone communications. See 50 Fed.
Reg. at 42,702-707. Similar technology is used in pay-per-view cable television
operations.
330. At present lockboxes are ineffective; they block whole channels, not just particular
programs, and "the unwanted complexity that these devices introduce into television view-
ing is attested to by their lack of use." Wilkinson (H), 800 F.2d at 1006 (Baldock,J., concur-
ring). See supra note 235.
331. They protect viewer choice, prevent viewer "capitivity," protect the welfare of
youth and children, and foster the family quality of the community.
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place and manner regulations need not submit to such subjective, transi-
tory analyses - they should be sustained if they are narrowly drawn and
reasonably necessary to further legitimate public interests.
IV. FEDERAL NONPREEMEPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL REGULATION
A. State and Local Regulations
The controversy over indecent cable television programs has cap-
tured the attention of a growing number of lawmakers in state and local
government. Recently, in more than a dozen states legislation has been
proposed to regulate the flow of offensive programming over cable tele-
vision.3 32 Additionally, ordinances restricting the distribution of offen-
sive programming over locally licensed cable television systems have
been proposed or enacted in many towns and cities.
333
In June of 1983, a grand jury in Cincinnati "indicted Warner Amex
Cable communications on four obscenity counts for the showing of two
sexually explicit films on the Playboy Channel.13 3 4 Likewise, in Febru-
ary of 1985, a grand jury in Virginia Beach, Virginia, indicted a cable
television company on seven counts charging violations of the state anti-
obscenity statute for transmitting seven movies that were carried on The
Playboy Channel.3 35 In August of 1985, an Oklahoma City grand jury
considered indicting a cable company which carried The Playboy
Channel.
3 3 6
B. Federal Statutes and Regulations
Recently there have been significant indications that federal
lawmakers are concerned about the transmission of sexually explicit ma-
terial over cable television.33 7 Until October 30, 1984, the only relevant
332. Operators Opposing Penn. Obscenity Bill, CableVision, Jan. 20, 1986, at 23; Florida Sys-
tents Prepare to Fight 'Obscenity 'Ban, CableVision,Jan. 20, 1986, at 23 (eleventh bill to restrict
cable porn in six years in Florida); Smith, supra note 22, at 22, col. 3; Hofbauer, supra note
161, at 174-81; Calif. Faces 'Cableporn' Bill, CableVision, May 7, 1984, at 57.
333. Such ordinances have been enacted in Miami, Florida, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and
Roy City, Utah, and have been proposed in many other communities. See Weinstein, supra
note 20, at 29 (describing attempts to restrict sexual cable programming in Rochester,
New York, Buffalo, New York, Memphis, Tennessee, and Vista, California); Newswire,
CableVision,June 18, 1984, at 11 (reporting defeat of Escondido, California, ballot propo-
sition to ban "indecent" cable programming by 289 votes: 7,955 for, 8,244 against).
334. Smith, Battle Intensifying, supra note 22, at 22, col. 6. The case was later settled.
335. Obscenity Charges Brought Against Cox Cable System, CableVision, Feb. 18, 1985, at 11.
The investigation began when local ministers and church groups petitioned the city coun-
cil to not grant a rate increase requested by the cable company unless it dropped The
Playboy Channel. The city council balked at the pressure, but passed a resolution asking
the commonwealth's attorney to investigate the complaint. The prosecutor showed nine
Playboy Channel movies to a grand jury which handed down seven indictments. Id. Three
weeks later the cable company announced that it was dropping The Playboy Channel. Cox
Operator Drops Playboy Channel in Face of Obscenity Indictments, CableVision, Mar. 4, 1985, at
16.
336. Wolfe, Indictments Against Cox System Mixed, CableVision, Aug. 26, 1985, at 20. The
grand jury decided not to indict, finding the program ming was not "legally obscene." Id.
337. In 1976 Senator Pastore, acting at the request of the Federal Communications
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statute was 18 U.S.C. § 1464 which prohibits the uttering of "any ob-
scene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communica-
tion. .... ,,338 Section 1464, however, specifically addresses "radio"
broadcasting. While cable television arguably uses "radio" to receive
microwave, satellite, and broadcast transmissions, programming
originated by a cablecaster and transmitted through its cable system
would not be covered. 33 9 Since this section only penalizes one who "ut-
ters language" it would not appear to cover the transmission of
pictures.
3 40
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984,341 however, con-
tains two provisions designed to control the problem of sexually explicit
indecent cable programming. Section 639 imposes a penalty of up to
two years' imprisonment or a fine of $ 10,000, or both, upon anyone who
"transmits over any cable system any matter which is obscene or otherwise
unprotected by the Constitution .... .,342 Additionally, section
624(d)(2)(A) requires cable operators to provide customers upon re-
quest a device to prohibit the viewing of a particular cable service during
Commission, introduced Senate Bill 3858. S. 3858, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC.
33,359 (1976). This bill would have amended section 1464 to explicitly prohibit transmis-
sion of obscene or indecent material over cable television. It would have provided an
affirmative defense to the dissemination of indecent material, however, if the material had
been transmitted on a pay-per-program basis or by other means which would have mini-
mized the risk that children under twelve or unwilling adult viewers would be exposed to
the indecent material. Id. In 1982 Senator DeConcini proposed Senate Bill 2136. This
bill would have made it a federal crime, punishable by up to one year imprisonment
and/or a fine of up to $5,000, for "distributing any indecent or profane material, by means
of television or cable television communications." S. 2136, 97th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1982).
In 1984, Senator Helms introduced Senate Bill 2769. S. 2769, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130
CONG. REC. § 7320-23 (daily ed. June 14, 1984). That bill would have amended section
1464 by adding the term "indecent" to the prohibition sections; it would have specified
that "broadcasting, telecasting, or cablecasting" of obscene, indecent or profane material
was prohibited; it would have clarified that indecent "material" as well as "language" is
prohibited; and it would have expressly preserved the authority of state and local govern-
ments to regulate obscenity, indecency, and profanity "in a manner which is not inconsis-
tent with this section." Id. (statement of Senator Helms). In May, 1985, Senator Helms
introduced and Congress enacted the "Cable-Porn And Dial-A-Porn Control Act," to out-
law the transmission of "obscene, indecent or profane" material on cable television, and to
subject offenders to the possibility of two years in prison, a $50,000 fine, or both. S. 1090,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
338. See supra note 16. However, two additional statutes could arguably apply to cable
programming: § 1462, which prohibits interstate carriage on common carrier of "any ob-
scene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, motion-picture film, paper, let-
ter, writing, print, or other matter of indecent character ... " 18 U.S.C. § 1462(a)(1982)
(emphasis added), and § 1465, which proscribes the transportation in interstate commerce
"for the purpose of sale or distribution [of] any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book,
pamphlet, picture, film, paper, letter, writing, print, silhouette, drawing, figure, image,
cast, phonograph recording, electrical transcription, or other article capable of producing
sound or any other matter of indecent or immoral character .... 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1982) (em-
phasis added).
339. The Justice Department is studying whether 18 U.S.C. §§ 1462, 1464-65 may be
applied to cable programming, Justice Probes Cable Obscenity Issue, CableVision, May 20,
1985, at 11.
340. See Letter from Stephen S. Trott, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
to Senator Helms (May 24, 1984) reprinted in 130 CONG. REc. S7,321 (June 14, 1984).
341. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 521-59 (West Supp.) [hereinafter cited as C.C.P.A.].
342. 47 U.S.C.A. § 559 (West Supp. 1986) (emphasis added). This provision
originated as as amendment proposed by Representative Dannemeyer.
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selected periods so that subscribers may "restrict the viewing of pro-
gramming which is obscene or indecent."
3 43
At present there are no federal regulations prohibiting or restrict-
ing nonobscene sexually explicit cable television programming.3 4 4 Fol-
lowing enactment of the C.C.P.A. of 1984, the FCC repealed its only
cable indecency regulation, because it was covered by the newly-enacted
statutory provisions.3 4 5 The FCC has never been very active in attempt-
ing to regulate indecency or obscenity on television, much less cable
television. Indeed, the Commission has never brought an enforcement
action against a television station or programmer, broadcast or cable,
for violation of the indecency or obscenity standards.3 4 6 If anything, the
Commission has indicated a strong preference for local or state regula-
tion in that area. In 1981, the Commission recommended to Congress
that the statute giving the FCC responsibility for enforcing obscenity
and indecency regulations be repealed, leaving the responsibility to the
states and the Justice Department. 34 7 While Congress was considering
the C.C.P.A., the Chairman of the FCC wrote to Senator Helms expres-
sing "serious reservations" about the Commission's role in regulating
indecency and obscenity on cable television.3 48 Nearly a year after the
C.C.P.A. was enacted an FCC official, speaking at a cable industry meet-
ing, reportedly "made it clear that the FCC would not be a factor in the
controversy over 'indecent' programming on cable television.
' 3 49
343. 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). This provision
originated as an amendment proposed by Representative Bliley.
344. Until 1984, the only FCC regulation concerning the transmission of indecent ma-
terial over cable television provided: "No cable television system operator when engaged
in origination cablecasting shall transmit or permit to be transmitted on the original cable-
casting channel or channels material that is obscene or indecent." 47 C.F.R. § 76.215
(1984). The term "cablecasting" referred to "(p]rogramming (exclusive of broadcasting
signals) carried on a cable television system over one or more channels and subject to the
exclusive control of the cable operator." Id. at § 76.5(V). The FCC has emphasized that
there is a distinction between the programming on "access type channels," on the one
hand, and "programming subject to the system operator's editorial control," on the other
Cable Television Channel Capacity and Access Channels Requirements, 45 Fed. Reg. 76,
178 (1980); see also Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
Concerning the Cable Television Channel Capacity and Access Channel Requirements of
Section 76.251 [sic], 87 F.C.C.2d 40 (1981).
345. 50 Fed. Reg. 18,656 (1985) (deleting 47 C.F.R. § 76.215).
346. Letter from Mark S. Fowler, Chairman, FCC, to Senator Helms (May 14, 1984)
reprinted in 130 CONG. REC. 7321 (June 14, 1984) (statement of Sen. Helms); see also
WGBH Educational Foundation, 69 F.C.C.2d 1250 (1978) (FCC rejects petition of anti-
indecency group to deny license renewal to owner of station that broadcast programming
which is allegedly "offensive, vulgar and . . .harmful to children").
347. Letter from Mark S. Fowler, supra note 346.
348. Id. In his May, 1984, letter to Senator Helms, Chairman Fowler acknowledged
that "the Commission will impose sanctions where warranted [for violating a federal ob-
scenity and indecency statute], or will defer to local officials or the Justice Department, as may
be appropriate." Id. (emphasis added).
349. Censorship Issue Tops Atlantic Show's "Great Debate", CableVision, Sept. 23, 1985, at
24.
1986]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
C. Cases Considering Preemption of State and Local Cable Indecency
Regulations
Because several provisions of the C.C.P.A. address the subject of
the transmission of sexually explicit cable programming, opponents of
state restrictions on cable indecency argue that state and local indecency
regulations are preempted. 3 50 Were this argument to prevail, it could
have a significant impact on the effectiveness and enforceability of cable
indecency regulations, because, while state and local governments have
aggressively enacted and enforced such regulations, the FCC has tradi-
tionally been reluctant to enforce restrictions of sexually explicit pro-
gramming. Moreover, such a policy change would be inconsistent with
the current trend toward deregulation in federal administrative agen-
cies. However, the relevant case law indicates that preemption depends
upon congressional intent, and the expression of congressional intent in
the comprehensive C.C.P.A. clearly authorizes and encourages state and
local indecency regulation.
1. Crisp
While only two federal courts3 5' have directly considered the ques-
tion of preemption of cable indecency regulations, the Supreme Court
recently applied the preemption doctrine in a case dealing with another
type of cable television regulation. In Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp,
3 52
the Court unanimously held that Oklahoma's constitutional and statu-
tory provisions which prohibited liquor advertising could not be applied
to prevent in-state cable television systems from telecasting cable televi-
sion programs originating from out-of-state which contained wine ad-
vertisements, because regulation of that aspect of cable television
operations had been preempted by the FCC regulations.3 53 Even
though the lower courts had not considered preemption, the conflict be-
tween federal and local law was so apparent that the Court decided the
case on that basis.
3 54
The Supreme Court stated that federal regulations have no less pre-
emptive effect than federal statutes, and that "[t]he power delegated to
350. See, e.g., Shapiro, First Amendment Considerations in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE,
(1985)-A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE CABLE COMMUNICATIONS POLICY ACT of 1984 at 137,
143. Mr. Shapiro has represented the cable networks or operators in suits challenging
state or local indecency regulations.
351. Wilkinson (1), 611 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Utah 1985) and Wilkinson (H), 800 F.2d 989
(10th Cir. 1986); see supra text accompanying notes 119-148; see also infra text accompany-
ing notes 366-78.
352. 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984).
353. The Court also rejected Oklahoma's argument that the liquor advertising ban as
applied to cable television and the importation of foreign broadcast signals was a valid
exercise of state power under the twenty-first amendment. Acknowledging that the
twenty-first amendment provides states with broad power to regulate the importation and
use of liquor, the Court noted that the Oklahoma statute was merely an indirect regulation
of the sale or use of liquor and that it directly conflicted with express federal policies.
Thus, the state's interest was not of the same importance as the FCC's interest in fulfilling
its statutory obligations. Id. at 2707-09.
354. id. at 2699.
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the FCC plainly comprises authority to regulate" television signals being
rebroadcast over cable television systems if such regulation is necessary
to achieve delegated responsibilities. 35 5 The Court determined that the
Oklahoma prohibition of liquor advertisements originating in out-of-
state television broadcasts retransmitted in-state over cable television
would be preempted "if the FCC has resolved to pre-empt" that area of
cable television regulation and if it was reasonably necessary to achieve
FCC policies.
3 56
The Court found irrefutable evidence of preemptive intent in, inter
alia, the "deliberately structured dualism" adopted by the FCC allowing
state and local authorities to regulate local incidents of cable operations,
while maintaining FCC exclusive jurisdiction over all operational as-
pects.3 5 7 Further evidence was found in the "must carry" rules of the
commission which require cable operators to retransmit signals of
broadcast television stations in specific geographic zones, including out-
of-state stations located in those zones,3 5 8 and in FCC rules prohibiting
cable operations to alter or delete signals imported from out-of-state
broadcast television stations. 35 9 Indeed, the unequivocal intent of the
FCC to preempt state and local regulation of commercial advertising on
cable television had been emphatically reiterated only one year earlier in
an important published Commission opinion.
360
The Court also found that the FCC preemption decision was rea-
sonably necessary to achieve legitimate FCC policies. The Court noted
that it would be "prohibitively burdensome" for Oklahoma cable opera-
tors to monitor each broadcast signal imported from out-of-state and
delete every wine commercial before retransmitting the signal,3 6 1 and
that the commission had "retained exclusive jurisdiction over all opera-
tional aspects of cable communication, including signal carriage and
technical standards.
'36 2
Some commentators interpret the Crisp opinion to suggest that state
and local regulation of indecent programming on cable television must
also be superceded.3 6 3 In sweeping terms, Justice Brennan's opinion
referred to the cable industry's need for "breathing space ... to expand
vigorously and provide a diverse range of program offerings to potential
cable subscribers,"' 364 as well as to the FCC's preference for local
355. Id. at 2700 (quoting Fidelity Say. and Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,
153 (1982)).
356. Id. at 2701.
357. Id. at 2702 (quoting Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d at 207
(1972)).
358. Id. at 2703-04.
359. Id. at 2704.
360. Community Cable TV, Inc., 54 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 1351, 1359 n.20, (Nov. 15,
1983), cited in Crisp, 104 S. Ct. at 2704 n.ll.
361. 104 S.Ct. at 2705.
362. Id. at 2702.
363. See, e.g., Witt, Cable Television Regulation After Crisp: Is There Anything Left?, 17 URB.
L. REv. 277, 293-97 (1985); Barbash, High Court Limits State, Local Power in Cable Television,
Washington Post, June 19, 1984, at Al, col. 5.
364. 104 S. Ct. at 2705.
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nonregulation of many aspects of cable television services.3 6 5 The hold-
ing of the Court in Crisp, however, was very specific: the FCC clearly
intended to preempt and, with congressional approval, clearly had pre-
empted, state and local regulation of commercial advertising contained
in broadcast signals imported for retransmission over local cable televi-
sion. In fact, the emphasis in Crisp on the indisuputable evidence of the
intent of Congress and the FCC to specifically preempt state regulation
of commercial advertising in broadcast programs retransmitted by cable
might suggest that similarly unequivocal evidence of preemptive intent
must be shown before state regulation of indecent cable programming is
deemed to be preempted.
2. Wilkinson (I) and Wilkinson (II)
The first court to consider the question whether state or local regu-
lation of indecent cable programming is preempted by federal law was
the federal district court in Utah. The preemption analysis ofJudge An-
derson began with a lengthy review of the Crisp decision, suggesting that
Crisp would support a finding of preemption, but eventually acknowledg-
ing that "the Supreme Court did not explicitly consider whether state
indecency regulations were preempted." 3 66 The court next turned its
attention to the C.C.P.A. The district court reviewed selected provisions
of the Act and found some evidence of intent to preempt state indecency
regulations. First, the court noted that sections 611 and 612 provide
specific methods of restricting indecent cable programming on public
access or educational channels and precluding other types of regula-
tion. 36 7 More importantly, however, the district court rejected Utah's
argument that the cable indecency regulation was authorized by section
638 which explicitly preserves criminal and civil liability under
"[f]ederal, [s]tate or local law of libel, slander, obscenity, incitement,
invasions of privacy, false or misleading advertising, or other similar
365. It is, of course, possible that Justice Brennan was subtly trying to lay the ground-
work for a future holding that local regulation of indecent cable programming is pre-
empted under his last-mentioned basis for federal preemption. Certainly the broad
discussion of the cable industry's need for "breathing space" and of the federal policy to
not interfere with the development of this new industry could be a useful entree to such a
holding. But this part of the opinion is better read in context, with reference to the partic-
ular type of regulation before the Court. This discussion was knitted closely into the anal-
ysis of the specific state regulation being assessed in Crisp. It could be misleading to
transpose that general discussion into a different regulatory context.
366. Wilkinson (1), 611 F. Supp. at 1102.
367. Section 612(h) provides that, on "special access channels," cable services shall not
be offered, or shall be provided subject to the condition that the service not transmit mate-
rial "obscene ... filthy or indecent or is otherwise unprotected by the Constitution." 47
U.S.C.A. § 532(h) (West Supp. 1986). The district court found the Utah law to be defec-
tive on two counts under this section: first, the Utah law applied to all channels, not just
"special access channels;" second, the statute only authorized conditioning or forbidding
cable service, not the regulation of specific programming itself. Thus, the district court
concluded that section 612 expressly preempts "the Utah law with regard to these chan-
nels." 611 F. Supp at 1103. Similarly, the district court read section 611(e) which prohib-
its the exercise of editorial control on public education channels, as preempting the Utah
indecency law as applied to those channels. Id.
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laws .... ."3 6 8 The district court emphasized that "indecency" was not
specifically mentioned in section 638. Since that term was used in other
sections, the court declared "that Congress deliberately omitted inde-
cency" from section 638 and thereby intended to preempt local regula-
tion of indecency on cable television. 36 9 The court emphasized that
" 'indecent' expression is not wholly unprotected speech," so it ought
not to be read into the catch-all phrase "other similar laws."' 3 70 State-
ments of members of Congress which indicated that the Act would not
preempt state and local regulation were dismissed, because Representa-
tive Nielson's remarks were not officially transcribed and Senator Gold-
water's remarks were inserted into the Congressional Record rather
than spoken on the floor of the Senate.
3 7 '
Nevertheless, the district court noted that the House Report sug-
gested a congressional intent to link regulatory power with constitu-
tional principle. 3 72 Thus, after strongly suggesting that Congress
intended to preempt state and local regulation of indecent cable pro-
gramming, the district court reached a different conclusion. Judge An-
derson concluded that if the state regulations were unconstitutional
under the first amendment, they were also preempted under the
C.C.P.A.; presumably if they were not unconstitutional, they would not
be preempted.
On appeal in Wilkinson (II), the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit summarily affirmed the district court's decision in a brief per curiam
opinion. The Court of Appeals apparently read Judge Anderson's opin-
ion as holding that Congress intended to preempt state regulation of
nonobscene sexual cable programming,3 73 and without any independ-
ent analysis affirmed the judgment of the lower court "on the basis of
the reasons stated in the [district court] opinion.
'3 74
Judge Baldock, concurring specially in the judgment, explicitly dis-
agreed with the conclusion that federal law preempts state regulation of
sexually explicit cable programming which is not obscene. The C.C.P.A.
prevents the states from imposing criminal or civil liability based on the
content of programs transmitted on leased access or public, educational
or governmental channels. 3 75 To that extent state regulation of inde-
cency is partially preempted. However, even as to those channels, the
Act authorizes state and local franchising authorities to regulate pro-
gram content insofar as it is not protected by the Constitution. 3 76 And
368. 47 U.S.C.A. § 558 (West Supp. 1986).
369. 611 F. Supp. at 1104.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 1105.
372. Id.
373. Id., n.2. This is one reason why Judge Baldock refused to subscribe to the per
curiam opinion. Wilkinson (II), 800 F.2d at 992 (BaldockJ., concurring) ("I do not agree
with this court's apparent conclusion that federal law preempts state regulation of sexually
oriented content which is not obscene.") Id. (emphasis added).
374. Wlilkinson (11), 800 at 992.
375. 47 U.S.C. § 558 (Supp. III 1985).
376. 47 U.S.C. §§ 532(h), 544(d)(I) (Supp. II 1985).
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as to all other cable channels, the Act explicitly preserves state and local
authority to impose liability under laws regulating obscenity "or other
similar laws." '3 77 The relevant House of Representatives Committee Re-
port clearly reveals unequivocal congressional intent to allow state and
local governments to regulate indecency if the courts hold such regula-
tions constitutional. The committee was aware of uncertainty regarding
the constitutionality of indecency regulations and intended to incorpo-
rate the evolving constitutional standards. The provision of the
C.C.P.A. requiring lockboxes to be made available shows that Congress
considered the use of lockboxes to be one way, but not the only way, to
deal with the problem of indecent cable programming.
3 78
The analysis of the preemption question in Wilkinson (I) is, regretta-
bly, self-contradictory and erroneous. Although Judge Anderson began
his preemption analysis with a clear understanding that the question was
ultimately one of congressional intent, his opinion abandoned the
search for congressional intent to engage in a rather superficial semantic
exercise. In the end, however, the district court correctly concluded that
the intent of Congress was to permit state regulation of indecency to the
extent it is not prohibited by the first amendment. The preemption
analysis of Judge Baldock is much more perceptive and coherent, but it
failed to receive the endorsement of the other judges on the Tenth Cir-
cuit panel. Since the opinion in Wilkinson (I), which was endorsed by two
judges in Wilkinson (II), does not do a very good job of analyzing the
preemption question, and since most of the court's analysis seems to
contradict the conclusion reached, the matter deserves clarification here.
D. State and Local Regulation of Indecent Cable Programming is Statutorily
Authorized, Not Preempted, by the Cable Communications Policy Act
of 1984
The supremacy clause of the Constitution3 79 establishes the preem-
inence of all federal laws enacted pursuant to the constitutional scheme
of specifically allocated federal powers. When a state law conflicts with a
valid federal law, the state law is preempted and superseded by the supe-
rior federal law. When federal preemption is claimed to result from the
exercise of a power granted to Congress, the question is one of congres-
sional intent and the court's responsibility is to discern whether Con-
gress intended to preempt state law.3 8
0
Earlier in this century, the Supreme Court was willing to liberally
infer congressional intent to preempt state legislation which impeded in
any way the furtherance of federal policies that it favored.3 8' This ap-
proach has been tempered in recent years by judicial reluctance to pre-
377. 47 U.S.C. § 558 (Supp. III 1985).
378. Vilkinson (II), 800 F.2d at 992-995 (Baldock, J., concurring).
379. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
380. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 292, 293 (2d. ed. 1983).




sume or infer intent to preempt state -laws in the absence of clear
evidence of congressional purpose to supersede.3 8 2 In Crisp,3 8 3 Justice
Brennan summarized the "familiar and well-established" doctrine of
preemption. Federal preemption of state regulation may be found in
three circumstances: (1) when Congress has "expressed a clear intent to
preempt state law;" (2) when federal legislation so comprehensively reg-
ulates the field that " 'no room for the states to supplement' federal law"
remains; or (3) when compliance with both federal and state law is im-
possible or compliance with state law would effectively frustrate achieve-
ment of the full objectives of Congress.38 4 Thus, in the face of clear
congressional intent to preempt, a judicial finding of preemption is
impermissible.
Four months after the Supreme Court decided Crisp, Congress
passed the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984.385 The C.C.P.A.
is the only comprehensive regulatory statute for the cable television in-
dustry that has been enacted by Congress. Its language and history pro-
vide dispositive evidence of congressional intent regarding preemption
of state and local regulation of indecent cable programming.38 6 Be-
cause the question of preemption of local and cable regulation of sexu-
ally explicit programming is specifically addressed in the text of the
C.C.P.A. and was discussed in Congress during the passage of the Act,
resolution of the preemption question must be determined under the
first standard summarized in Crisp, as set forth above.38 7 Both the Act
and the legislative history evidence a clear congressional intent not to
preempt state and local regulation of indecent cable programming.
The C.C.P.A. contains a general declaration of congressional intent
to preempt conflicting state or local regulation of cable television. Sec-
tion 636(c) of the Act provides that state and local laws or franchise re-
strictions which are inconsistant with the Act are "preempted and
382. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 132 (1978); New York
State Dept. of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973); Goldstein v. California,
412 U.S. 546 (1973).
383. 104 S. Ct. at 2700.
384. Id.; see also Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, 105 S. Ct.
2371, 2375 (1985).
385. The Senate version of this cable television deregulation bill, sponsored by the
National Cable Television Association, S. 66, passed on June 14, 1983. See generally Phone
Rate Policy is Added Beo're Senate OKs Cable Bill, 41 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1237 (1983): Cities.
Cable Operators Reach Agreement, 41 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 637 (1983); Cities Divided Over
Measure Curbing Regulation of Cable, 41 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 845 (1983); 41 CONG. Q
WEEKLY REP. 1885, 2270 (1983). The House version, H.R. 4103, passed on October 1,
1984. 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4655. A compromise version, the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984, passed both houses of Congress on October 11,
1984, and was signed into law by the President on October 30, 1984. 47 U.S.C. § 521-59
(West Supp. 1985).
386. See Wilkinson (1), 611 F. Supp. at 1102.
387. If an intent not to preempt is clearly expressed by Congress in the text or legisla-
tive history of an Act, the courts are not free to declare that state laws are, nonetheless,
superceded by the creative application of constructive intent under one of the other tests
described by Justice Brennan.
1986]
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
superceded. ' '3 88 Congress also explicitly prohibited federal, state and
local authorities from imposing regulations "regarding the provision or
content of cable services except as expressly provided" in the Act.
3 89
It is also clear that Congress was concerned about the transmission
of sexually explicit indecent programming over cable television. "In or-
der to restrict the viewing of programming which is obscene or inde-
cent," section 624(d)(2)(a) requires cable operators to make lockboxes
available. 3 90 Section 639 makes it a crime to transmit obscene or other-
wise unprotected material over cable television systems. 39 ' While regu-
lation of content or editorial control of public, educational and
governmental channels is generally prohibited, 3 92 Section 614(d)(1) of
the Act specifically authorizes state and local agencies to prohibit or reg-
ulate cable services "if such cable services are obscene or otherwise un-
protected by the Constitution of the United States."' 393 Likewise, while
cable operators are generally immune from liability for programs shown
on designated commercial access channels,3 94 section 612(h) prohibits
or authorizes state and local government to regulate programming on
such channels which "is obscene, or is in conflict with community stan-
dards in that it is lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent or is otherwise unpro-
tected by the Constitution of the United States."
'39 5
Aware of the potentially preemptive consequences of the enactment
of a broad regulatory scheme and of the provisions regulating indecent
programming on cable television, however, Congress inserted two pro-
visions in the C.C.P.A. intended to preserve local regulation of sexually
explicit cable television programming. Section 624(d)(1) of the Act
provides:
Nothing in this title shall be construed as prohibiting a
franchising authority and a cable operator from specifying, in a
franchise agreement or renewal thereof, that certain cable serv-
ices shall not be provided or shall be provided subject to condi-
tions, if such cable services are obscene or are otherwise unprotected
by the United States Constitution.
3 9 6
Also, section 638 of the Act, specifically preserves the authority of state
and local lawmakers to enforce obscenity and similar laws:
Nothing in this title shall be deemed to affect the criminal or
civil liability of channel programmers or cable operators pursu-
ant to the Federal, State or local law of libel, slander, obscenity,
388. Cable Communications Policy Act § 636(c), 47 U.S.C. § 556(c) (West Supp.
1985).
389. Cable Communications Policy Act § 624(f)(1), 47 U.S.C. § 544(l)(1) (West Supp.
1985) (emphasis added). As noted earlier, however, regulations of indecent forms of ex-
pression ought not to be considered regulations of cable "content."
390. See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
391. See supra note 343 and accompanying text.
392. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 § 611 (e), 47 U.S.C. § 531(e) (Supp. III
1985); see also C.C.P.A. § 638, 47 U.S.C. § 558.
393. C.C.P.A., § 624(d)(1), 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
394. C.C.P.A., § 638, 47 U.S.C. § 558 (Supp. III 1985).
395. C.C.P.A., § 612(h), 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added).
396. C.C.P.A., § 624(d)(1), 47 U.S.C.A. § 544(d)(1) (Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added).
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incitement, invasions of privacy, false or misleading advertis-
ing, or other similar laws, except that cable operators shall not
incur such liability for any program carried on any public, edu-
cational, governmental use, or on any other channel under sec-
tion 612 [public access channels] or under similar
arrangements.
39 7
Since neither of these sections specifically mentions state or local
authority to regulate indecency, the critical question is whether Congress
intended indecency regulations to be included by use of the broader,
categorical terms preserving state and local regulation of material that is
"obscene or otherwise unprotected" and preserving state and local laws
restricting "obscenity ... or similar laws."
'398
In Wilkinson (I), Judge Anderson concluded that Congress did not
intend to include indecency regulations, "because 'indecent' expression
is not wholly unprotected speech."'3 99 While the conclusion that inde-
cency is not "wholly unprotected" by the Constitution is not bad as first
amendment theory, it is erroneous as a finding of fact regarding con-
gressional intent. In section 612(h), the drafters of the C.C.P.A. explic-
itly included indecent material in the list of examples of material which
they described as "unprotected by the Constitution of the United
States."'40 0 Moreover, in the very next subsection after the drafters re-
ferred generally to materials that are "obscene or are otherwise unpro-
tected by the United States Constitution," they referred specifically to
materials that are "obscene or indecent." '40 1 Thus, the text of the
C.C.P.A. reveals congressional understanding that "indecent" cable
programming was "unprotected" by the Constitution and "similar" to
obscenity.
Both the House and Senate Reports also provide unequivocal evi-
dence that Congress intended not to preempt state and local regulation
of indecent cable programming. The Senate Report noted that the pro-
posed Act "continues to give local governments the authority over local
areas of concern and authorizes them to protect local needs."'40 2 Concerning the
predecessor of section 624(d)(1) the Senate Report notes:
Lastly, section 607 [the Senate version counterpart of § 624]
makes it clear that this bill does not preclude or prohibit
franchising authorities and cable operators from specifying, in
a franchise agreement or renewal thereof, that certain cable
services shall not be provided, or shall be provided subject to
conditions, if such cable services are obscene or otherwise un-
protected by the U.S. Constitution. The standards for making
397. Id. at § 638, 47 U.S.C.A. § 558 (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
398. The omission of the term "indecent" is not conclusive because the terms that
were used are facially even broader and more inclusive. The intent of the draftsmen was
to use a catch-all phrase rather than to attempt to specify each and every particular type of
speech that could be regulated.
399. 611 F. Supp. at 1104.
400. See supra note 313 and accompanying text. See also C.C.P.A., § 624(d)(2)(A), 47
U.S.C.A. § 544(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985).
401. C.C.P.A. § 624(d)(2)(A), 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985).
402. S. REP. No. 67, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (emphasis added).
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such determinations are established and applied by the courts
.... This section would apply to future U.S. Supreme Court
decisions which may find that other kinds of speech are unpro-
tected under the Constitution.
40
The House Report concerning section 624(d)(1) likewise reveals
that the draftsmen intended that state and local authorities would con-
tinue to be empowered to go as far as the courts would permit them to
go under the first amendment to regulate sexually explicit material. The
drafters of the House Report noted that the Supreme Court had ruled
that regulation of indecent radio programming was not prohibited by
the first amendment, but that several lower courts had ruled that regula-
tion of indecent cable programming was impermissible. 40 4 Neverthe-
less, the drafters of the House Report noted:
The provision covers not only obscene speech, but other
speech which may also be unprotected by the Constitution of
the United States. This provision would also permit change in
constitutional interpretations to be incorporated into the stan-
dard set forth in 624(d)(1), should those judicial interpretations at
some point in the future deem additional standards, such as indecency,
constitutionally valid as applied to cable.
40 5
Finally, two formal statements by the Chairman of the relevant
House Committee and by the Chairman of the relevant Senate Subcom-
mittee 40 6 unequivocally establish that Congress intended not to pre-
empt state and local regulation of indecent cable programming. When
H.R. 4103, the House counterpart of S. 66, came before the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce for markup in late June of 1984,
there was a significant undercurrent of concern about protecting the
rights of state and local governments to prohibit indecent and obscene
cable programming. The same day the Dannemeyer and Bliley amend-
ments were introduced,40 7 Congressman Howard Nielson and Chair-
man John Dingell engaged in a formal colloquy -to clarify the legislative
intent behind section 639 which became section 638 of the Act and sec-
tion 624(d) that state and local regulation of indecent cable program-
ming would continue to be allowed "if constitutionally permitted."
Cong. Nielson: I would also like to clarify that laws regulating
indecency are included under section 639, through the use of
the phrase "other similar laws," as long as these laws are
constitutional.
Chairman Dingell: Yes. Indecency is similar to obscenity, and
thus would be included.
403. S. REP. No. 67, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 11. It was the Senate version of the bill that
was passed in lieu of the House bill after compromise amendments had been adopted.
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws4655.
404. H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., at 69, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 4706 (emphasis added).
405. Id. (emphasis added). See also Wilkinson (1), 611 F. Supp. at 1105.
406. Both congressmen represented their respective houses in the Conference Com-
mittee which put together the C.C.P.A. 130 CONG. REC. 14,281-89, (Oct. 11, 1985).
407. See supra notes 342 and 343 and accompanying text.
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Cong. Nielson: I note that under section 624(d), a franchising
authority can specify that certain cable services shall not be
provided if they are obscene or are otherwise unprotected by
the U.S. Constitution. I feel strongly that local authorities should
have authority to prohibit such programming. I assume that, to the
extent that programming which is indecent is not constitutionally pro-
tected, it could also be subject to such agreements.
Chairman Dingell: Restrictions on indecent programming have
been upheld by the Supreme Court in a broadcast context. In
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the court said that indecency could
be regulated. For example, it could be restricted to certain
times of day, in order to protect children. Such restrictions on
indecency, if constitutionally permitted, are not prohibited by this bill.
40 8
Another crucial colloquy took place in the Senate on October 11, 1984,
the day the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 was voted on and
passed in both houses of Congress. Senator Goldwater, the Chairman
of the Communications Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Com-
mittee, the sponsor of S. 66, and one of the Senate conferees, clarified
the understanding of the conferees that section 638 of the Act preserved
and did not preempt state and local regulation of obscene or indecent
cable programming.
Mr. Trible. I am particularly concerned about a recent Supreme
Court decision regarding the question of FCC preemption. In
Capital Cities Cable, Inc., et. al. against Crisp, Director,
Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, the Court held
that conflicting State regulations are precluded when the FCC
resolves to preempt an area of cable television regulation ....
Although the Court did not specifically address the ques-
tions of obscenity and indecency, that case is already being cited by
plaintiffs attempting to over turn a Utah statute regulating
cable television content. Is section 638 addressed directly to the
Supreme Court's decision in Capital Cities?
Mr. Goldwater. Yes, it is and that is the understanding of the conferees.
Section 638 makes clear that nothing in this measure is to be
interpreted as granting exclusive authority for regulating cable
television content to the FCC. Rather, States and localities retain
any authority which they would have in this area if the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 had never been enacted.
Mr. Trible. I also wish to ask whether section 638 applies to
408. Colloquy between Congressman Nielson and Chairman Dingell before the Com-
mittee on Energy and Commerce, June 26, 1984 (emphasis added) (copy of transcript in
author's possession). See also Thone, Energy and Commerce Committee Move to Control Cabe TV
Content, The Daily Herald (Provo, Utah), June 28, 1984, at 19, col. 1; Del Porto, Measure
Could Free Way for Local Cable Restrictions, Desert News (Salt Lake City, Utah),June 28, 1984,
at 12A, col. 1. At the time this colloquy took place, the relevant sections of both the Sen-
ate bill and the House version provided: "Nothing in this title shall be deemed to affect
the criminal or civil liability of channel programmers or cable operators pursuant to the law
of libel, slander, obscenity, [etc.]." S. 66, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 612 (1983); H.R. 4103,
98th Cong., 2d Sess., § 642 (1983) (emphasis added). But the Act as passed, apparently
reflecting concern, contained the additional words, "Federal, State or local" between "the"
and "law" in the text just quoted. C.C.P.A. § 638, 47 U.S.C.A. § 558 (West Supp. 1985).
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Federal, State, and local laws dealing with indecency in cable
television?
Mr. Goldwater. Yes, it does and that is the understanding of the
conferees. Indecency laws are related to laws prohibiting obscenity, and
thus would be covered by the phrase from section 638: "and other similar
laws. " Under this section, Federal, State, and local laws regulating inde-
cency on cable would be preserved. Restrictions on indecent pro-
gramming in a broadcast context have been upheld by the
Supreme Court. For example, the Supreme Court said in FCC
against Pacifica Foundation that indecent speech on radio
could be restricted to certain times of the day in order to pro-
tect children. Such restrictions on indecency-if otherwise constitution-
ally permissible -would not be preempted by this legislation or other
provisions of the Communications Act.
4 0 9
This colloquy was adopted by the conferees as expressing their under-
standing and intent.4 10 Thus, Congress clearly intended not to preempt
state and local regulation of indecent cable television programming.
E. Attempted Federal Preemption of State and Local Indecency Regulations
Would Raise Serious Constitutional Questions
Finally, it is questionable whether Congress constitutionally could
preempt all regulation of indecency by state and local authorities. Just
as the supremacy clause establishes the preeminence of federal law in
the areas of regulation assigned by the Constitution to the federal gov-
ernment, the ninth and tenth amendments establish the preeminence of
state and local law in the reserved areas of local concern.4 '1 If state and
local regulations of indecency "would substantially affect those primary
decisions respecting human conduct which our constitutional system
leaves to state regulation" then "the Constitution requires that the state
rule prevail, even in the face of a conflicting federal rule."'4 12 Awareness
of the constitutional problems which could be created by federal pre-
emption of matters left by the Constitution to the states for local regula-
409. 130 CONG. REC. 14,288 (Oct. 11, 1984) (emphasis added); see also id. at 14,285.
410. 130 CONG. REC. 14,288 (Oct. 11, 1984); see also id. at 14,285.
411. See, e.g., Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-79 (1938); The Federalist
No. 39 (J. Madison) p. 256 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("[L]ocal authorities form distinct and
independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject within their respective spheres to
the [national] authority than the [national] authority is subject to them in its own sphere."
Id.
412. Hannah v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965), (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice
Harlan explained the significance of the Erie decision in terms of constitutionally man-
dated federalism:
I have always regarded that decision as one of the modern cornerstones of
our federalism, expressing policies that profoundly touch the allocation ofjudi-
cial power between the state and federal systems. Erie recognized that there
should not be two conflicting systems of law controlling the primary activity of
citizens, for such alternative governing authority must necessarily give rise to a
debilitating uncertainty in the planning of everyday affairs. And it recognized
that the scheme of our Constitution invisions an allocation of law-making func-
tions between state and federal legislative processes which is undercut if the fed-
eral judiciary can make substantive law affecting state affairs beyond the bounds
of congressional legislative powers in this regard.
Id. at 474, 475.
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tion may be one reason why the Supreme Court has shown
extraordinary caution in applying the doctrine of preemption to state
laws regulating domestic relations.4 13 Thus, preemption is not just a
one-way, pro-federal doctrine; it is a rule of "respect for the separate
spheres of governmental authority preserved in our federalist
system."
4 14
The interests which "indecency regulations" are designed to pro-
tect are interests primarily entrusted to the states to regulate, not to the
federal government. 4 15 The United States is a nation of pluralities.
States and local communities are much closer to their constituencies and
much more accurately reflect the local sensitivities than does the federal
government. Regulations designed to protect standards relating to sex-
ual indecency are more manageable at the state or local level than at the
national level. 4 16 At the national level some voices speaking on appro-
priate sexual programming could not be adequately represented or
would be ignored. These voices would have a more representative influ-
ence at the state and local level.4 17 Local regulations of cable television
programming may withstand constitutional scrutiny even if similar regu-
lations adopted by the federal government would not.
4 18
In recent years the interpretation of the tenth amendment has been
inconsistent. 4 9 However, under any substantial interpretation of the
meaning of the tenth amendment, 4 20 the reasons for deference to local
413. The Court has held that it will not find federal preemption of state domestic rela-
tions laws, unless it is shown that they do "major damage" to "clear and substantial" fed-
eral interests. McCarthy v. McCarthy, 453 U.S. 210, 220 (1981); Hisquierdo v.
Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979); see also Sosnma v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975);
Ohio ex rel Popovich v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383 (1930); Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162,
167 (1899); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1858).
414. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 522 (1981).
415. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 504 (1957) (Harlan,J., dissenting). Thus,
a national commission investigating pornography recently noted "that in our federal sys-
tem primary responsibility for law enforcement has always been with the states. The po-
lice power of the states has commonly been taken to include primary responsibility for
dealing with the very types of harms at which the obscenity laws are directed." 1 Attorney
General's Commission on Pornography, Final Report 374 (1986).
416. See generally Note, Cable Television: The Practical Implications of Local Regulation and
Control, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 391 (1978). Cable television regulation "ultimately functions at
its best when specifically designed to meet local conditions and needs." Id. at 418.
417. This could justify deference to state sovereignty even under the restrictive dicta of
Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Auth.. 105 U.S. 1005. 1018 (1985). See generally Note. On Reading and Using the Tenth Amend-
ment, 93 YALE L.J.723, 35-43 (1984).
418. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985),
overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
419. See generally Harrison, Access And Pay Cable Rates: Off-Limits to Regulators After Mid-
West Video 11?, 16 COLUM. J. & Soc. PROBS. 591, 645 (1981).
420. It might be that federalism suggests not a division of power, but a division of
function. See S. DAVIS, THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE 143, 186 (1978). On a functional basis,
implementation and protection of community values regarding when and how limits upon
the transmission of sexually explicit programming into homes over systems requiring the
use of community resources would be for local, not national, regulation. See also Nagel,
Federalism as a Fundamental Value, 1981 SuP. CRT. REV. 101-09; Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1028-29
(Powell, J.. dissenting) (reviewing history of adoption of tenth amendment and intent of
the framers that the states retain power to regulate matters of local, everyday concern).
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regulation of sexually explicit indecent cable programming could be
even more compelling. 42 1 Thus, the tenth amendment could be inter-
preted as requiring that local laws which further state interests may not
be preempted by inconsistent federal laws.
CONCLUSION
The constitutionality of laws regulating the transmission of sexually
explicit "indecent" programming over cable television is a matter of far-
reaching significance. The federal courts which have directly addressed
this issue have uniformly invalidated state and local laws restricting in-
decent programming on cable television. Legal commentators have
generally endorsed that result. The courts, however, have erroneously
refused to apply the Pacifica doctrine in assessing the constitutionality of
cable indecency regulations.
Applying first amendment analysis, the intrusiveness of the regu-
lated communication must be assessed and weighed against the intru-
siveness of the challenged regulation. Sexually explicit cable
programming is intrusive, because it invades the privacy of the home,
because cable television viewers have no control over the programming,
because of the accessibility of cable television to children, because the
medium monopolizes public resources which could be dedicated to pro-
gramming suitable for the entire community, and because of the vulgar-
ity of the manner of expression.
Insofar as cable television is analytically similar to broadcast televi-
sion and since it involves private exploitation of the public domain,
some regulation of cable television programming is constitutionally per-
missible. Whether any particular cable TV indecency regulation is per-
missible or not depends upon the type of regulation and the context of
enforcement. Assessing the balance of harm to protected interests,
criminal laws banning all nonobscene, but sexually explicit program-
ming from all cable channels probably are not justifiable. Reasonable
regulations which require cablecasters to "channel" or segregate the
time or manner of presenting sexually explicit material are justifiable.
Regulations which merely shift the cost or burden of taking the initiative
from persons who do not want to have sexually explicit programming
intrude into their home via cable television to persons who want to have
access to sexually explicit programming by means of cable television are
justifiable under this analysis, because they provide a better remedy for
the real but often intangible injuries which individuals suffer when unde-
sired, sexually explicit, indecent matter intrudes into their lives and
when they are excluded from full access to mass media.
Finally, Congress and several states have enacted laws designed to
421. The four dissenters in Garcia all predicted that the de minimus content of the tenth
amendment suggested in the majority opinion would not be the final word on the subject.
105 S. Ct. at 1021 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist and O'Connor,
JJ.); id. at 1033 (RehnquistJ., dissenting); id. at 1033 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by
Powell and Rehnquist, JJ.).
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protect the public from the uninvited intrusion of sexually explicit cable
television programming. Federal laws do not preempt state laws regu-
lating indecency. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 explic-
itly reserves the power of state and local governments to regulate and
restrict sexually explicit material to the extent permitted under the Con-
stitution. The scope of authority for state and local governments to reg-
ulate sexually explicit material under the preemption doctrine is
determined under the first amendment: if a cable indecency regulation
is constitutional it is not preempted. If Congress had attempted to pre-
empt state and local indecency laws, it would have triggered serious con-
stitutional questions regarding the balance of powers inherent in our
federal system.

